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ABSTRACT
FROM CHADHA TO CLINTON: THE SUPREME COURT IN LEGISLATIVE
PROCESS-SEPARATION OF POWERS CASES
Christopher B. Brough, Ph.D.
Department of Political Science
Northern Illinois University, 2018
J. Mitchell Pickerill, Director
For nearly fifty years the U.S. Supreme Court’s agenda virtually excluded cases
involving structural-separation of powers issues, and especially those surrounding the legislative
process. But in the early 1980s structural-separation of powers issues where moved back onto the
Court’s agenda, with the Court striking down federal legislation in INS v. Chadha (1983) and
subsequent cases Bowsher v. Synar (1986) and Clinton v. New York (1998). This research
illustrates the ways elected officials benefited from the Court’s reentry into separation of powers
issues, and in fact, how members of Congress and executive officials invited the Court to decide
the cases. While some scholars argue that the Court was exhibiting judicial independence in this
line of cases, it was really acting in the interest, and with the support, of elected elites who had a
range of reasons for accepting the Court’s authority in these cases. Over time, path dependent
forces reinforced the Court’s role in this issue area, and political actors now routinely defer to the
Court’s role in deciding these cases and accept its decisions. While these decisions do not seem
to be explained by the ideology of the justices, they do fit a broader pattern of judicialization and
jurisprudential regimes theory found by law and courts scholars.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
DE KALB, ILLINOIS
AUGUST 2018

FROM CHADHA TO CLINTON: THE SUPREME COURT IN LEGISLATIVE
PROCESS-SEPARATION OF POWERS CASES

BY
CHRISTOPHER B. BROUGH
©2018 Christopher B. Brough

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Doctoral Director:
J. Mitchell Pickerill

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work would not have been possible without the help and support of many
individuals. To my dissertation committee chair and advisor, J. Mitchell Pickerill, thank you for
always pushing to strengthen my research and for your constant encouragement over the last six
years. You always knew when I needed a kick to get motivated. Your knowledge and expertise
have had a profound influence on this dissertation and me as a scholar. I would also like to thank
my entire committee for all of the constructive feedback and suggestions throughout this entire
process: Artemus Ward, Scot Schraufnagel and Jasmine Farrier. Each of you helped shape this
project in important ways. There are also a number of organizations and individuals who were
vital to the completion of this dissertation: Vincent LoVoi, Nathan Gerth and the entire staff at
the Carl Albert Center, Jody M. Brumage and the staff at the Robert C. Byrd Center, and John N.
Jacob at the Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives.
Additionally, I could not have completed this journey without the love and support of my
wife, Li-Yin Liu. You did everything to make sure I only had to worry about finishing, and for
that I am truly grateful and forever in your debt. It would have also been impossible to finish
without the constant support of my Mom and Dad who helped me through all of the good, the
bad and the difficult, and of my brother for helping me get away when I most needed it, whether
that be a long hike or a concert. To my Taiwanese family, thank you for providing me a warm
home in Taiwan. Damir Kovacevic, I could not imagine going through the last six years with
anyone else. Gail Jacky, for all of the hours spent reading through the following pages with me. I

iii
think you have read this dissertation more than I have. To the Support Group, thank you for the
great conversations and even better food. Last and certainly not least, Maxwell Brovacevic. You
sat right by my side as I wrote every page of this dissertation and attacked anyone who came
near me while my back was turned with my head buried in my computer screen. Thanks, little
buddy.

DEDICATION
In loving memory of Nonnie

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................................vii
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................ viii
Chapter
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 1
1. THEORY & RESEARCH DESIGN ........................................................................................ 7
Judicialization, Judicial Authority and Judicial Decision Making .......................................... 14
Supreme Court and Separation of Powers-Legislative Process Cases ..................................... 24
Case Selection and Methods .................................................................................................. 36
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 47
2. CHADHA AND AN EMERGING PATH .............................................................................. 48
Litigation over the Legislative Veto ...................................................................................... 50
Congress and the Legislative Veto ........................................................................................ 58
Presidents and the Legislative Veto ....................................................................................... 68
Law Reviews and the Legislative Veto .................................................................................. 72
Chadha at the Judiciary ......................................................................................................... 80
Discussion............................................................................................................................. 90
3. MR. SYNAR GOES TO COURT ......................................................................................... 96
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings and the Anticipation of Litigation ................................................ 99
Debate and Development of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings ....................................................... 100

Chapter

vi
Page

Vote and Passage of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings ................................................................... 116
Mr. Synar Goes to Court: Gramm-Rudman is Struck Down ................................................ 120
Argument by Congressman Synar and the National Treasury Employees Union.................. 127
Argument by the United States (Executive Branch) ............................................................. 129
Argument by the Comptroller General................................................................................. 131
Argument by the Speaker and Bipartisan Leadership Group, and the Senate........................ 131
Supreme Court Decision ..................................................................................................... 133
Discussion........................................................................................................................... 138
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 145
4. A CONTINUED PATH: CLINTON V. NEW YORK ............................................................ 147
Congressional Debate over Line-Item Veto ......................................................................... 150
Line-Item Veto Act at the Judiciary..................................................................................... 161
Raines v. Byrd ..................................................................................................................... 165
Clinton v. New York ............................................................................................................ 168
Discussion........................................................................................................................... 175
5. CRITICAL JUNCTURES, PATH DEPENDENCE AND THE CHADHA REGIME ........... 178
Critical Juncture, Path Dependence and Judicialization ....................................................... 178
Chadha Jurisprudential Regimes ......................................................................................... 185
Implications ........................................................................................................................ 191
REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................... 195

LIST OF TABLES
Table

Page

1. Legislative Veto Cases in the Federal Judiciary ..................................................................... 51
2. Justices Votes in INS v Chadha (1983) ................................................................................ 189
3. Justices Votes in Bowsher v. Synar (1986) .......................................................................... 189
4. Justices Votes in Clinton v. New York (1998) ...................................................................... 190

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure

Page

1: Supreme Court separation of power cases, per decade ........................................................... 10
2: Critical juncture. ................................................................................................................... 32
3: New issue map. ..................................................................................................................... 33
4: Introduced legislative veto provisions by congressional session, 1973-2017. ......................... 59
5: Legislative veto provisions enacted by congressional session, 1973 – 2017. .......................... 60
6: Committee hearings per Congress, House and Senate, 1973-1985 ......................................... 61
7: Legislative veto discussion in law reviews, 1970 – 1983. ...................................................... 74
8: Law review position on legislative veto, 1975-1983. ............................................................. 74
9: Chadha critical juncture ........................................................................................................ 92
10: GRH House votes by party ................................................................................................ 117
11: GRH House votes: Competitive vs. safe district ................................................................ 117
12: GRH House vote by party: Safe vs. competitive district ................................................... 118
13: Have you heard or read about the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act ...................................... 143
14: Do you understand the term “Gramm-Rudman” well enough to explain to someone? ........ 143
15: Chadha critical juncture and path dependence. .................................................................. 180
16: Percentage (of total words) of Chadha deliberation ........................................................... 183
17: Percentage (of total words) of constitutional deliberation. ................................................. 183

INTRODUCTION
In a 1929 address, President Herbert Hoover announced his desire to obtain control over
executive agency reorganization because of a “failure of congressional efforts over a period of
two decades” (Millett and Rogers 1941, 178). While this (the authority to reorganize executive
agencies) had been a desire of previous administrations, the difficulties presented by the Great
Depression increased attention to the issue. Obtaining reorganization authority at the expense of
congressional power would be a tough sell to members of Congress, but Hoover offered a
compromise. President Hoover “recommended that Congress delegate reorganization authority to
him, subject to the approval of a joint committee of Congress,” and “[i]n 1932, in the midst of
the Great Depression, Congress gave Hoover the authority he wanted. He could submit
reorganization plans to Congress, and they would become law within 60 days unless either house
disapproved” (Fisher 2007, 139). But this disapproval by Congress, better known as a legislative
veto or congressional veto (and in some instances a committee veto), raised serious constitutional
concerns related to separation of powers. Specifically, can Congress alter legislation that has
already passed the carefully designed legislative process that is detailed in Article I, Section 7 of
the United States Constitution through veto.
Even though President Hoover obtained authority over agency reorganization, he was not
comfortable with the check Congress was able to place on his ability to reorganize agencies.
Presidents Eisenhower, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter were all against the legislative veto and
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all, in some instances, vetoed legislation containing legislative vetoes on the grounds that it was
unconstitutional (Tribe 1984, 7). Despite these concerns over the constitutionality of the
legislative veto, it took roughly fifty years for it to be challenged before the Supreme Court.
The invalidation of the legislative veto by the United States Supreme Court in INS v.
Chadha (1983) raises questions about the expansion of judicial authority and its effects. This is
important because there can be consequences for the Court if the justices engage in judicial
review over a new issue area. The Court could lose the support of the politicians in the elected
branches of government if it is seen as the Court overreaching its constitutionally prescribed
authority. Additionally, this has been a vexing issue in literature on judicial power. Given these
possibilities, how does judicial power expand and what effect does this expansion have on the
other branches of government?
One key issue area that can serve as an example to aid in building a theory to explain the
expansion of judicial authority as well as test theories on judicial behavior in the United States is
issues related to separation of powers, specifically those separation of powers issues related to
the detailed process for passing legislation found in Article 1, Section 7 of the United States
Constitution. Supreme Court decisions in this issue area are important because they affect how
government operates at its most important level, the passing of legislation. Yet the most used
models for judicial decision-making based on the ideology of the justices fail to explain the
justices’ behavior in these instances. Additionally, research on the Court places a heavy focus on
the connections between the judiciary and the political majority, often ignoring important
decision-making factors brought about by the political minority.
The general issue of separation of powers has been an important topic of discussion by
political theorists, as it is seen as a key function of the government to protect against tyranny. In
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1690, John Locke discussed separation of powers in Two Treatises of Government, arguing that
“because it may be too great a temptation to humane frailty apt to grasp at Power, for the same
Persons who have the Power of making Laws, to have also in their hands the power to execute
them” (Locke 1988, 364), the legislative and executive branches must be separated. But in
addressing the separation of powers, Locke considers the judiciary part of the legislative branch.
Additionally, in The Spirit of the Law, Montesquieu placed a great deal of importance on
separation of powers, stating that “when legislative power is united with executive power in a
single person or in a single body of the magistracy, there is no liberty, because one can fear that
the same monarch or senate that makes tyrannical laws will execute them tyrannically” (Cohler
et al. 1989, 157).
In notes on Thomas Jefferson’s draft constitution in 1788, James Madison wrote,
The power of the Legislature to appoint any other than their own officers departs too far
from the Theory which requires a separation of the great Departments of Government.
One of the best securities against the creation of unnecessary offices or tyrannical powers
is an exclusion of the authors from all share in filling the one, or influence in the
execution of the other. (Meyers 1981, 38)
And in Publius 47, Madison wrote, “The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and
judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, selfappointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny” (Meyers 1981,
126).
While separation of powers was vital to the Framers’ organization of government,
developments over the course of the twentieth century blurred some of the lines between the
branches with Congress delegating increased authority to the executive branch and executive
branch agencies. Additionally, the Supreme Court remained quiet on the issue, allowing
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separation of powers issues to be dealt with through electoral politics. That is, until the 1980s
when the Court began accepting separation of power cases back onto its agenda.
In 1983, the United States Supreme Court invalidated the legislative veto, a tool that
allowed Congress to invalidate the actions of the executive branch by one House of Congress,
both houses of Congress, or, in some instance, by a congressional committee. This authority had
been used by Congress since the 1930s, but in 1983, the Court ruled that the legislative veto was
a separation of powers violation that ran counter to the precisely described legislative process
detailed in Article 1, Section 7 of the Constitution.
Three years later, the Supreme Court invalidated the Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Act of 1985 in Bowsher v. Synar (1986). Once again, the Court ruled that the legislation
was a separation of powers violation. However, while those arguing against the legislation spent
a substantial amount of time arguing that the legislation violated Article 1, Section 7, the Court
ruled the legislation, in fact, violated the Appointment Clause of the United States Constitution.
And again, in the 1998 case Clinton v. New York, the Supreme Court invalidated the Line-Item
Veto Act of 1996 as a legislative process-separation of powers violation.
Before the decision in these three cases, the Court had rarely decided separation of
powers cases in the previous fifty years. This raises important questions: how are new issues
moved onto the Court’s agenda after a long absence and what are the effects of these decisions.
In the chapters that follow, I will build a theory to explain how judicial authority expands by
moving new issues onto the agenda and test theories that explain the judicial decisions in the
above mentioned cases. I argue that new issues are brought to the Court, specifically separation
of powers-legislative process issues, because of a combination of increased conflicts over the
constitutionality of an issue between the legislative and executive branches coupled with an
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increase in salience among political elites. The Court then engaged in activism and policymaking
as it struck down laws to expand judicial power. In turn, expansion into a new issue area was
accepted by political elites in the form of judicialization that aided in perpetuating path
dependence. The decision then created path dependent dynamics perpetuated through political
elites’ use of judicialization and the Court’s establishment of a jurisprudential regime. In these
instances, members of Congress used the newly created precedent to argue against future
legislation and eventually worked to place the newer issues onto the Court’s agenda.
Chapter 1 discusses the existing theory and relevant debate around how issues are moved
onto the Supreme Court’s agenda and the effects this process has on all three branches of
government. While the existing scholarship properly explains judicial and political elite
behavior, it falls short in relation to separation of powers-legislative process issues. I suggest
there is a combination of factors taking place. First, new issues are moved onto the Court’s
agenda after a conflict and salience increases for a particular issue. Political actors worked to
place the issue onto the Court’s agenda so it could be settled once and for all as conflict
increased among political actors, the political branches of government, and outside groups. This
conflict is different in that it was not partisan conflict but constitutional conflict over a particular
issue –the legislative veto. As the conflict increased, so did the salience over the issue. This was
not salience among the general public, but salience within the government. The Court then
displayed what is argued to be independent policy making behavior but more closely resembles
aspects of political regimes theory and jurisprudential regimes.
In Chapter 2, I analyze the debate over the legislative veto in the 1970s and 1980s. The
analysis illustrates the growing conflict and salience over the issue that led to its invalidation in
INS v. Chadha. Additionally, I argue that the Chadha ruling was a critical juncture, breaking
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from the past, which sent the Court and American politics down a new path. Chapter 3 turns to
analysis of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Act of 1985, better known as GrammRudman-Hollings (hereafter referred to as GRH), and its invalidation in Bowsher v. Synar
(1986). I discuss and illustrate how a minority within Congress used the ruling in Chadha to
argue against the passage of GRH, which perpetuated path dependency through judicialization.
Analysis of this case heavily relies on the personal papers of Rep. Mike Synar (D, OK) who
brought the suit against the legislation. In Chapter 4 I analyze the Line-Item Veto Act of 1996
and its invalidation in Clinton v. New York (1998). Here I further illustrate the role the Chadha
decision played during congressional debate, giving minority members of Congress a judicial
precedent to use in an attempt to block the legislation and protect their institution from further
delegation of power. Again, as is discussed in the Bowsher chapter, a small number of members
of Congress used the Chadha precedent to, at best, block the legislation from passing and to, at
worst, bring about litigation to get the legislation invalidated in court.
Lastly, in the conclusion, I connect all of the case studies together to fully illustrate how
Chadha was a critical juncture by way of placing structural-separation of powers cases back on
the Court’s agenda that then sent the Court and political elites down a path on which members of
Congress used the Court precedent to protect their institution from further delegation. Further, I
discuss how the dominant theories of judicial politics independently overstate their claims but
can be explained through a combination of theories all working together. Thus, theories in their
singular form overstate their explanatory power when it comes to separation of powers issues.
Ultimately, the decision in Chadha established a jurisprudential regime that explains the judicial
decision Bowsher and Clinton.

CHAPTER 1:
THEORY & RESEARCH DESIGN
The United States Supreme Court’s involvement in separation of powers-legislative
process issues is a controversial one. While separation of powers in the broad sense encompasses
any issue that involves one branch encroaching on the constitutional authority granted to another
branch, there are different sub-fields of separation of powers, most notably questions related to
war powers. For the purposes of this study, I will focus specifically on separation of powers
issues that call into question the actions of a political branch in the legislative process that is
detailed specifically in Article I, Section 71 of the Constitution and issues pertaining to the
removal and appointment of officials detailed in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2.2 In other words,
this is a dissertation about federal court cases involving national government processes, not
1

The language of Article 1, Section 7 states: “Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and
the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approves, he shall
sign it, but if not, he shall return it with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall
enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds
of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which
it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such
Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by Yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and
against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House, respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the
President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in
like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it
shall not be a Law.”
2
The language of Article 2, Section 2, Clause 2 states: “He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment
of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.”
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national government powers, which are located in Article I, Section 8 and include taxes,
commerce, and military.
In 1983, the Court invalidated the legislative veto in INS v. Chadha. The legislative veto
was an authority first adopted by Congress in 1932 as a compromise with President Hoover who
was seeking enhanced authority over agency reorganization in light of the Great Depression.
Congress delegated this authority to President Hoover but placed a check in the form of a veto
that either the Senate or House could utilize within 60 days of the presidential action. Although
Congress used the legislative veto relatively infrequently, Congress began placing legislative
vetoes in an increasingly large number of legislation in the 1970s, until it was eventually
invalidated in the Chadha decision for violating the carefully designed legislation process found
in Article I, Section 7.
Three years later in Bowsher v. Synar (1986) the Court invalidated the Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Act of 1985, better known as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (hereafter
referred to as GRH), which set maximum deficit amounts for each fiscal year. Put simply, if the
deficit targets were not met, the Comptroller General was charged with issuing a report to the
president detailing the budget cuts needed to bring the budget under control. In turn, the
president was charged with issuing a sequestration order containing the budget reduction
measures specified in the Comptroller’s report. In Bowsher, the Court invalidated the reporting
section of GRH because of the executive role authorized to the Comptroller and the appointment
clause, which makes the Comptroller’s office a member of Congress. While the Court did not
invalidate the legislation because of an Article I, Section 7 violation, the Court and the parties
before the Court heavily relied on the Chadha precedent.
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Then in 1998, the Court invalidated the Line-Item Veto Act of 1996 in Clinton v. New
York (1998). The Act authorized the president to cancel, in certain situations, spending from bills
after enacting them into law. The legislation raised serious constitutional concerns as a violation
to the separation of powers and the Presentment Clause of the Constitution. Once again, relying
predominantly on Chadha, the Court invalidated the legislation as an Article I, Section 7
violation.
These separation of powers cases are a way of getting to broader questions about modern
judicial behavior. Specifically, how do new issues get moved onto the United States Supreme
Court’s agenda and what effect does the expansion of judicial authority have on the other
branches of government? Second, what explains the decisions by the Court in separation of
powers cases, specifically INS v. Chadha, Bowsher v. Synar, and Clinton v. New York? These
three cases are at the very heart of how government operates and directly impact the policy
making process for both Congress and the president in the United States. This question is
important because, when specifically analyzing separation of powers cases as displayed in Figure
1, there was a gap between the 1940s and 1980s during which the Court adjudicated very few
separation of powers cases.3

3

Data for Figure 1 were collected from the Supreme Court Database, specifically cases coded as Miscellaneous
(legislative veto), Constitution (Article 1, Section 7, Separation of Powers), Constitution (Article 1, Section 1,
Delegation of Powers) and cases that dealt with multiple issue areas but were not labeled as any of the abovementioned issues. For example, Buckley v. Valeo (1978) was coded as a campaign finance case but still had an
important impact on delegation of powers, and A.L.A. Schechter v. US (1935) was coded as economic activity and
interstate commerce. This case also had important separation of power implications not represented in the coding
scheme.
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Figure 1: Supreme Court separation of power cases, per decade.

The gap that began in the 1940s came after the Court adjudicated three important cases:
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (1935), Schecter Poultry v. U.S. (1935), and U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corporation (1936). First, in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (1935), the Court, in an 8 to 1
decision, invalidated the Petroleum Code, which was part of the National Labor Recovery Act of
1933 (NLRA), as a separation of powers violation in the form of an improper delegation of
legislative authority. The Petroleum Code authorized the president to halt shipments of
petroleum produced in violation of state laws. The Court argued that when Congress delegated
this authority, it failed to set rules and standards for the president to follow.
Months later, in Schecter Poultry v. U.S. (1935), the Court was asked if Congress had
unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the president in Section 3 of the National Labor
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Relations Act (NLRA), which allowed for the president to regulate working hours and wages.
The Court, in a unanimous decision, struck down Section 3 of the act as it delegated authority
without any set standards in line with the previous decision in Panama. Then in U.S. v. CurtissWright Export Corporation (1936), the Curtiss-Wright Corporation challenged a joint resolution
of Congress in which a presidential proclamation halted Curtiss-Wright’s weapons sale to
Bolivia. The Court, in a 7 to 1 decision, upheld the joint resolution and congressional action,
arguing that although the president was afforded broad authority under the resolution, there was
an important distinction between presidential authority when it came to domestic and foreign
affairs.
The three rulings in these cases set clear standards for political elites to follow moving
forward. First, to properly delegate authority Congress would have to set clear guidelines on the
powers and authority the branch would be handing over to other government actors. Second, the
Court set a distinction between foreign and domestic affairs when it came to separation of
powers issues. As this period came to a close, there was also a movement by scholars, and as
evidence suggests, some on the Supreme Court argued the judiciary should remain silent on
particular issues and allow for dispute resolution through electoral politics rather than through
the courts (Wechsler 1959, 1954; Choper 2005, 1980). While these cases and arguments were
aimed at economic regulations and federalism issues, this movement coincides with the period
during which separation of powers cases were no longer moved to the Court for adjudication and
is thus important to illustrate the political and judicial climate of the time.
Although the case was about economic regulations and had nothing to do with separation
of powers issues, the Court in the 1938 United States v. Carolene Products Co. decision signaled
through Justice Harlan Stone’s Opinion, in the now infamous Footnote 4, a policy shift away
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from structural cases such as separation of powers to a focus on “prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities” ("United States v. Carolene Products Co." 1938, 152). Although Carolene
Products does not directly relate to separation of powers, specifically issues related to Article I,
Section 7 or Article II, Section 2, the case marked an important point for the Court with a shift in
the focus of cases being moved onto the Court’s agenda that had an impact on other issue areas.
Additionally, the Court’s role, according Justice Stone’s footnote, is the role suggested by legal
scholars who argued that structural issues, such as separation of powers, are best handled through
electoral politics rather than judicial actions (see Wechsler 1954, 1959; Choper 1980, 2005;
Tushnet 1999).
Herbert Wechsler proposed the political safeguards of federalism that asserted “the
constitutional limits on national legislative power would be best enforced through the states’ own
representation in the national political process rather than through active judicial enforcement”
(Keck 2004, 149). While this theory directly speaks to issues of federalism, Jesse H. Choper
(1980) took it a step further to suggest a “Separation Proposal,” which states:
The federal judiciary should not decide constitutional questions concerning the respective
powers of Congress and the President vis-à-vis one another; rather, the ultimate
constitutional issues of whether executive action (or inaction) violates the prerogatives of
Congress or whether legislative action (or inaction) transgresses the realm of the
President should be held to be nonjusticiable, their final resolution to be remitted to the
interplay of the national political process. (Choper 1980)4
Thus, if the Court were to refrain from hearing these types of issues and leave them to the
political process, this would give the Court the role Justice Stone envisioned in Footnote 4.
There is also real evidence that some justices agreed with these theories and put them into
practice from the bench. In Harper et al. v. Virginia Board of Elections et al. (1966), Justice
4

It should be noted that Choper’s claim is broad and general, arguing that the Court should stay out of all structural
questions, including federalism.
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Harlan’s dissenting opinion cited Wechsler’s neutral principles of constitutional law. Later, in
1976, Justice Brennan, with Justices White and Marshall joining, cited Wechsler’s political
safeguards argument in a dissenting opinion. And in 1985’s Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, Justice Blackmun’s opinion of the Court referenced Wechsler and Choper.
This illustrates that, at the very least, there were justices who were in agreement with this role for
the Court, even if it simply served their political agenda. And again, while these cases are not
related to separation of powers, there was still a movement on the Court, for some justices, to let
issues play out through the political process rather than within the judiciary.
Further, this argument is consistent with the political questions doctrine, which argues
that “courts will not decide what the Constitution means; they leave the task of interpreting a
particular constitutional provision to the political branches. . . A political question’s holding
means that the language’s meaning is determined by the Senate [or House], not by the courts”
(Tushnet 1999, 104-105). The Court attempted to define the political questions doctrine in the
Baker v. Carr (1962) decision:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question. (369 U.S. 217)
The doctrine, which “saw its heyday in the New Deal Court and received its highest measure of
devotion from Justice Frankfurter, . . . was perhaps an expression of a wider and deeper mood by
Justices appointed to restore judicial self-restraint and allow the elected governors to govern”
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(Henkin 1976, 625). However, a precisely defined rule for the application of the political
questions doctrine has been the subject of important debate (see Wechsler 1959; Bickel 1961).
Choper’s separation proposal, and others who call for the Court to utilize the political
questions doctrine, suggests a political environment in which those in the legislature and
executive branch are opposed to the Court exercising judicial authority over questions of
separation of powers. However, there are reasons to call their claims into question. First, there
are normative arguments supporting the Court’s role in structural issues and cases. While Choper
and others (see Yoo 1997; Kramer 2000; Clark 2001; Waldron 2006) argue against the Court’s
role in making political decisions, it can be contended that political decisions by the Court are
more democratic because “political motivation on the part of the justices is critical to ensuring
that the Court exercises its power of judicial review in a responsible, legitimate, and democratic
manner” (Peretti 1999, 3). Second, Choper’s argument against the Court’s role in structural
issues is based on an empirical idea that the Court is, according to Alexander M. Bickel (1962), a
counter-majoritarian institution,5 and when the Court is engaged in deciding structural issues, the
justices are preventing elected officials from carrying out the democratic will of American
voters. It is this second point that is of interest in this research.6
Judicialization, Judicial Authority and Judicial Decision Making
While scholars argue that judicial supremacy over particular issue areas is an
unwelcomed obstacle to the authority of political actors, even when the Court is engaged in

5

Alexander M. Bickel (1962) argues that the Court and its judicial review authority is counter majoritarian because
unelected judges are able to overturn legislation that is passed through the democratic lawmaking process.
6
Although the normative debate is important, we need to get the empirics right or else our normative arguments are
based on faulty empirical assumptions.
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judicial review, there is substantial evidence arguing that this is not the case and members of
Congress and the executive branch welcome or work to get their policy goals affirmed by the
judiciary. As Keith Whittington (2007) explains, research often approaches topics of judicial
authority as if the judiciary is under threat, but there may also be opportunities in which the court
can offer political actors solutions to important problems. One approach that explains how
separation of powers was moved to the Court’s agenda is the “judicialization of politics” as
discussed by Ran Hirschl (2007) or “juridification” as discussed by Gordon Silverstein (2009).
Research into the judicialization of politics argues that “strategic legal innovators – political
elites who have compatible interests – determine the timing, extent, and nature of constitutional
reform” (Hirschl 2007, 12). Thus, one of the keys to the judicialization of politics is the bringing
about of constitutional change by political elites in concert with the judiciary: constitutional
change in the interpretative sense, in that, the language of the Constitution is not altered but the
understanding of a particular clause or provision is adapted to legitimize a particular policy goal.
However, when it comes to separation of powers-legislative process decisions in the 1980s and
1990s, the Court was not bringing about constitutional change but blocking it, which is precisely
what Silverstein discussed in his brief case study of these judicial decisions, instances in which
the Court said no to constitutional change.
For example, and as I discuss in greater detail in Chapter 3, with GRH, Congress worked
to pass legislation to bring the budget deficit under control through automatic cuts that would be
triggered if target deficit amounts were not reached. While those challenging the legislation
argued that it was unconstitutional and urged for the legislation to be examined by the judiciary,
those in favor of the legislation were supportive of this move so the Court would legitimize their
policy goals. However, once the legislation was before the Supreme Court, the justices ruled the
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Act was unconstitutional. Thus, the Court said no to the constitutional change the congressional
majority was attempting to bring through the passage of the legislation.
Silverstein’s work suggests there are multiple reasons why political elites move issues to
the judiciary and different patterns for constitutional change. As for reasons for juridification,
political elites take this course of action to sidestep political or institutional barriers. However,
that does not mean it always leads to political gain. Additionally, there are two patterns for
juridification: constructive and deconstructive. Constructive patterns occur when political elites
and members of the judiciary work together for a similar policy outcome. In deconstructive
patterns, policy makers attempt to build on gaps left behind from the judiciaries’ invalidation of
pieces of legislation. No matter the pattern taken, there are instances in which the Court says yes
(meaning the Court upholds the new government action by Congress or the president) and aids in
bringing about constitutional change and instances in which the Court says no (meaning the
Court invalidates the action by Congress or the president) and forces political elites to continue
to follow the status quo.
Ultimately, judicialization and juridification come down to judicial authority and political
actors’ willingness to give up authority to the courts. As Whittington (2007) argues in relation to
reconstructive presidents (but can also be connected to Congress):
The judiciary and the presidency are not simply static entities with potentially conflicting
preferences. They are also competing and dynamic institutions struggling for the
authority to define the nature of the political regime. The basis for that authority is
granted in the Constitution, but the extent of that authority is subject to historical action.
The politics of reconstruction hinges on the ability of the president to bolster his authority
to define the new regime and to wrest control over the definition of the constitutional
order from other political actors, including the judiciary. This contest for authority
determines presidential power to reshape the political future and judicial authority to
intervene in political affairs. (Whittington 2007, 76)
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Thus, it is up to the politicians to decide how much and to what extent they want the judiciary to
have authority over a particular issue area. When it comes to instances of judicialization, political
actors are handing over authority to the judiciary to decide the outcome with the hope that the
decision will come out in their favor.
Additional research on inter-branch relations and how issues are moved to the Court’s
agenda focus on the many important roles the Supreme Court plays when exercising judicial
review, which further calls into question Choper’s separation proposal. First, there are instances
when judicial review is welcomed by members of Congress (see Graber 1993; Lovell 2003;
Whittington 2005, 2007). Judicial review can provide important information that shapes future
deliberation in Congress (Rogers 2001; Pickerill 2004) and can insulate politicians from having
to make decisions that may prove dangerous for reelection (Graber 1993, 36). Additionally, the
Court does not have a monopoly on shaping constitutional meaning. Through constitutional
dialogue all three branches of government engage in shaping constitutional meaning both before
and after the Court acts on particular issues (see Fisher 2007, 1988, 1978).
Conflict also plays an important role as to when and why issues are moved to the Court
and judicialized. As John Ferejohn (2002) explains, judicializing politics comes when the
legislature is too divided to bring about a solution to a problem and when the courts are able to
act on the matter. Most notably, issues are moved to the Court so that national norms can be
imposed on regional outliers (Klarman 1997, 1996). For example, settling of conflict between the
national norm and regional outliers can be found with racial segregation in 1954, the death
penalty in 1972, abortion in 1973, affirmative action in 1978 and sexual orientation in 1986
(Klarman 1997).
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But congressional acceptance for judicial review to settle conflict suggests that the
majority within Congress is expecting an outcome that is favorable to their cause. As Keith
Whittington (2007) explains, “For the Court to compete successfully, other political actors must
have reasons for allowing the Court to ‘win’” (Whittington 2007, 26), meaning the authority to
decide the issue is moved to the judiciary. Thus, “[t]he president, among others, must see some
political value in deferring to the Court and helping to construct a space for judicial autonomy”
(Whittington 2007, 26). But how independent is the Court in situations when Congress and
political actors are deferring to the judicial branch for legislative clarity or as a bargaining chip?
Regimes theory offers a strong argument to explain the behavior of the Supreme Court by
asserting claims that run opposite to the counter majoritarian difficulty. Building on Robert
Dahl’s (1957) argument that “the policy views on the Court are never for long out of line with
the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United States” (1957, 285),
regimes theory postulates that the Court’s decision making is in line with a political regime in
power or the regime that appointed the justices to the Court. Through the judicial appointment
process, the system “encourage[s] cooperation between judges and political leaders to obtain
common objectives” (Whittington 2005, 584). In a broader sense, “in the literature of American
political development, a regime defines a period marked by a combination of political content
and the particular ways in which federalism and separation of powers operate in practice”
(Richards and Kritzer 2002, 307; see also Orren and Skowronek 1998-99)
The political regimes approach is used to analyze the Court and decision making within
the larger political and legal system. Under a political regimes theory framework, “the meaning
of ‘the law,’ particularly in cases going to the Supreme Court, is contingent upon the views and
relative relationships of institutionalized actors who make up the political system or political
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regime at any given time” (Clayton and May 1999, 234). The political regimes approach
attempts to bridge the gap between the attitudinal model and those who argue that the Court roots
its decisions in normative legal criteria, arguing “a justice may believe that individual institutions
are themselves embedded within, and draw meaning from, the larger political regime” (Clayton
and May 1999, 244).
Political regimes theory does not simply rest on the behavior of the judiciary but also
affects the behavior of politicians. Politicians in a dominant political regime will support judicial
review and judicial supremacy to advocate for their preferred policy preferences or on issues
they cannot publicly favor (Graber 2008). To an extent, this relates to arguments found in
comparative courts literature claiming that judiciaries are empowered as an insurance policy for
the political regime in power. In this research, courts are only afforded the authority of judicial
review after a second political party emerges that begins to challenge the dominant regime (see
Ginsburg 2003).
Regimes theory additionally accounts for judicial expansion. For example, in the late 19th
century, activist judges attempted to pursue a conservative agenda but were politically motivated
by other political actors (see Gillman 2002). Thus, political regimes theory illustrates an alternate
take on judicial and political behavior that accounts for judicial attitudes but argues that there are
different motives than simply believing judges make decisions based on their own policy
preferences or strategic behavior to maximize their policy goals. But there are instances when
this theory cannot explain judicial outcomes, where the Court appears to be engaged in
independent policy making.
An additional theory connected to political regimes is jurisprudential regimes (see
Richards and Kritzer 2002). Within the jurisprudential regimes framework, the “law at the
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Supreme Court level is found in the structures the justices create to guide future decision
making: their own, that of lower courts, and that of non-judicial political actors” (Richards and
Kritzer 2002, 306) and not in the precedent that courts creates. This research illustrates how
jurisprudential regimes do not strictly determine the outcome of a case, but they establish the
relevant case facts and level of scrutiny to be used in the decision making process. This research
does not completely remove the justices’ attitudinal position when deciding a case, but places it
as one factor along with the law that matters in decision making. But there are those who argue
against this theory. Segal and Spaeth (2003) suggest that jurisprudential regimes are simply
byproducts of the justices’ policy preferences. However, further analysis of jurisprudential
regimes has found “only weak evidence that major Supreme Court precedent affect[sic] the way
the justices themselves vote in subsequent cases” (Lax and Rader 2010, 282).
Whereas the above discussion of regimes theory suggests the Court will follow the
dominant regime when issuing decisions that are salient, there are those who suggest the Court
will engage in independent policy making when deciding less salient issues (Gillman 2008). The
impact of salience on the Court is an important area of research that argues salience does have an
impact on the behavior of justices or the Court as an institution (Epstein and Segal 2000; Rohde
1972; Segal and Spaeth 2002; Wahlbeck et al. 1998, 2000). For example, the Chief Justice is
more likely to assign the opinion to a justice who is similar to his ideology, but when salience is
low, the Chief Justice is more likely to assign the opinion to a colleague more distant to his
ideology (Wahlbeck et al. 2000, 51). As it comes to salience and regimes theory in this context,
we might then expect to see the Court engage in independent policy making in cases that relate
to salient issues but can be spun in a way that addresses them from a less salient angle. For
example, when the Court invalidated the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993 in
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Printz v. United States (1997), it did not do so on Second Amendment grounds that would have
been a highly salient issue for the public. Instead the Court invalidated the Brady Bill on
federalism grounds, which is less important to the average American citizen (Pickerill 2004).
There are four explanations for why we might find the Court engaging in independent
policy making from a political regime. First, because judicial appointments typically hinge on
the salient issues of the time, we might expect to see judges then act independent of the political
regime when it comes to issues of less salience. Second, there may be political conditions that
allow for more independent policy making by the Court, such as periods of divided government
due the lack of a concise voice to push the agenda. Third, independent policy making occurs, in
part, because of American political development, which could explain why a quasi-dependent
institution is able to act independently. Fourth, independent policy making could suggest the
institution itself gives the judges a sense of purpose and responsibility different from other
political actors (Gillman 2008).
As Thomas Keck (2007b) found, partisanship and ideology (the attitudinal model) do not
explain many of the cases in which the Court invalidated legislation during the “Ginsburg
Court,” specifically separation of powers-legislative process cases.7 This led him to suggest there
are perhaps regime politics dynamics or a sense of duty to the institution that influences justices’
decisions. Additionally, Matthew Hall’s (2011) study found that the Court can engage in
independent policy making when the decisions can be easily implemented by lower courts. The
same can be said for separation of powers issues; the Court can issue an opinion that clearly
spells out what is acceptable for the other branches of government. These separation of powers
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Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth (2002) argue that the attitudinal model “holds that the Supreme Court decides
disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the justices. Simply put
Rehnquist votes the way he does because he is extremely conservative” (2002, 86).
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cases allow the Court to act as a referee over the other branches in an attempt to uphold the
constitutional structure that was so vital to the Framers when creating the American political
system.
While the justices may often rule in line with their ideological or partisan coalition in the
legislature, “[a]t other times the justices might well act on their own constitutional
understandings even when those understandings are not shared by political leaders or when their
expression is not desired” (Whittington 2005, 585). This is evident when looking at the Court’s
handling of habeas corpus cases, which illustrates how in recent decisions the Court has acted
independent of the larger political coalition to which it is attached. Instead of upholding
conservative legislation aimed at enemy combatants involved in the War on Terror, the Court,
composed of a majority of Republican appointees, ruled against its conservative counterparts,
striking down much of the enacted legislation aimed at taking rights away from enemy
combatants (Wert 2011). These studies suggest there is something other than ideology and
partisanship taking place in Supreme Court decision making. There are institutional and legal
factors that in the right situations outweigh the ideological preferences of the justices and allow
the Court to act independently.
But more specifically, separation of powers is not generally considered an attractive or
salient issue to the general public as it does not have a direct impact on their daily lives.
Additional evidence to illustrate the non-salience of separation of powers to the average citizen
comes from studies on the American voter, if we approach this as a voting choice scenario. Three
conditions must be met to influence voter choice: “1) The issue must be recognized by the voter.
2) The issue must evoke some degree of preference for one policy solution over another. 3) The
voter must believe that one candidate is more likely to work for the voter’s preferred policy

23
solution” (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008, 163). It is difficult to find a way to structure a separation of
powers issue into this framework.
Furthermore, there are reasons the Court may refrain from making certain decisions in
connection to the public. First, the Court may refrain from making a decision if the justices
believe it will be highly unpopular. Second, the Court may refrain from making certain decisions
if it can be perceived as being “inappropriate on procedural rather than substantive grounds”
(Baum 2006, 64). Third, the Court may refrain from a decision because it wants to keep it
ideologically in line with public opinion. As a former justice remarked, “We read the newspaper
and see what is being said – probably more than most people . . . We know if there is a lot of
public interest; we have to be careful not to reach too far” (quoted in Clark 2009, 973). Decisions
on separation of powers remove these factors because issues dealing with separation of powers
have little impact on citizens’ daily lives. Any decision in this issue area may be largely ignored.
Separation of powers is not ideological but procedural. Second, separation of powers cases are
rarely seen as inappropriate. The Court, as a political branch, was created as the watchdog over
the legislative and executive branches. This is precisely the type of issue people would expect the
Court to be engaged in, although there are those who would argue differently and call for the
Court to focus on civil liberties and civil rights and abandon deciding separation of powers cases
(see Choper 1980). Last, separation of powers cases are removed from ideological debates and,
for these reasons, aid the Court in acting independent in separation of powers cases.
While I have focused the above discussion on the Court’s role as a decision maker on
constitutional issues, that is not to say the Court has a monopoly on separation of powers issues
(see Fisher 2007, 1988, 1978), although research into congressional decision making, like
research on the Court, focuses on the partisan behavior of members of Congress. The seminal
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works on congressional decision making illustrate how members of Congress are single minded
seekers of reelection (see Mayhew 2004) who do not take the Constitution into account when
making voting decisions (see Kingdon 1989). If members of Congress are only concerned with
reelection, then they would not be concerned with the authority they retain or delegate to other
branches of government as long as they can win reelection. Over time the delegation of
congressional authority became more pronounced and was evident in the role Congress played in
the political system. As Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein explain, “the absence of
regard for the institution among its leaders diminished Congress in the constitutional scheme and
encouraged more unilateral and less responsible behavior by the executive” (Mann and Ornstein
2009, 53). This behavior is made more evident when looking at Congress’ attempt to delegate
away key budgetary authority in the 1980s and 1990s (see Farrier 2004, 2010, 2016).
While research on congressional behavior illustrates how members are not concerned
with the Constitution in their decision making, the United States’ system of government allows
for sharing authority when it comes to constitutional interpretation. Under the theory of
‘“coordinated dialogue,’ the President and members of Congress have both the authority and the
competence to engage in constitutional interpretation, not only before the courts decide but after
as well” (Fisher 1988, 231). As the following chapters will detail, most members of Congress do
not typically concern themselves with constitutional issues, but there are those who make it a
central theme in their arguments to protect key powers within their institution.
Supreme Court and Separation of Powers-Legislative Process Cases
The aforementioned literature on judicial authority and behavior, while connected, fails
to properly account for why this issue area was moved to the Court’s agenda, the behavior of the
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Court, and/or the effects of the decisions in separation of powers-legislative process cases in the
1980s and 1990s. During this period, the Court invalidated widely popular legislation by a mixed
ideological coalition on the Court. By this I mean both liberal and conservative justices joined in
the majority decision. While Choper’s argument is normative, there is evidence that some of the
justices had adopted it at least for federalism cases.8 If this separation theory was adopted by the
Court and other political actors, then the issue would have been decided through electoral
politics rather than by the Court or, at the very least, the Court would have proclaimed it was a
political question and refused to reach a verdict.
Additionally, while Silverstein argues that these cases fit into his framework, there is
more to unpack that cannot be done in the single chapter he spent discussing this issue,
especially when it comes to illustrating the path dependent dynamics taking place (see Epp
2010). With path dependency I am speaking about how past decisions and/or choices have an
effect and influence on future decisions and events.9 As I illustrate in the chapters that follow,
while a large bipartisan majority was attempting to move these issues to the Court to further
validate their creative policy proposals, in each instance there was a small, but vocal, minority
attempting to move the issue onto the Court’s agenda to protect the constitutional authority given
to the institution. However, the motivation of the advocates for and opponents of the legislation
was less a political/policy fight and more about the constitutionality of the legislation. Advocates
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As previously discussed, Justice Brennan cited Wechsler’s “political safeguards of federalism” argument in his
dissenting opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery (1976). Justice Blackman cited both Choper and Wechsler
in his opinion of the Court for Garcia v. San Antonio Transit Authority (1983), which overturned the Usery ruling.
9
For the purposes of this project, I borrow Pierson’s (2004) definition of path dependence, which he explains as
“social processes that exhibit positive feedback and thus generate branching patterns of historical development”
(2004, 21), with positive feedback being the results of the behavior or decisions becoming increasingly attractive as
the institution continues down the path (2004, 20). Additionally, conflict takes place through “a dominant political
coalition successfully fending off all attempts by minorities to alter the political course” (Peters et al. 2005, 1278)
within path dependent situations.
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and opponents both willingly accepted the Court’s role in determining the outcome to settle the
Constitutional issues being presented. This suggests a third motivation; constitutional conflict
judicialization. Under constitutional conflict judicialization theory, political elites who both
support and oppose legislation will openly advocate for the constitutional argument/questions to
be settled by the judiciary once and for all. Additionally, once the Court decides the issue,
opponents of future legislation will further attempt to move similar questions to the judiciary to
settle constitutional conflict. This leads to political elites placing an increased focus on
institutional duty in their rhetoric, rather than political or ideological purposes, in an attempt to
move issues onto the Court’s agenda to block creative policy making that would result in the
institution delegating important constitutional authority.
As for decision making, the dominant models that focus on partisanship and ideology fail
to explain the judicial outcomes. Keck (2007a) suggests that the decisions in Chadha, Bowsher,
and Clinton might be explained through political regimes theory or possibly a sense of duty the
justices have that comes from the institution. With regard to political regimes theory, we would
expect to see the Court make a decision that furthers the interests of the dominant regime, and
there are multiple ways this can be accomplished. However, if there is strong support for the
policy, then we would expect to see the Court uphold the legislation. I will discuss in greater
detail throughout this project that there was substantial support within Congress for the
legislation that was invalidated in the 1980s and 1990s, even in the face of allegations the
legislation violated separation of powers, which suggests that regimes theory fails to explain
these decisions.
When considering the Court as an independent policy maker, there are many aspects of
these cases that point to the Court as an independent policy maker. However, if this were the
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case, why did it take the Court as long as it did to place these issues on its agenda? For example,
legislative veto was an authority Congress had used since the 1930s, and the executive branch
routinely spoke out against its use. It was not until 1983 that the Court officially issued a ruling
on congressional power. Additionally, while small, there was an outspoken group of political
elites urging the Court to make the decisions it made. As will be illustrated throughout this
project, the Court appeared to wait until there was sufficient conflict and could find support for
its arguments from a large enough coalition so its decisions would not be attacked and/or
possibly overturned.
Ultimately, while political regimes, duty, and independent policy making fail to explain
the Court’s decision in Chadha, I will illustrate how jurisprudential regimes theory explains the
decisions in Bowsher and Clinton. Jurisprudential regimes theory directly relates to path
dependency and juridificiation. As the Court established a jurisprudential regime in Chadha
through the settling of constitutional conflict between Congress and the executive branch, the
justices set the stage for how separation of powers issues would be discussed and adjudicated in
the future. Members of Congress then used the language of the Court to move future
constitutional questions to the judiciary rather than decide them through electoral/partisan
politics. The juridification of separation of powers then led to more questions being moved to the
Court, which perpetuated path dependency and helped further solidify the Chadha jurisprudential
regime.
As Kathleen Thelen (2003) points out in her discussion of institutional evolution, the
Court is a perfect institution for examining critical junctures and path dependency.10 The Court
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Critical junctures are defined as “brief moments in which opportunities for major institutional reforms appear,
followed by long stretches of institutional stability. Junctures are ‘critical’ because they place institutional
arrangements on paths or trajectories, which are then very difficult to alter” (Pierson 2004, 134-135).
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focused on structural issues in the nineteenth century and shifted to minority rights and
individual freedoms in the twentieth century. I seek to further this argument and illustrate how
the latter end of the twentieth century marked a return to these structural issues that were so
prominent during the early years of the republic. The decision in Chadha was the first case in
nearly fifty years in which the Court engaged in judicial activism in separation of powerslegislative process issues. In other words, it marked the return to structural issues that were
largely abandoned in the 1930s and 1940s, creating a critical juncture that altered the direction of
politics in the United States.
Much has been written about the Court and path dependency because of the justices’
reliance on precedent to decide cases. Research illustrates how there is path dependence in law
when judges act consistently over time (Che and Yi 1993; Kornhauser 1992; Niblett 2013).
When it comes to courts of last resort, such as the Supreme Court, studies illustrate how they are
less likely to display path dependent behavior because their unique position allows them to
change policy (Kahn 2006; Segal and Spaeth 2002), whereas lower courts and legislative bodies
are more strongly confined to follow precedent that has been set (Songer et al. 1994; Segal and
Spaeth 1996). But when the Supreme Court gives a broad and emphatic no, it is harder for the
Court to break from the path it has set, especially in the short term. Most notably, Silverstein
(2009) illustrates the path dependency of law and its effects on politics in these same cases
(Chadha, Bowsher, Clinton) but focuses on the Court’s formalistic use of the law.
My research adds to this long line of literature to first illustrate the role of constitutional
deliberation in Congress through analysis of congressional floor debate and committee hearing
transcripts, how it aids in perpetuating the path dependency that takes place within judicial
decision making, and how members of Congress who oppose legislation used this deliberation to
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judicialize separation of powers-legislative process issues to protect their institutions from
further delegation. Additionally, while in typical path dependent situations a political majority is
fending off a minority, in these case studies I will illustrate how the political minority (those who
opposed the legislation, both liberal and conservative) working with the judiciary was able to
fend off a political majority (proponents of the legislation) from taking corrective action. With
the decisions favoring the political minority, the Court was, to some degree, engaging in antimajoritarian behavior.
It is important to understand that “designers ‘do not want their’ agencies to fall under the
control of opponents and given the way public authority is allocated and exercised in a
democracy, they often can only shut out their opponents by shutting themselves out too. In many
cases, then, they purposely create structures that even they cannot control” (quoted in Pierson
2000, 262). The study of separation of powers-legislative process cases is the perfect example of
this behavior. Members of Congress and the executive branch were in dispute over certain
aspects of legislation that were altering the constitutionally mandated legislative process. Rather
than solve the dispute themselves, political elites turned to the Court to resolve the issue.
Additionally, members of the majority and members of the executive branch welcomed this
approach as they believed the judiciary would validate their preferred policy goals.
Additionally, there is more to critical junctures than simply illustrating an opportunity for
institutional reform, it is just as important to understand what precedes a critical juncture to
properly understand the implications of a critical juncture (see Soifer 2012). There are critical
antecedents, permissive conditions, and productive conditions that help explain how and why a
critical juncture occurred (see Figure 2). Critical antecedents are defined as “factors or conditions
preceding a critical juncture that combine in a causal sequence with factors operating during that
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juncture to produce a divergent outcome” (Slater and Simmons 2010, 889), and are important
because they acknowledge conditions that precede the critical juncture that play a causal role on
the outcome (Slater and Simmons 2010; Soifer 2012, 1576). During the critical juncture, there
then must be permissive and productive conditions. Permissive conditions are factors that alter
the current path an institution is following and increase the possibility that the path will be
broken.11 Whereas productive conditions are factors that shape the outcome of a critical
juncture.12
A critical juncture and path dependency framework that examines the importance of what
prompts a critical juncture is just as important as the juncture itself and will be used to argue that
new issues move onto the Court’s agenda after increased action by a political majority upsets the
established constitutional norms, creating conflict. By conflict, I am discussing disagreements
between political actors over a particular policy. The conflict I analyze in the following chapters
is different in that political elites, while concerned with the policy goals the legislation promoted,
focused the conflict on the constitutional issues rather than the policy goals. Congress’s
increased incorporation of legislative veto provisions in legislation reached a point where the
Court was essentially forced to intervene in Chadha. The judicial decision to invalidate the
legislative veto then acted as a critical juncture that resulted in path dependency. Path
dependency came in the form of what I call protective judicialization, a vocal minority of
political elites who engaged in judicialization to protect their institutions’ authority from being
further delegated to other branches of government. Protective judicialization is different from the
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Permissive conditions are defined as “those factors or conditions that change the underlying context to increase
the causal power of agency or contingency and thus the prospects for divergence” (Soifer 2012, 1574, italics in
original)
12
productive conditions as “the aspects of a critical juncture that shape the initial outcome that diverge across
cases” (Soifer 2012, 1575, italics in original).
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type of behavior discussed by Hirschl (2008, 2007, 2004) and Silverstein (2010, 2009) in which
political elites attempt to further their policy goals through the judiciaries’ positive rulings that
further and entrench their policy goals. As for the decision-making aspect, I will illustrate that
what appears, at first glance, to be independent policy making more closely resembles a
jurisprudential regime in which the Court set a standard in the Chadha decision that in return
shaped debate and judicial decisions in cases that follow.
As I seek to further understanding of how and why judicial power expands and the effects
of that expansion, I make a two-part argument. First, I argue that a new issue is moved onto the
Court’s agenda when there are increased challenges to constitutional norms by a political
majority that creates a conflict over a particular policy issue – that issue, in this instance, being
separation of powers-legislative process issues. The Court decision then creates a new judicial
precedent. Second, I argue that the new precedent creates a jurisprudential regime that brings
about path dependent dynamics because political elites engage in judicialization in an effort to
use the new precedent to protect their institution from further delegation of power. Additionally,
the new precedent gives incentives for political minorities to use the precedent in future debate
when further conflict arises. The use of the legal language in debates is a key aspect of
Silverstein’s juridification, in which political actors use legal language in debate. This two-step
process is further detailed in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Critical juncture.

As Figure 3 displays, this all begins with a period in which there is a status quo for the
type of behavior being displayed by political actors. For separation of powers, the status quo was
for the Court to remain silent, effectively deferring the issue to the elected branches of
government to settle. This resulted in members of Congress pushing the boundaries of what was
constitutionally acceptable when it came to the increased use of the legislative veto. When the
judiciary did step in, at the very least, it issued narrow rulings that left the veto upheld in all
other instances. This then led to political actors increasing their behavior by way of issuing more
legislative veto provisions, which brought about further constitutional objections.
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Uphold status quo

Yes

Court intervenes, invalidates
majorities challenges to
constitutional/institutional norms?

No
Uphold status quo

Yes

Constitutional deliberation based on
new precedent mixed with attempts
to challenge new precedent?

No

Yes

Uphold status quo

Political elites push issue to
judiciary to settle conflict over
actions by the majority?

No
Uphold status quo

Yes

Court upholds and reinforces
precedent?

No
Return to previous
status quo.

Yes

Creation of new status quo - Path
Dependence

Figure 3: New issue map.

Because of the increased conflict, the Court then intervened and had the option of setting
a new precedent or upholding the previous status quo. With Chadha, the Court set a new
precedent that marked a critical juncture and brought about a new path, which suggests
institutions follow a path based on the decisions and behavior of institutional actors. Critical
junctures occur when the path or trajectory of an institution is broken by some type of shock to
the system and the institution starts down a new alternative path. After the Court intervened and
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struck down the legislative veto, political elites engage in constitutional debate, while the
political majority attempted to return to the previous status quo behavior with the passage of
GRH. Political elites then pushed the issue to the judiciary to have the debate settled once and for
all in the Court. The Court then upheld the new precedent set in Chadha, creating a new status
quo. And it is important to note, as is displayed in Figure 1, the institutions can return to the
previous status quo at any stage along this path.
In terms of this case study, separation of powers-legislative process cases were virtually
absent from the Court’s agenda for nearly fifty years. During this period, it was the status quo for
these issues to be resolved through electoral politics. However, there was an increased effort by
members of Congress to test the limits of the legislative process through the passage of an
increasingly large number of bills containing legislative veto provisions (as will be illustrated in
the following chapter). This created political conflict, which can be defined as situations when
“challengers contest authorities over the ‘shape’ and governance of ‘institutionalized systems of
power’” (Morrill et al. 2003, 393). But this conflict is different than the typically discussed
conflict that leads to the Court exercising its judicial review authority (see Ferejohn 2002;
Klarman 1997, 1996). Under the conflict theoretical approach, as discussed by John Ferejohn
(2002) and Michael Klarman (1997, 1996), the increased debate over the constitutionality of the
legislative veto made it more likely that the court would step in to resolve the issue.
The Court engaging in the debate and settling the issue marked a critical juncture for the
Court and the other political branches of government. Critical junctures are defined as “brief
moments in which opportunities for major institutional reforms appear, followed by long
stretches of institutional stability. Junctures are ‘critical’ because they place institutional
arrangements on paths or trajectories, which are then very difficult to alter” (Pierson 2004, 134-
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135). Outcomes from these critical junctures are then reinforced through feedback that comes
from the behavior of political actors during that particular moment in time (Pierson and Skocpol
2003).
Just as Keck (2002) discussed with the post-New Deal period for the judiciary, the
Chadha case offered several paths for the justices to take. First, the Court could have remained
silent on the issue and let the lower courts handle the issue. Second, the Court could have issued
a narrow decision striking down the legislative veto as applied to this particular case, leaving the
overall constitutionality of the veto intact as the lower federal courts had already done in several
instances. Third, the Court could have called it a political question and made a political
safeguards argument. Fourth, the Court could have heard the case and crafted a deferential
doctrine for the Court’s role in these matters. But the Court addressed the issue head on and
broadly invalidated the legislative veto in the Chadha decision. While the decision on the
legislative veto in Chadha had very little impact on congressional behavior as to legislative veto
style provisions (see Fisher 1993), there were important consequences that shaped congressional
behavior in future instances through the establishment of a jurisprudential regime. Thus, I will
illustrate how this created a critical juncture, adding new issues to the agenda that would have an
impact on the political branches for many years to come.
This juncture then resulted in path-dependent dynamics over the next twenty years with
the Court reinforcing and furthering the Chadha decision. Further, I illustrate how, over time,
path dependent forces reinforced and entrenched the Court’s role in this issue area and political
actors now routinely defer to the Court’s authority in deciding these cases and accepting its
decisions. Analysis also demonstrates the importance and impact constitutional deliberation in
the legislative process has on the judiciary and ultimately the judicial outcome. Lastly, I suggest
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there is another side to constitutional conflict judicialization. In asking for protection from the
judiciary, the political minority, or opponents to legislation, gave the Court the final authority on
separation of powers-legislative process issues and in return limited congressional policy making
efforts in the future when it came to creative policy choices, specifically in this instance with
budget and deficit policy making and reform.
Case Selection and Methods
In choosing cases, I selected the legislative veto and its invalidation in INS v. Chadha
(1983), the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Act of 1985 and its invalidation in Bowsher
v. Synar (1986), and the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 and its invalidation in Clinton v. New York
(1998). As previous research has illustrated (see Keck 2007b), these cases can be labeled as
deviant from an ideological and partisan perspective and crucial when analyzing these cases
from an independent policy making perspective. John Gerring (2008) states that “[t]he deviantcase method selects that case(s) which, by reference to some general understanding of a topic
(either a specific theory or common sense), demonstrates a surprising value. It is thus the
contrary of the typical case” (2008, 655). Because deviant cases are only deviant in that models
fail to properly explain them, “the primary purpose of a deviant-case analysis is to probe for
new–but as yet unspecified–explanations” (Gerring 2008, 656). Or as Alexander L. George and
Andrew Bennet (2005) state, deviant cases “can be useful for heuristic purposes of identifying
new theoretical variables or postulating new causal mechanisms” (2005, 81). Thus, the end-game
is to identify causal factors that not only explain the cases selected for this study, but are also
applicable to other cases. In this instance, the standard models of decision making fail to fully
explain their outcome, with each being decided by a large, mixed ideological coalition (see Keck
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2007b) and with the Court invalidating legislation that was supported by large bipartisan
majorities in Congress. Large judicial coalitions are larger than a minimum winning coalition.
Additionally, mixed ideological coalitions consist of members who are both liberal and
conservative justices.
On the other hand, crucial cases are defined as cases “that must closely fit a theory if one
is to have confidence in the theory’s validity, or, conversely, must not fit equally well any rule
contrary to that proposed” (Eckstein 1975, 118). Cases labeled as crucial can either be mostlikely or least likely. Most-likely cases are “one[s] that, on all dimensions except the dimension
of theoretical interest, is predicted to achieve a certain outcome, and yet does not. It is therefore
used to disconfirm a theory” (Gerring 2008, 659). Conversely, least likely cases are “one[s] that,
on all dimensions except the dimension of theoretical interest, is predicted not to achieve a
certain outcome, and yet does so. It is therefore used to confirm a theory” (Gerring 2008, 659).
Analyzing these cases under a crucial case framework will either illustrate that these judicial
decisions were instances of independent policy making (least-likely), meaning there is a
complete absence of political influence, or it will illustrate that these judicial decisions are
influenced by politics and thus not instances of independent policy making (most-likely).
The benefit of combining these two types of case selection methods allows for not only
disproving theory, but also building theory. However, it must be noted that there are many who
argue these two forms of case selection are problematic because of selection bias, selecting cases
based on the dependent variable.13 Collier and Mahoney (1996) offer an example, explaining that
when analyzing “revolutions, the onset of war, the breakdown of democratic and authoritarian
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See Goertz and Mahoney (2012, 178-179) for a discussion of literature that claims selecting on the dependent
variable is problematic.
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regimes, and high (low) rates of economic growth” (1996, 57), the outcome is already known
and this creates a bias in the research. But as Barbara Geddes (1990) states, it “is not to say that
studies of cases selected on the dependent variable have no place in comparative politics. They
are ideal for digging into the details of how phenomena come about and for developing insights”
(1990, 149). Choosing cases based on the dependent variable is problematic when the purpose of
the research is to study the outcome, which is already known. In this instance, the purpose of the
current study is to analyze the process to better explain why and how the outcome was achieved.
To ensure that cases were not left out that deal with separation of powers during this time
period, specifically Article I, Section 7 issues, I utilized the Supreme Court Database to select
cases that specifically dealt with separation of powers-legislative process issues. Although the
database is widely used, it is not without problems. First, the database is not reliable for cases
coded specifically as separation of powers. Additionally, the coding of these cases may not be
reliable, with many criticizing the issue area and judgment coding (see Keck 2007b; Landes and
Posner 2009; Shapiro 2009). For example, in A.L.A Schechter Poultry v. United States (1935),
the Court was asked to determine if the National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutionally
delegated legislative authority to the president. Rather than labeling the case a delegation case or
a separation of powers case, the database labels the case issue areas as economic activity and
interstate commerce. Second, the database only goes back to 1946, which leaves out the period
of time when the Court shifted its agenda from structural issues (separation of powers and
federalism) to a rights-based agenda.
To overcome these shortcomings, I analyzed of all Court decisions categorized as
“miscellaneous” to isolate the specific cases dealing with separation of powers-legislative
process. Second, to locate decisions prior to 1946 and cases that may have been mislabeled in the
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database, I conducted a search of Westlaw using a keyword search of Supreme Court decisions
(separation of powers, delegation) and content analysis to locate cases in this issue area. The
process produced a total of five cases between 1980 and 2000.14 Of these cases, three stand out
as having significant importance and will be the focus of this research: INS v. Chadha (1983),
Bowsher v. Synar (1986), and Clinton v. New York (1998). There is also a scholarly consensus
about these cases being significant. For example, Silverstein (2009) illustrates the path
dependence that came from the Court’s formalist approach to the decisions, and Farrier (2004)
illustrates how the legislation at issue in Bowsher and Clinton are important instances of
Congress attempting to delegate away their constitutional authority. Additionally, the remaining
cases, while having to do with separation of powers and delegation are not of the specific subset
of cases that dealt directly with the legislative process.
In Chadha the Court invalidated the use of the legislative veto by Congress. Bowsher
builds on the Chadha decision, invalidating the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Act of
1985 because the authority delegated to the Comptroller General was executive in nature and,
thus, violated separation of powers. Later, in Clinton, the Court invalidated the Line Item Veto
Act for violating separation of powers and, more specifically, the Presentment Clause of Article
I. These three cases will serve as the basis for the research in the following chapters and will be
conducted through a multi-method approach consisting of archival research, legislative histories,
interviews, and analyses of secondary sources.
The additional two cases, Mistretta v. US (1989) and Metro Washington Airport
Authority v. Citizens (1991), where excluded from this study because they do not address
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questions of the legislative process. Mistretta was excluded because the legislation in question
created a sentencing board that was to be a part of the judiciary. In Metro Washington Airport
Authority, the creation of a review board that transferred authority from Congress to the District
of Columbia was challenged and struck down as a violation of separation of powers. Thus,
neither of these two cases presented an issue that related directly to the legislative process.
To build a theory and illustrate how judicial authority expands when new issues are
moved to the Court’s agenda and the effects when the Court embraces new issue areas, I
conducted research through an American political development (APD)/historical institutional
framework. As Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek (2004) explain, “political development is a
durable shift in governing authority” (Orren and Skowronek 2004, 123). With governing
authority meaning “the exercise of control over persons or things that is designated and
enforceable by the state,” shifts meaning “a change in the locus or direction of control resulting
in a new distribution of authority among persons or organizations within the polity at large or
between them and their counterparts outside,” and durable meaning that “the distribution of
authority is not fixed, and that its stability or change in any given historical instance must be
regarded as contingent” (Orren and Skowronek 2004, 123). With a focus placed squarely on the
United States rather than being comparative with other countries, APD allows for research into
change and how it comes about in one single country so researchers can gain a fuller
understanding of how government and politics develop and change over time.
Just as APD embraces a historical approach to gaining an understanding about how
politics develop, historical institutionalism sets out to study “institutional arrangements over time
to identify order and change in politics and they search for patterns in successive combinations
of old and new elements” (Orren and Skowronek 2004, 79). Thus, applying a historical
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institutional approach to APD means there is a focus on the institutions rather than the individual
actors. This does not mean that individuals will be ignored. It is individuals who make up these
institutions, and it is their behavior that is of importance in how they influence and impact the
institutions.
APD proposes three methodological propositions. The first is that when political change
takes place, it happens with a pre-established system with rules and actors that are in operation,
or as Orren and Skowronek (2004) call it, “site” (Orren and Skowronek 2004, 20). The purpose
of this proposition is the “placement of time and space” (Orren and Skowronek 2004, 20) within
the research agenda. As has already been noted, the site of this research consists of the period
between the 1980s and 2000. The actors being studied consist of political actors within Congress,
the executive branch, and the Supreme Court, and the rules consist of the legislative process
found in the Constitution under Article 1, Sect. 7.
The second proposition states, “Sites of political change are characterized by ‘full’ or
‘plenary’ authority; rules and agents designated to enforce them cover the territory, however it is
defined” (Orren and Skowronek 2004, 22). The authority in this research shifts throughout the
site, beginning with Congress assuming full authority over the legislative process and attempting
to alter the predetermined legislative process. The rules, however, change over time with the
Court limiting the actions of Congress and establishing a new order on how authority will
operate.
The third and final proposition states, “Political change ultimately registers its
developmental significance in altered forms of governance” (Orren and Skowronek 2004, 24).
Put another way, this third proposition seeks the “changes in how people are governed” (Orren
and Skowronek 2004, 25). This methodological proposition will be illustrated through analysis
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of how Congress and the Court as institutions have changed over time because of the Court
precedent that was set in Chadha.
Within an APD/historical institutional framework, this research will be a mix of two
types of case studies: heuristic and theory testing (see Lijphart 1971; Eckstein 1975; George and
Bennet 2005). Heuristic case studies are performed with deviant cases (as discussed above) and
“inductively identify new variables, hypotheses, causal mechanism, and causal paths” (George
and Bennet 2005, 75). Whereas “[t]heory testing case studies assess the validity and scope
conditions of single or competing theories” (George and Bennet 2005, 75).
While APD and historical institutional research does not typically discuss research
methodology in terms of dependent and independent variables, I think it is important to set out
the factors I analyzed in an effort to build a theory that explains how new issues are placed onto
the Court’s agenda and what effects these decisions have. These factors were operationalized in
more general terms rather than through precise definitions that are the standard in much of
quantitative research.
Through historical and archival analysis, I focused on four factors. For the legislative
veto, my analysis in relation to these factors begins in 1970 and continues until its invalidation.
This period of time illustrates how the veto authority shifted and became more frequent. Analysis
of GRH begins with its introduction in Congress and continues until it was invalidated by the
Court. Last, analysis of the line-item veto only consisted of the debate over the passage of the
Line-Item Veto Act and does not cover earlier attempts to pass line item veto legislation.
First, the presence or existence of a vocal congressional minority working to halt the
government action is the opposition and includes members of both parties. Thus, I am describing
opposition to the legislation that included both Republicans and Democrats. Even though all
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three congressional actions being studied were supported and/or passed with bipartisan support,
the presence of a vocal congressional minority is important to illustrate the conflict present in
Congress regarding the passage of the legislation or government action. Opposition for the
legislative veto is less evident because all members of Congress were in favor of the veto power,
but is especially true when considering the behavior of the Court as either a part of regime
politics or an act of independent decision making by the judiciary. Information on this variable
came from analysis of congressional records, floor debates, committee hearing transcripts,
archival documents from personal papers and government archives (memos, speech,
correspondence), Congressional Research Services (CRS) reports, and newspaper editorials
drafted by members of Congress. Analysis of these materials not only illustrates if a minority is
working to block the legislation, but more importantly, it helps detail what types of tactics and
what types of deliberation the members of Congress engaged in. Specifically, are members of
Congress who are in the minority using political arguments or engaging in constitutional debate.
The second factor I analyzed is the executive branch’s stance on the issue, which includes
the president and other executive branch agencies. The executive branch position illustrates
whether the president and executive branch were working with the political majority passing the
legislation or if the president was siding with the political minority on the issue. For the
executive branch position, archival documents (drafts of speeches, internal memos, and
correspondence), public statements, campaign speeches, and signing statements were analyzed.
The archival documents illustrate not only the executive branch’s stance on the issue but also
how committed the president and the executive branch were to fighting for or against the issue.
Additionally, just as with members of Congress, was the executive branch focused on the
political or constitutional arguments.
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The third factor I analyzed is outside government groups’ support for political elites who
opposed the congressional action – primarily, the legal community but also the general public.
As detailed previously, there are reasons to consider the legal community as an important
audience not just to judges but also to members of Congress and the executive branch, as they
are experts in their field. Information on this variable was collected from law review articles and
newspaper editorials. As for the general public, information was collected through polling data to
illustrate the level of salience for these issues.
The fourth factor I analyzed is the use of Supreme Court precedent. This variable cut
across all categories as I sought to understand how government officials and members of outside
groups used previous Court precedent to make their case against or in support of the particular
issue. Even if political elites, like members of Congress, are speaking in legal terms through the
use of Court precedent in their arguments for political reasons, it is still illustrating how law
shapes politics. Using legal arguments and Court precedent in this way shaped the arguments
being made.
From analysis of these variables, I illustrate how many of the models overstated their role
in the process and argue that independent policy making is influenced and conditioned by regime
politics – meaning, independent policy making increases when there is a coalition of political
elites that provides protection for the Court. To accomplish this goal, I analyzed archival
documents, legislative histories, and Court documents and conducted interviews to find evidence
of political actors actively attempting to give the Court a role and place separation of powerslegislative process cases on the Court’s agenda. While there are instances in which politicians
come straight out and say that the Court should have a role in or decide the case, for the most
part political actors engaged in signaling that was subtler than an outright endorsement. There
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are a number of ways politicians can accomplish this, but most notably it happens through the
reference of case law during the deliberative process.
I analyzed legislative histories and debates from the Congressional Record and
committee hearing transcripts to find evidence of members of Congress using arguments based
on constitutional issues and precedent rather than political partisan arguments. Arguments
grounded in Court decisions and constitutional arguments illustrate that members of Congress
are at some level taking the Constitution seriously, while also providing signals to judges and the
Court through the use of precedent. More importantly, arguments against legislation in these
instances based on constitutional issues mean there is a political coalition united by
constitutional arguments rather than ones grounded in partisan politics that can provide the Court
political protection against any attempts of retribution from the majority who supported the
legislation. Additionally, I conducted archival research of executive branch documents from the
Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Jimmy Carter Library, and Ronald Reagan Library to
analyze how each administration dealt with issues related to the legislative veto, and for Reagan,
his administration’s stance on GRH.
For members of Congress, I collected archival documents from Rep. Mike Synar’s
personal papers at the Carl Albert Center and Sen Robert Byrd at the Robert C. Byrd Center for
Congressional History and Education. Inter-office memos and draft documents were analyzed to
identify how members and their staffs were discussing the constitutional issues involved in the
legislation and how those issues shaped their statements during floor debates, committee
hearings, and interviews. Additionally, letters received from and addressed to constituents
highlight how members of Congress were engaging with their voting base and the impact these
constitutional issues had on their correspondence. Overall, I used archival documents from
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congressional members’ personal papers to find evidence of how they engaged in and used Court
precedent, the effects previous cases had on their decision making, and how they attempted to
place this issue area onto the Court’s agenda.
From Court documents and archival documents from the Powell Archives Online hosted
by Washington and Lee University School of Law, I illustrate how the Court referenced the
arguments made by members of Congress and other political actors. Finding references by the
Court to political actors’ constitutional arguments against the legislation in Chadha, Bowsher,
and Clinton provided evidence that the Court was influenced by, or at the very least concerned
with, political elites. Specifically, when analyzing documents related to Chadha, I first analyzed
Court archival documents from Buckley v. Valeo (1976) where Justice Byron White declared his
support for the legislative veto in a concurrence and dissenting opinion. The Court had not yet
addressed this issue, and I make the argument that White’s opinion in Buckley was both a signal
to members in Congress that the legislative veto was constitutionally acceptable and also a
contributing factor to the Court adding separation of powers-legislative process cases back onto
its agenda. Further, I analyzed debates over the implications of the decision in Chadha and to
what degree the Court wanted to get back into separation of powers-legislative process issues. In
the subsequent cases, Bowsher and Clinton, I analyzed the Court documents to illustrate the
influence Chadha had over these decisions. Findings the Court built on Chadha and the
precedents it had set gave further weight to the critical juncture aspect of the Chadha decision
and the path dependent dynamics of the precedent in future cases.
I then also conducted interviews with Alan B. Morrison, the attorney who won in Chadha
and Bowsher, but lost in Byrd v. New York, and Vincent LoVoi, legislative director to Mike
Synar. These interviews supplemented the findings in the archival documents to gain a better
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understanding of how these issues were placed onto the Court’s agenda and the effects these
decisions had on the political landscape. These interviews were conducted with IRB approval
from Northern Illinois University, and the interviewees gave approval to be named in the study.
Conclusion
As noted throughout this chapter, research into Court-Congress relations details a great
deal about the behavior of members of Congress and the judiciary and when and why members
of Congress looked to the Court to settle debates. I did not set out to discredit those who have
come before but to illustrate how the accuracy of existing scholarship is overstated when it
comes to separation of powers issues dealing with the legislative process in these three case
studies. The key issue is that these theories rely on ideology and partisan politics. While ideology
and partisanship are present, they are less pronounced because of the nature of the problems
being confronted in these instances – specifically, the problems are not political but are
procedural.

CHAPTER 2:
CHADHA AND AN EMERGING PATH
In 1983, the Supreme Court invalidated the use of the legislative veto by Congress in
Immigration and Nationalization Services v. Chadha, a tool Congress had been using without
any significant legal challenge for over fifty years. The legislative veto was an authority used by
Congress to nullify administrative action by the executive branch, passed by a majority but not
requiring the signature of the president. As I have already reviewed in the previous chapter, there
were strong normative arguments against the Court adjudicating structural issues such as
separation of powers cases. Additionally, there is evidence that members of the Court accepted
this argument as they routinely referenced these assertions in Court opinions. However, in a
heavily criticized decision, the Court struck down the use of the legislative veto and nearly 200
pieces of legislation with it. Senator Carl Levin (D, MI) was quoted as arguing that “[t]his
decision is going to cause a lot of conflict and chaos” (quoted in Wheeler 2008, 83-84). Rep.
Elliott Levitas (D, GA), who was one of the biggest champions of the legislative veto, described
the Court’s decision as a “train wreck” (quoted in Craig 1990, 233).
While it can be argued that Congress has essentially ignored the Court ruling and has
continued to utilize legislative veto style provisions to this day,15 the Court’s invalidation of
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For more on this topic see Louis Fisher (2005). Instead of legislative vetoes, Congress has used joint resolutions
and informal methods to accomplish the same goals. Additionally, although Congress continues to place legislative
vetoes in legislation, presidents continue to sign them into law and argue in signing statements that they are
unconstitutional and carry no force of law. However, as will be detailed later, Congress has not acted on any of these
legislative veto provisions.
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congressional action in a separation of powers-legislative process cases is an important moment
for the Supreme Court, members of Congress and the executive branch. This chapter will first
discuss the early attempts to invalidate the legislative veto to illustrate the impact these early
failures had on setting up the case in Chadha. Second, I analyze how presidents dealt with and
handled the legislative veto provisions to detail how, over time, the executive branch became
more forceful in its attempts to stop Congress from including veto provisions in legislation.
Third, this chapter examines the importance of Justice Byron White’s concurrence and dissent in
Buckley v. Valeo (1976) and the impact it had on congressional debate. I then move on to discuss
how Congress debated legislative veto provisions over the years and how the inclusion of veto
provisions increased in number after the Buckley decision. Next, I analyze the debate that took
place in the legal community over the legislative veto through analysis of law review articles.
Legal academics are an important audience for justices on the Supreme Court, and these
publications will help shed light on influences in the justices’ legal reasoning.
Finally, I discuss the Chadha case, analyzing the briefs presented to the Court, the oral
argument and the judicial opinions by the Supreme Court. All of this analysis illustrates how
Chadha is a critical juncture, breaking from the previous path by placing a separation of powerlegislative process cases back on the Court’s agenda and invalidating legislation. Understanding
a critical juncture is more than detailing the specific point that broke the path. Discussing and
analyzing the congressional debates, law review articles, and presidential behavior illustrates the
political climate of the time that necessitated this issue’s placement on the Court’s agenda.
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Litigation over the Legislative Veto
Legislative vetoes are a congressional authority that allows Congress to veto executive
branch rulemaking. Veto provisions are included in the language of a bill that passes through
Congress and is signed into law by the president. Depending on language, legislative veto could
come from the House, the Senate, or a committee and is exercised by Congress after the
legislation has been passed into law. Prior to Chadha, the Supreme Court had not directly
confronted the legislative veto, and even though the veto had been an authority exercised by
Congress since the 1930s, lower federal courts had only begun to discuss and rule on the issue in
the latter half of the 1970s. Alan Morrison, the attorney who represented Jagdish Rai Chadha in
his suit, recalled that he had not heard about of the legislative veto before 1976; “Indeed,
although there had been a part of Buckley v. Valeo, . . . I had only the faintest recollection of that
and never saw it as a particular problem—indeed the Court never reached that question in that
case” (quote in Marcus 2009, 71).
Table 1 displays the cases in which the Supreme Court had an opportunity to address the
constitutionality of the legislative veto in some way and outcomes regarding the veto in those
cases leading up to its invalidation. Chadha was not the first or only instance of the legislative
veto before the courts; there are numerous instances in which the federal judiciary had the
opportunity to invalidate its use.
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Table 1
Legislative Veto Cases in the Federal Judiciary
Case

Decision Date

Court

Legislative Veto Outcome

Buckley v. Valeo
(424 U.S. 1)

Jan. 30, 1976

Supreme Court

Majority did not discuss the legislative
veto issue. Only discussed by Justice
White in concurrence and dissent. White
argued that in most instances the
legislative veto is constitutional.

Clark v. Valeo
(559 F.2d 642)

Jan. 21, 1977

D.C. Circuit Court

Legislative veto challenge dismissed as
unripe.

Atkins v. United States
(556 F.2d 1028)

May 18, 1977

U.S. Court of
Claims

Narrow decision upholding the
constitutionality of the legislative veto.

Nixon v. Administrator
of General Services
(433 U.S. 425)

June 28, 1977

Supreme Court

Court did not address the legislative veto
issue.

McCorkle v. United
States
(559 F.2d. 1258)

July 26, 1977

Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit

The challenge to the legislative veto
provision was not decided because the veto
provision was not severable from the
President's power to fix salaries.

Chadha v. INS
(634 F.2d 408)

Dec. 22, 1980

9th Circuit

Legislative veto violates the separation of
powers doctrine.

Supreme Court

Legislative veto found to be
unconstitutional because the practice is
essentially legislative and thus subject to
the constitutional requirements of passage
by a majority of both Houses and
presentation to the President.

INS v. Chadha
(462 U.S. 919)

June 23, 1983

Buckley v. Valeo (1976) was the first instance of the Supreme Court and the federal
judiciary mentioning legislative vetoes, but the Court refrained from ruling on its
constitutionality. Buckley questioned the legality of legislation drafted in the wake of the
Watergate scandal that attempted to remove corruption from political campaigns through
restrictions on campaign contributions to candidates. This legislation created the Federal Election
Commission (FEC), which was charged with enforcing the new rules. The central question
before the Court was whether the limitations placed on campaign contributions were a violation
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of the First Amendment’s freedom of speech and association, but it also questioned the
constitutionality of the FEC’s and Congress’s ability to directly appoint members.
Although the Court did not address the veto, it was still a highly debated topic by both
parties in their briefs. In Buckley, the Attorney General (the appellee) argued that officers of the
FEC are not executive but legislative and, therefore, are subject to congressional oversight. In
this instance, the Attorney General argued that the legislative veto is constitutional simply
because it is not subjecting the executive to the veto, but also members of its own branch:
Plaintiffs also have argued that the “legislative veto” provided for in Section 438(c) is
unconstitutional. Whatever constitutional issues might be posed were this a provision for
a one-house legislative veto by the executive branch, the Commission is an arm of
Congress, so that the “legislative veto” established by Section 438(c) is simply one means
by which Congress controls its own instrumentality. It is not an attempt by Congress to
control the executive branch or an executive officer, nor is it a method by which
Congress or the Commission can change the law without presidential participation.
("Brief for the Attorney General as Appellee and for the United States as Amicus Curiae"
1977, 111-112)
Thus, Congress has oversight authority because the FEC was a congressional agency. If the
Commission was of executive function and nature, then the use of the legislative veto over the
Commission would have been a constitutional violation.
The Appellants’ conceded to the point that the FEC was an arm of Congress “because of
its method of appointment and Congress’ reservation of veto power over its rules” ("Reply Brief
of the Appellants" 1977, 6). However, as the Appellants’ brief stated:
Congress has no plenary power, exercisable other than “by law,” with regard to the
federal electoral process, nor do the so-called historical “precedents” offered by the FEC
support any such argument. . . An agency charged with enforcing a critical area of
substantive federal civil and criminal law through interpretative and substantive
rulemaking, advisory opinions, investigations, hearings and civil-enforcement actions
consists of officers of the United States; thus presidential appointment and Senate
confirmation are constitutionally required. . . Astonishingly, Commission counsel
disavows powers which the Commission has already exercised and is exercising today.
And Congress’ vigorous use of its veto power to protect incumbent advantages vividly
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demonstrates why an arm of Congress may not be crowned czar, with vast discretionary
power, over the political process. ("Reply Brief of the Appellants" 1977, 6-7)
For the Appellants, the FEC, as an arm of Congress, would have the authority to utilize the
legislative veto. However, the powers afforded to the FEC were executive in nature and, thus,
could be given to executive agencies and not legislative agencies. And as for the rule making
function of the FEC, “If the Commission can validly make rules, those rules have the force of
law and are binding on the population. Since Congress has reserved to itself (and is vigorously
exercising) the power to veto such rules, 2 U.S.C. §438(c), the rules become effective essentially
as actions by Congress itself” ("Reply Brief of the Appellants" 1977, 97). By this, the
Appellants argued that the actions taken by the FEC are legislative and must follow the
constitutionally prescribed process.
These points were also briefly discussed before the Court during oral arguments, but
when it came to the ruling in Buckley, the Court did not take up the issue in the majority opinion.
However, in a concurrence and dissenting opinion, Justice Byron White stated his acceptance of
legislative vetoes: “I am also of the view that the otherwise valid regulatory power of a properly
created independent agency is not rendered constitutionally infirm, as violative of the President’s
veto power, by a statutory provision subjecting agency regulations to disapproval by either
House of Congress” ("Buckley v. Valeo" 1976, 284). Although the parties before the Court
spent very little time discussing this issue in their briefs and the majority opinion completely
refrained from discussing legislative vetoes, Justice White took it upon himself to declare that it
was his belief that the legislative veto was constitutionally sound:
I would be much more concerned if Congress purported to usurp the functions of law
enforcement, to control the outcome of particular adjudications, or to pre-empt the
President's appointment power; but in the light of history and modern reality, the
provision for congressional disapproval of agency regulations does not appear to
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transgress the constitutional design, at least where the President has agreed to legislation
establishing the disapproval procedure or the legislation has been passed over his veto.
("Buckley v. Valeo" 1976, 285-286)
While this was only one paragraph out of a lengthy decision, it can be viewed as a cautionary
message to the executive branch to not challenge the legislative veto as long as Congress
continues to use it as it has been.
When drafting the opinions for Buckley, the Justices of the Court expressed their
concerns and asked Justice White to either write separately on this issue or completely remove it
from his opinion all together. In the early draft stages of the opinions, in a memo from Justice
White to Chief Justice Burger, White discussed that he was still wrestling with the legislative
veto issue, stating, “I should add, however, that if the commissioners had been appointed in
accordance with Article II, it is likely that I would not find constitutionally suspect the limited
congressional veto of commission regulations which the statute provides. I am not wholly at rest
on that question” (White 1975). But after seeing Justice White’s inclusion of language regarding
the legislative veto in his opinion, the other justices were not comfortable with its inclusion.
Chris Whitman, a clerk for Justice Powell, drafted a memo addressing concerns about
White’s discussion of the legislative veto, stating:
I would urge you also too [sic] concur in Justice White’s opinion, were it not for the
legislative veto discussion. I think the discussion of the ‘legislative veto’ is too simplistic.
It turns on the argument that the President has the power to veto the bill that provides for
the legislative veto and that power is sufficient to protect the interest of the Executive.
But what happens if the President vetoes the bill and Congress passes it over his veto? Is
White devising a new test for constitutionality dependent on whether the bill was
approved by the President or passed over his objection? If not, could Congress approve a
bill over a Presidential veto that, say, set up a commission to regulate interstate
commerce by regulations and rules subject to a legislative veto? This would take all
power over the particular field out of the hands of the Executive permanently. (Whitman
1975)
To this, Justice Powell wrote in the margins, “yes.”
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Justice Rehnquist circulated a memo stating, “The reason that I would not decide the
question of the one House veto, which Byron would decide, is that it is not necessary to decide it
in view of the resolution of the appointment issue, and I think it is a sufficiently doubtful and
multi-faceted question that we should not express a view upon it before we are required to do so”
(Rehnquist 1975). Later, Justice Potter Stewart echoed these concerns, arguing, “I should
suppose that if these drafts are consolidated, the consolidated versions would simply not deal
with the one House veto question, and that Byron would set out his views on that issue in a
separate opinion, which any of the rest of us would, of course, be free to join” (Stewart 1975).
Justice Powell also weighed in on the discussion in a memo to the Court, stating, “My
one reservation (at the moment I think it is my only one of substance) relates to the ‘legislative
veto’ issue. I would prefer Potter’s suggestion that we save this for another day. If we must
address the issue, I am not yet persuaded by Byron’s view” (Powell 1975). Despite these
concerns by his brethren on the Court, Justice White left the language regarding the legislative
veto in his final draft opinion, and as it will be illustrated, White’s statements were used in
support of legislative vetoes during congressional debates.
It was after the Buckley decision that Alan Morrison, who co-founded the Public Citizen
Litigation Group with Ralph Nader in 1972, became interested in the legislative veto. Morrison
and the Citizen Litigation Group in Clark v. Valeo (1977) attempted to take on the issue of the
veto found in the FEC that had not been decided in Buckley. As Morrison recalled when he had
first heard about the veto, “This seemed to me to be complete insanity from a political science
perspective—and also unconstitutional. Because I remember from fourth grade civics or fifth
grade that the Congress passes a law, you have to have two houses and the president” (quoted in
Marcus 2009, 72).
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Morrison’s argument was based on three parts that called for the veto to be found
unconstitutional no matter how it was approached: “if it’s Legislative, it violates the Presentment
Clause because it didn’t go through two houses and the president. If it’s executive, it violates
separation of powers because Congress can’t do this. And if it’s Judicial and they’re vetoing it,
as in overruling it, it violates Article III because only judges can do it” (quoted in Marcus 2009,
73-74). However, the Court ruled on procedural grounds, in a per curium decision, that the
parties lacked Article III standing. The Justices returned the case to the District Court with an
order to dismiss.
That same year, in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services (1977), the Supreme Court
again had the chance to rule on the constitutionality of the legislative veto but remained silent on
the topic. In the “Preliminary Memorandum” to the Justices, the only mention of the legislative
veto came in the form of a footnote, stating:
The SG believes that the provision for a “one-house veto” in § 104(b) of the Act is an
unconstitutional attempt by Congress to participate in the detailed administration of the
Act (citing separation of powers and Art. 1, § 7, cl. 3). But the SG says that that provision
is not an issue here, since appellant does not challenge it and claims no right under the
regulations disapproved by the Senate. (Preliminary Memorandum 1976, 7)
And in the Supreme Court opinions, the legislative veto was only discussed in Chief Justice
Burger’s dissent as a question that should be left for later cases: “If and when the one-House veto
issue, for example, comes before us, are we to accept the opinion of the Department of Justice as
to the effects of that legislative device on the Executive Branch’s operations?” ("Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services" 1977, 521).
That very same year the legislative veto was also challenged in the United States Court of
Claims. In Atkins v. United States (1977), federal judges brought suit against Congress for
additional compensation, claiming the legislature had failed to increase their salary during a
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period of inflation under the Tucker Act. In addition to ruling that Congress had not violated the
compensation clause, the Court of Claims narrowly ruled that the one-House veto contained in
the Salary Act was constitutional:
The only ‘one-House veto’ we have before us is that contained in section 359(1)(B). The
only instance of its use that is before us occurred in S.Res. 293, which disapproved the
whole of the President’s recommendations. We are not to consider, and do not consider,
the general question of whether a one-House veto is valid as an abstract proposition, in all
instances, across-the-board, or even in most cases. ("Atkins v. United States" 1977, 241)
Ultimately, after analysis of the relevant constitutional provisions, the Court of Claims ruled that
“[t]he case before this court does not involve any of the powers enumerated in article II, and we
do not see how any of such powers are infringed by this legislative veto” ("Atkins v. United
States" 1977, 259). This marked an important moment for proponents of the legislative veto. For
the first time a court was directly upholding the use of the veto, even if on very narrow grounds.
In 1981, the Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit found the legislative veto to be
unconstitutional in Chadha v. INS (1981). Judge Anthony Kennedy, writing for the Court, argued
We cannot accept that definite, uniform, and sensible criteria governing the conferral of
government burdens and benefits on individuals should be replaced by a species of
nonlegislation, wherein the Executive branch becomes a sort of referee in making an
initial determination which has no independent force or validity, even after review and
approval by the Judiciary, save and except for the exercise of final control by the
unfettered discretion of Congress as to each case. The defects of this procedure are
aggravated by the unicameral aspect of the statutory mechanism and the deficiencies of
that procedure preclude justifying congressional action as a separate and independent
way of adjudicating the status of aliens outside the executive and judicial processes. In
such a world, the Executive's duty of faithful execution of the laws becomes meaningless,
as the law to be executed in a given case remains tentative until after action by the
Executive has ceased. ("Chadha v. INS" 1981, 435-436)
It was this ruling that was then appealed by the INS to the Supreme Court in 1983, where the
decision was upheld in a seven to two vote, invalidating the use of the legislative veto and nearly
200 pieces of legislation with it.
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Chadha will be discussed in further detail later in this chapter, but it is important to first
understand members of Congress, presidents, and legal academics in relation to the legislative
veto. In following section, analysis of these actors illustrates how and why the Court invalidated
the legislative veto after nearly fifty years of use and provide greater insight into the effects the
Chadha decision ultimately had on legislative, executive, and judicial behavior in the twenty
years that followed.
Congress and the Legislative Veto
Although the legislative veto had been, for the most part, an acceptable tool used by
Congress since the 1930s, as the 1970s progressed into the 1980s, the number of bills introduced
and passed containing legislative veto language increased substantially until the veto was
invalidated by the Court in the Chadha decision. Figures 4 and 5 provide results for legislative
veto provisions using key word searches of legislation introduced and passed from 1973 to 2017
(93rd to 114th Congresses) in Congress.16 Figure 4 displays results of bills introduced by
Republicans, Democrats, and the total number in Congress from 1973 to 2017. The Buckley
decision and Justice White’s opinion were released in January of 1976. As is illustrated, the
number of pieces of legislation in Congress with legislative veto provisions increased
substantially starting during the period from 1977 to 1983 before it started to decline.
Additionally, there was a substantial increase in veto provisions being introduced during the
congressional session immediately leading up to the Chadha decision in 1983. While the
decision in Chadha did not completely end members of Congress introducing bills containing

16

Data for Figure 4 and Figure 5 were collected using key word searches on thomas.gov for “congressional veto,”
“legislative veto,” “one-house veto,” and “committee veto” to identify individual pieces of legislation that contained
one or a combination of these terms.
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veto provisions, there is a clear decline in the years following and a complete end beginning in
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Figure 4: Introduced legislative veto provisions by congressional session, 1973-2017.

Similarly, Figure 5 displays the results of legislation that successfully passed through
Congress. As illustrated, zero veto provisions passed from 1973 to the early part of 1977, but
substantially they increased up to 1983 before declining later that year after the Court’s Chadha
decision. While there is a noticeable difference between Republican and Democratic legislation
passing during this period, it would be unwise to conclude that this was the result of partisan
fighting over the legislative veto itself, but simply a result of a dominant Democratic majority in
both chambers for much of this period. Democrats held a majority in the House for this entire
period and in the Senate for every Congress but the period from 1981 to 1985.
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Number of Veto Provisions Enacted
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Figure 5: Legislative veto provisions enacted by congressional session, 1973 – 2017.

There is a clear increase in legislative veto provisions leading up to the Court’s decision
to invalidate it, specifically after White’s Buckley opinion and discussion of the issue in lower
federal courts. Committee hearings also illustrate this point. Figure 6 displays results for
committee hearings in the House and the Senate from 1973 to 1985 (the 93rd to 98th
Congresses).17 As displayed, there was a steady increase in discussion over the legislative veto
leading up to its invalidation in 1983. As expected, as the number of bills containing veto
provisions increased, so did the number of committee hearings. It is also important to note that
despite legislative veto provisions being enacted in legislation, Congress did not act on its

17

Data for Figure 6 was collected through a keyword search for congressional documents containing one or a
combination of “legislative veto,” “congressional veto,” and/or “one-house veto” using Hein Online.
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authority after its invalidation. As Matthew Hall’s (2011) research indicates, Congress has not
used its legislative veto authority since the Chadha decision.
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Figure 6: Committee hearings per Congress, House and Senate, 1973-1985.

These figures help illustrate the important point about why the Court decided to accept
the legislative veto, and with it structural-separation of powers issues, on its agenda. Congress
was ever increasingly introducing and enacting legislation containing veto language. For the
most part, the legislative veto was widely supported by members of Congress and opposed by
those in the executive branch, as will be detailed later. Little time was spent debating the
legislative veto or the merits of its use in Congress, and it was not until the 1960s that real
discussion started to take place as presidents began vetoing legislation that contained legislative
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veto provisions, increasing conflict between the two branches. The increased debate over the
years will illustrate how the legislative veto was reaching a tipping point that increasingly
encouraged the Supreme Court to take up the issue and settle the constitutionality of the
legislative veto once and for all.
Arguments in favor of the legislative veto came in many different forms. Some argued
that the veto was needed because the executive and judiciary had been amassing increasingly
more authority over Congress and legislative veto was needed to help bring back its authority
(Bates 1965, 22967). Others argued that the veto was constitutional when narrowly tailored to
specific goals, but reports on legislative vetoes conducted by the House of Representatives
warned that veto provisions raised serious constitutional questions (Moss 1978, 219).
While these debates were playing out in the mid to late 1970s and early 1980s, instead of
passing legislative veto provisions piecemeal, Congress attempted to enact broad legislative veto
legislation regardless of being incorporated into individual bills. The House Subcommittee on
Administrative Law and Government Relations in 1976 drafted a legislative veto bill that
received 265 votes for and 135 votes against. It was considered under special rules requiring a
two-thirds vote, and thus failed passage by only two votes. Congressman Levitas (D, GA)
introduced the same legislation yearly. While these bills received broad approval, they were
never brought to consideration by the full House. Likewise, in the Senate, Harrison Schmitt (R,
NM) routinely attempted to introduce veto legislation that was widely supported but never
materialized with a vote.
In 1981, the Senate created the Subcommittee on Agency Administration for the purpose
of dealing with, among other things, the legislative veto. In April of that year, the Committee
held its first hearing on issues related to the legislative veto over agency regulations. At this
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hearing, Senator Paul Laxalt (R, NV) reminded members of the Committee that during other
hearings there were those who argued against the constitutionality of the legislative veto.
However, although “[s]uch testimony is helpful, . . . it must be remembered that the Congress
has a responsibility to make its own judgments about the constitutionality of any particular
measure before it” (Laxalt 1981, 25). Senator Laxalt further clarified his point, arguing that the
constitutionality of the legislative veto is secondary in importance to whether it is “wise policy”
(Laxalt 1981, 25).
For Senator Schmitt, the legislative veto was not legislating or usurping the executive
function of the president, but it was giving Congress additional oversight authority:
Now, what the legislative veto does is put teeth into that oversight. It means that before a
rule becomes law that there will be a fixed period of time under a fixed set of procedures
by which the committee or other Members of the Congress can have a chance to review
that rule, insure its compatibility with legislative intent or other factors considered
important by the Congress; and if necessary, and I repeat if necessary, veto the
implementation of that rule. (Laxalt 1981, 29)
These sentiments calling for greater oversight of agency rule making were repeated by many
during the hearing.18
The growing salience of the legislative veto and its importance to Congress was further
solidified with Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s nomination hearing before the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary in 1981. Senator Charles Grassley (R, IA) questioned O’Connor regarding her
views on the legislative veto. O’Connor first remarked that she had zero experience with the
legislative veto because it was not an allowed authority in the Arizona legislature. “I would only
say that there may be basic issues of separation of powers involved in a particular enactment, but
I would certainly want to look at the particular enactment that was produced before formulating
18

Members calling for the legislative veto based on needs for greater oversight: Harry F. Byrd, Jr (D, VA), Carl
Levin (D, MI), Orrin Hatch (R, UT).
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any conclusion and would also want to have the benefit of brief, arguments, and discussion”
(O’Connor 1981, 208). And she continued by stating:
It strikes me that Congress has a very effective power irrespective of any legislative veto
provision that it might want to adopt, and that is the power to take a look at the
administrative regulations which the particular agency has adopted, and if Congress feels
that that agency has gone beyond the scope of the intended authority of Congress,
Congress has the power to directly legislate in such a fashion as to make clear that it was
not intended to have that power and to effectively by direct enactment curtail that kind of
power. So I assume that that is a very direct means which Congress can also use.
(O’Connor 1981, 207)
O’Connor concluded by admitting that even with her time as an Arizona state senator, she had
little experience with legislative vetoes because they were not authorized in the state. Regardless
of her answer, it is more evident that this was a growing concern for members of Congress and
the Senate was attempting to gauge the future justice’s reactions to the congressional oversight
tool.
In addition to constitutional deliberation, many in Congress pointed to White’s opinion as
the Court giving its acceptance for the legislative veto. Rep. Levitas (D, GA), who was the
champion of legislative vetoes during this period, cited Justice White on multiple occasions,
stating that “[i]f Justice White’s dictum is an indication, I think we can expect that congressional
veto of regulations will be held constitutional by the Supreme Court when it accepts such a case
for review” (Levitas 1978, 178). Rep. Harold T. Johnson (D, CA) addressed the fact that the
legislative veto was not ruled on in Buckley, but it still was given a stamp of approval. “Mr.
Justice White in a separate opinion strongly endorsed the constitutionality of Congressional
veto” (Johnson 1978, 213). Rep. Henson Moore (R, LA), after admitting to being one of the two
legislative veto activists who had been attempting to pass more through Congress, argued that
“Justice White did express the opinion that the only unconstitutionality he could see in it was if it
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violated separation of powers by the legislative body getting involved with the Executive office’s
powers” (Moore 1978, 280).
Support for the veto in light of Justice White’s comments also came from the academic
legal community. Eugene Gressman, Kennan Professor of Law at the University of North
Carolina Law School, appearing as Special Counsel to the House of Representatives to defend
the constitutionality of the legislative veto, stated:
One House normally rejects innumerable proposals made to it during any session of the
Congress, and it was in that context that Mr. Justice White’s dictum in Buckley v. Valeo
is significant. In realization of this legislative fact he said that when Congress rejects a
recommendation it is not acting legislatively and does not act by way of a bill or
resolution that is normally submitted to and enacted by both Houses subject to
Presidential approval or veto. (Gressman 1979, 460-461)
Additionally, Joseph Cooper, Dean of the School of Social Science at Rice University, stated that
“as argued by Justice White in Buckley v. Valeo, veto action simply prevents a change in the law.
It is negative in impact. Nothing remains on which the President’s veto could operate” (Cooper
1979, 495).
Further support came from the academic community during various committee hearings
between 1977 and 1983. Bernard Schwartz, professor at New York University Law School,
testifying before the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Finance stated:
Justice White in a concurring opinion went out of his way – it had nothing to do with the
case – but he went out of his way to say that in his opinion, the provision, the legislative
veto provision as it were . . . the legislative veto provision of the Federal Election Act
was constitutional and he said in his concurring opinion that this has nothing to do with
the provision of article 1, section 7 which contains the clause subjecting every bill and
every order, resolution or vote, which requires the concurrence of both houses, to the
President’s veto power. (Schwartz 1979, 154-155)
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Collectively, these statements make it clear there were many in and out of Congress who
believed Justice White’s statement in Buckley was a signal that the Court would uphold the
constitutionality of the legislative veto.
However, many testified at committee hearings who expressed their reservations, or
outright disapproval, of White’s statement. Rep. John E. Moss (D, CA) reminded members that
this was just one justice on the Court and that it might be unwise to take one man’s claims as a
statement of acceptance by the entire Court. As Moss stated:
Justice White in his concurring opinion suggested that such a provision in that law would
have his constitutional blessing. But since the view of Justice White is dicta and since the
sharply divided Atkins decision is self-limiting, the basic question of whether a
congressional veto is constitutional is very much unsettled. (Moss 1978, 219)
Similarly, in written remarks, John Harmon, the Assistant Attorney General for the Carter
Administration, expressed reservations for this belief that White’s dicta in Buckley signified an
approval by the Court toward the legislative veto:
It is true that Justice White, speaking only for himself in Buckley, stated, his view that
one-House disapproval of regulations issued by “a properly created independent agency”
would be constitutional. Assuming that Justice White would adhere to this view in a case
in which this issue were actually raised and briefed, it would appear that he would not
necessarily reach the same result with regard to regulations issued by Executive Branch –
as opposed to independent – agencies. (Harmon 1978, 165)
These same sentiments were expressed by Theodore B. Olson, Assistant Attorney General during
the Reagan Administration, stating:
It is a 294 page opinion. Justice White’s concurring and dissenting opinion is one of six
separate opinions. He is the only one of the eight Justices on that Court, at that time, who
addressed that issue. His comments span just three of the 294 pages of opinions. The
issue of the legislative veto, as I understand it, was not briefed by the Government in that
case. Subsequent to Justice White’s comments in that opinion there have been various
expressions by scholars and other judges regarding Justice White’s views. (Olson 1981,
81)
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During committee questioning, Morrison, who at the time was serving as the Director of
Congress Watch, pointed to statements made in the petitioner’s brief for Consumer Energy
Council of America v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (1983), which stated:
There are several reasons why Justice White’s conclusion does not defeat petitioners’
challenge here. First, he appears to have examined the issue solely from the perspective
of Art. I, §7, and hence his views on the other issues are not known. Second, the
constitutional question presented was an abstract one, not keyed to the actual veto of any
particular rule. (Morrison 1981, 140)
Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti discussed White’s opinion as well, pointing out that White
made a distinction between regulatory bodies that are dependent of, or independent to, the
executive branch. However, Civilietti stated, “I do not think that distinction will hold up in
constitutional analysis” (Civiletti 1981, 431).
Although there was strong support by members of Congress pointing toward the
constitutionality of the legislative veto thanks to Justice White’s statements, as is illustrated
above, there were those in Congress and other political officials warning that White’s remarks
held little to no weight. It is evident that, for the most part, a majority inside Congress had
always welcomed and accepted legislative veto authority and the Court had done little to alter
that behavior. At the very least, and possibly unintentionally, the Court had signaled an
acceptance for legislative vetoes through Justice White’s opinion, which aided in furthering the
congressional behavior.
This overview of Congress and the legislative veto illustrates the importance of the veto
to members of Congress and the growing salience of the issue throughout the late 1970s and
early 1980s. Specifically, after Justice White announced his approval of the veto, members of
Congress included vetoes in an increasing number of bills introduced in Congress. More
importantly, while members of Congress knew there were questions as to the constitutionality of

68
the legislative veto, there were strong arguments in favor of it. With Congress delegating more
and more power to agencies and agencies were increasingly engaged in rulemaking, Congress
needed some type of oversight power; the veto afforded Congress that authority. The following
section further illustrates the increased salience and arguments around the constitutionally of the
legislative veto through analysis of presidents’ actions in relation to the legislative veto.
Presidents and the Legislative Veto
From the first use of the legislative veto, presidents had always been outspoken critics of
its inclusion in legislation. The first use of the legislative veto came in 1932 with President
Hoover’s plan to reorganize the executive branch, but he feared Congress would not approve. To
get around this, Hoover “recommended that Congress delegate reorganization authority to him,
subject to the approval of a joint committee of Congress,” and “[i]n 1932, in the midst of the
Great Depression, Congress gave Hoover the authority he wanted. He could submit
reorganization plans to Congress, and they would become law within 60 days unless either house
disapproved” (Fisher 2007, 139). As Lawrence Tribe (1984) discusses, Presidents Eisenhower,
Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter all vetoed legislation on the grounds that legislative vetoes
were unconstitutional (1984, 7). As time progressed, and Congress increased its use of the
legislative veto, presidents became more involved and increasingly concerned over this threat to
their authority.
Richard Nixon expressed reservations about the legislative veto in light of his Attorney
General advising him against its constitutionality. In a signing statement attached to the Second
Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1972, Nixon stated that a legislative veto clause was
“infringing on the fundamental principle of the separation of legislative and executive powers”
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(Nixon 1972). Additionally, Nixon attempted to challenge the constitutionality of the legislative
veto as part of his suit in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services (1977). However, this issue
was not discussed or decided in the Court opinion.
President Gerald Ford followed suit while in office, issuing signing statements
proclaiming his administration’s stance that legislative veto was unconstitutional. At the time
Ford was advised against taking action, specifically vetoing legislation containing legislative
veto provisions out of fear of a “potentially strong adverse congressional reaction” (Cole 1974,
3). The Department of Justice, IRS, and CIA all expressed their constitutional concerns with
legislative veto provisions in memos to Ford, arguing that they were “constitutionally
objectionable as congressional infringements upon the legitimate functions of executive
agencies” (Lynn 1976, 7). Then Director of the CIA, George Bush, advised President Ford to
veto specific legislation containing veto provisions, stating, “[B]y authorizing Congress to
overturn an agency head’s determination, the bill raises the question of the propriety of
legislative veto of administrative decisions in the Executive branch” (Bush 1976).
Once in office, President Carter received near weekly briefs on legislative veto provisions
and was advised on strategies to deal with them if passed through Congress (see Jimmy Carter
Library, Presidential Files). In June of 1978, Carter drafted a message to Congress outlining his
position on the legislative veto. In his message, Carter explained that the legislative veto was an
infringement on the Executive’s constitutional authority to execute the laws, stating that “for
both constitutional and policy reasons I strongly oppose legislative vetoes over the execution of
programs. The inclusion of such a provision in a bill will be an important factor in my decision
to sign or to veto it” (Carter 1978). Additionally, Carter stated that “if Congress subsequently
adopts a resolution to veto an Executive action, we will give it serious consideration, but we will
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not, under our reading of the Constitution, consider it legally binding” (Carter 1978). This was
precisely Carter’s message two years later, in June of 1980, when the administration advised the
Department of Education to ignore recent legislative veto action in relation to four of its
regulations (Babcock 1980). Whereas in the past, presidents had spoken out against the
constitutionality of the legislative vetoes, Carter was taking direct action, advising agencies and
departments to ignore any legislative veto that was aimed at their administration of the laws.
Carter was also being advised on legal challenges that could be brought against
legislative vetoes. However, Carter’s advisors felt the Atkins and Chadha cases that were
working their way through the judicial system were poor vehicles and would not get the desired
outcome Carter was hoping for. In 1977, White House Counsel, Robert J. Lipshutz advised
Carter on this very issue, stating:
Neither Atkins nor Chadha present what we think would be ‘ideal’ cases for review. It is
possible in both cases for the courts to conclude that the exercise of the veto – under the
particular statutes involved – was an appropriate exercise of Congress’ constitutional
responsibilities without reaching the broader question of the constitutionality of
legislative vetoes in other contexts. (Lipshutz 1977, 46)
Additionally, Carter was advised that because he and past presidents had signed legislation into
law that contained legislative veto provisions, any lawsuit challenged by the executive branch
would be difficult to win. To overcome this barrier, Carter was advised to challenge every piece
of legislation that came across his desk containing a veto provision and to treat them as “report
and wait” provisions that would accomplish the goal; these “[r]eport and wait provisions require
agencies to report certain actions to the appropriate congressional committees before the agency
action can take effect” (Funk and Seamon 2009, 51). This then prompted the committee to either
pass legislation to force the agency into action or the committee would attempt to apply pressure
on the agency to act.
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Later the Reagan administration argued against the legislative veto when it was before
the Court in Chadha, but on the campaign trail Reagan had taken a different approach. During a
campaign speech in October of 1981, Reagan stated “that ‘both Congress and the President’
should be granted ‘greater authority to veto regulations approved by executive agencies,’ and a
Republican platform provision had supported ‘use of the Congressional veto’ as a ‘means of
eliminating unnecessary spending and regulations’” (Taylor 1981). Additionally, in 1981, during
his first term in office, leading up to the Chadha decision, President Reagan endorsed some
forms of legislative veto provisions, “but only if the congressionally popular oversight tool
applie[d] to independent regulatory agencies and not to those in the Executive branch” (Brown
1981). Later that year, the Reagan administration announced that it “would be willing to accept
legislation giving Congress veto power over regulations issued by executive branch agencies so
long as the president ha[d] a voice in the veto process” (Mayer 1981). An administrator within
the Office of Management and Budget explained that Reagan would approve of the legislative
veto if he were given the opportunity to review and reject or accept the veto before Congress
acted (see Mayer 1981). This worried Morrison, who had been working to get the judiciary to
rule the legislative veto was unconstitutional. However, Morrison believes Reagan had a change
of heart once in office. “He was the president, and looked at all the other places in which this
thing was impinging upon his powers and potentially so” (quoted in Marcus 2009, 80)
When signing the Union Station Redevelopment Act of 1981, Reagan issued a signing
statement arguing that Section 1192
contains a legislative veto provision which the Attorney General advises is
unconstitutional . . . [C]ommittees of Congress cannot bind the executive branch in the
execution of the law by passing a resolution that is not adopted by both Houses of
Congress and presented to the President for approval or veto. Accordingly, this language
of section 114(e) must be objected to on constitutional grounds. The Secretary of
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Transportation will not, consistent with this objection, regard himself as legally bound by
any such resolution. (Reagan 1981)
In line with these statements, when Chadha made it to the Court, the Reagan administration
argued for the unconstitutionality of legislative veto provisions.
While the presidents in office initially favored the control they gained over agencies, as
time passed, veto provisions were being included in more and more legislation. No longer simply
controlling agency reorganization, in the 1970s and early 1980s legislative veto provisions found
their way into any piece of legislation that allowed for agency rulemaking. It was also during this
period that challenges to the constitutionality of the legislative veto began making their way to
the judiciary.
Law Reviews and the Legislative Veto
From a regime politics perspective, a political majority is the most direct link to find a
connection between a judicial decision and political preferences. A second important audience
comes from legal academics. Lawrence Baum (2006) states:
As a segment of the legal profession, law schools and legal scholars are especially
relevant to judges on higher courts. They interact directly with judges in conferences,
judges visit law schools, and other settings. More important, they are prominent
evaluators of judges’ work. Because law professors have so much prestige, their
evaluations of judges carry considerable weight. (2006, 100)
More important are “articles and notes in law reviews, which constitute the most detailed and
most widely circulated evaluations of judges’ work. These publications typically focus on
specific decisions or sets of related decisions” (Baum 2006, 100). Other than evaluations, when a
new issue is making its way through the judicial system, justices can look to the articles for
guidance and support for their arguments and justifications.
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With law review articles providing an important evaluative component to decision
making, judges can also take cues from these sources before making a decision. A state supreme
court justice was quoted as telling a group of law review editors, “You grade us and we pay
attention!” (quoted in Baum 2006, 100). Another federal court judge stated that “a good number
of judges no doubt begin their perusal of a new [law review] issue with the case comments,
anxious to see if one of their cases has been reviewed” (quoted in Baum 2006, 100). Further,
judges who have held legal academic positions often use their former colleagues as reference
groups when working through decisions.
For these reasons, analysis of law review articles published leading up to the Chadha
decision offered important insights into a possible influence on the justices’ decision making.
Finding evidence of those in the legal academic profession holding negative views toward the
legislative veto provides evidence for why the Court invalidated the veto despite the strong
support it garnered in Congress. Articles discussing the legislative veto were published as early
as 1941, but interest and publications increased substantially in the 1970s and early 1980s
leading up to the Chadha decision. These law reviews helped illustrate the change in arguments
over time and the increased salience that eventually led to the Court adding the issue to its
agenda.
Figure 7 displays the total number of law review articles published from 1970 to 1983.
There was an increase in discussion of legislative veto leading up to the decision in Buckley, and
it remained steady until increasing again before the Court’s decision in Chadha. Figure 8 then
illustrates the positions taken in these law review articles, coding the authors’ stances as
“Constitutional,” “Unconstitutional,” and “No Position.” As is illustrated, like discussion in
Congress, discussion of legislative vetoes in law review articles also substantially increased
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throughout the 1970s leading up to the invalidation of the veto in 1983. We also expected a lag
to take place because of the publication process and see the largest increase taking place in 1977,
the year after Buckley and White’s opinion. There is, again, another increase in law reviews
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Figure 8: Law review position on legislative veto, 1975-1983.
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Additionally, Figure 8 illustrates that the constitutionality of the legislative veto was not
straightforward. A majority of the law reviews published during this period discussed the
legislative veto strictly in terms of legislation that had been passed, including veto provisions or
proposals being discussed in Congress without taking any position. Of those who did take a
position, 21 argued the veto was constitutional, while 19 argued it was an unconstitutional
congressional authority. Content analysis of these articles further illustrates the division in the
arguments of those who were for and those who were against legislative veto.
In one of the first substantial examinations of legislative veto, John D. Millett and
Lindsay Rogers (1941) discussed the legislative veto contained in the Reorganization Act of
1939. With approval for congressional authority, Millett and Rogers stated, “If the legislature
wishes to insure that it will have an opportunity to express an opinion upon the exercise of
discretion by those who fill in the details of a legislative mandate, then the legislature ought to
include in the original law some reservation similar to that of the Reorganization Act of 1939”
(1941, 189). As will be detailed throughout this section, most of those who approved of the
legislative veto did so in relation to Congress’ further delegation of authority to agencies.
However, many in Congress were against further delegation “in a time when dictatorship is said
to be a real possibility” (Millett and Rogers 1941, 177). But with increasingly complex
situations, Congress continued to delegate, and with this increased delegation, proponents of the
legislative veto believed Congress was in need of greater oversight tools legislative veto
provided them.
Twenty years later, Joseph Cooper and Ann Cooper (1962) argued:
[The] veto provision constitutes an integral part of the original policy decision.
Furthermore, actions taken under the veto provision are limited by the nature of the
enabling act itself and they can be limited further by making proposals submitted under
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the veto provision non-amendable, whereas the range of policy decisions which can be
made by a new law or an amendment is virtually unlimited. (1962, 476)
This remained a strong argument throughout the debates of the late 1970s and early 1980s and
was discussed by Justice White in his Buckley opinion.19 For those who made this argument,
when legislation was enacted, the president had an opportunity at that moment to veto the bill
because it contained a legislative veto provision. If the president signed legislation into law that
contained a legislative veto, then the president had given his approval for the legislative veto
once exercised by Congress.
These remarks serve as evidence in support of legislative veto and give reason to question
why the Supreme Court came down on the side it did in Chadha. Approval based on
constitutional, policy, and/or governmental efficiency grounds would allow the Court to use
these arguments without making it appear partisan. But there were strong arguments against the
use and inclusion of legislative veto provisions as well. Harold Bruff and Ernest Gellhorn (1977)
examined the history of the legislative veto and the case law surrounding it and speculated about
the long term effects broad legislative veto authority would have on government institutions.
Building on previous discussions, Bruff and Gellhorn argued that over time the Court and
constitutional doctrine have developed in a way to support administrative lawmaking despite
constitutional limits on delegating such authority. Although
the courts purport to require only that statutory delegations of congressional authority
contain basic policy standards for the administrator to follow. This “standards”
requirement is designed to preserve the separation of powers by placing broad policy
determinations in the hands of elected representatives rather than appointed bureaucrats
and by facilitating judicial review. (Bruff and Gellhorn 1977, 1372)
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But even with these standards, Bruff and Gellhorn (1977) assert that the courts have failed to
uphold them in practice and has resulted in increased “lawmaking power . . . in administrative
hands without any constitutional assurance that the agencies are responsive to the people’s will”
(Bruff and Gellhorn 1977, 1373). Thus, instead of following the prescribed path for delegation of
power, Congress could use this negative check to control administrative lawmaking.
As for constitutional questions related to separation of powers, Bruff and Gellhorn (1977)
contended that “[c]hief among these [questions] is whether legislative vetoes constitute an
impermissible evasion of the President’s veto authority, or an impermissible intrusion into the
powers vested in the executive or judicial branches of government (depending on whether the
veto is meant for policy or legality review)” (Bruff and Gellhorn 1977, 1373). Specifically,
legislative authority is granted to a bicameral Congress as an “internal check against the
aggrandizement of congressional power” (Bruff and Gellhorn 1977, 1374). Thus, through its
legislative authority, Congress cannot alter the bicameral legislative process established in the
Constitution.
Lee Watson (1978) suggested that legislative veto was unconstitutional for both political
and constitutional reasons. First, the “[a]vailability of the legislative veto . . . may tempt
Congress to create powers in excess of those it would otherwise allow the President” (Watson
1978, 990). This argument is based on political reasons favoring a more balanced political
system rather than placing greater authority with Congress. As for constitutional reasons, Watson
considered the legislative veto a violation of a core constitutional value discussed and established
by the Framers:
[B]y authorizing action by Congress outside the check of the presidential veto power, or
action by the individual House of Congress without operation of the bicameral check,
these devices may shift the balance of governmental power toward Congress, and allow
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the legislative branch to dominate the executive, a situation greatly feared by the Framers
of the Constitution. (Watson 1978, 990)
Robert Dixon (1978) similarly disagreed with the legislative veto, describing this expansion as a
“troublesome . . . development” (1978, 424). Further, he asserted that the legislative veto, when
used as a “device to check day-by-day administration of the government, is both unconstitutional
and unwise, but that its use may be harmless in the context of discrete legislation” (1978, 426).
Building on the Framers, Dixon argued, Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution is defined
in strict detail, “according to Hamilton, . . . to enable the President to defend himself against
being ‘stripped of his authorities by successive resolutions, or annihilated by a single vote,’ and
to furnish additional security against enactment of improper laws because of the ‘effect of
faction’ or ‘want of due deliberation’” (Dixon 1978, 435). Dixon specifically details five areas in
which the legislative veto violates the Constitution:
(1) the provisions of article I, section 7, clauses 2 and 3, making the President a
participant in the lawmaking process and according him a veto power; (2) the allocation
to the President in the “take care” clause of article II, section 3—perhaps as augmented
by article II, section 1, clause 1, vesting in him the “executive power”—of the power of
execution of the statutes as enacted; (3) the firmly developed principle that it is the
function of the judiciary to interpret unamended statutes, and most certainly to rule on
questions of exceeding statutory authority; (4) the disability clause and incompatibility
clause in article I, section 6, which separate members of Congress from administrative
functions; and (5) the appointments clause of article II, section 2, clause 2, placing in the
President and not the Congress power to appoint administrative officials. In addition, if
the congressional veto device takes the mode of the one-house veto, or the committee
veto, rather than the less common mode of the concurrent resolution, the bicameralism
requirement for statute making and statute modification set forth in article I, section 7 is
violated. (Dixon 1978, 494)
This left Dixon to conclude that while there may be reasons and theory to support the legislative
veto as an appropriate and useful tool, the Framers had their reasons for establishing the system
they did and legislative veto is not consistent with that system of government. However, in
certain situations, like the Salary and Reorganization Act that was upheld by the Court of Claims
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in Atkins v. United States (1977), Dixon argues that legislative veto “may be constitutionally
harmless and politically insignificant” (Dixon 1978, 494).
The above discussion illustrates the legal academic debate in law review articles
throughout the 1970s and early 1980s regarding legislative vetoes and the escalating debate as
Congress was increasingly adding veto provisions to legislation. First, the increase in
publications discussing some aspect of the legislative veto indicates the increased salience of the
issue over time. The issue was becoming more salient as Congress increased their inclusion and
use of the legislation. As the issue was receiving more exposure, there was a higher probability
that the Court would accept the issue onto its agenda to settle the conflict taking place between
Congress and the executive branch as well as the conflict among those in the legal academic
community who were debating the constitutionality of the issue.
Second, if legal academics are an important audience to judges, then we can expect to see
these debates playing out in the justices’ Chadha opinions. Additionally, with the Court
invalidating the legislative veto in Chadha, the Justices could be encouraged by the knowledge
there was a minority of legal academics who agreed legislative veto was unconstitutional, and
there is evidence the Justices were aware of these debates with the Justices’ citing many of the
articles discussed above in their opinions.20 First, this illustrates that justices do look to legal
academics and their opinions and suggests their legal reasoning does matter. Second, it provides
evidence that although the justices were ruling against a large political majority, the justices had
and were using an important group for support in their arguments to justify their decision.
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Last, when the Court accepts a new issue onto its agenda, this audience can provide
important insight into how the legal community believed a decision should be adjudicated and
what dissenting arguments would look like. The justices’ opinions in Chadha mirror those found
in the legal community, with those in the dissent taking cues from those who wrote favorably
about legislative veto. With increased agency rulemaking, Congress needed a tool that would
give them more control over the powers they were delegating away. These arguments take on
both constitutional and political positions, believing the veto is not legislation in the
constitutional sense and, thus, does not have to follow the precise process detailed in the
Constitution.
Chadha at the Judiciary
The discussion of the legislative veto thus far has focused on the more general idea of
veto authority, but the case that ultimately invalidated its use was brought on much narrower
grounds. Even though Jagdish Rai Chadha was simply attempting to get his immigration status
approved, his case took on much greater importance in his challenge to the legislative veto. In
1972, Chadha overstayed his student visa, and at his deportation hearing, he admitted to this fact.
Subsequently, the hearing was adjourned so he could file for a suspension of deportation. Later
that year Chadha’s deportation was officially suspended because “he had resided continuously in
the United States for over seven years, was of good moral character, and would suffer ‘extreme
hardship’ if deported” (462 U.S. 924). However, under the law, Congress was able to review
suspended deportation orders and used congressional veto authority in 1976 to suspend Chadha’s
order. As a result, Chadha sued, arguing that Section 244(c)(2), which contained the legislative
veto, was unconstitutional. Joining in his attempt to strike down the legislative veto was
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Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS), the agency tasked with deporting Chadha.
Because the INS, on behalf of the executive branch, was arguing against the legislative veto, the
House and Senate were asked to defend the legislation before the Court. While Chadha’s story is
an interesting one, the focus of this analysis is on the constitutional arguments made by the
various parties before the Court and the legal reasoning handed down by the justices (for a
complete and detailed account of Jagdish Rai Chadha's story see Craig 1990).
Section 106(a) of the Act allowed Chadha to file a review of the deportation notice in the
U.S. Court of Appeals, which he filed in the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit ruled in Chadha’s
favor, arguing that Section 244(c)(2) was a violation of the Constitution’s separation of powers
doctrine. The Supreme Court then unanimously granted certiorari where, like the Circuit Court
case, Chadha was joined by the INS arguing against the constitutionality of the legislation and
the House and Senate filing briefs in support of the Act.
In the brief for Chadha, the Appellee-Respondent, the attorneys argued that the court of
appeals was correct in ruling that Section 244(c)(2) (the legislative veto provision) ran counter to
the constitutional separation of powers. Use of the legislative veto, according to the Chadha
brief, saw Congress exercising either executive or judicial authority when vetoing Chadha’s
relief. Citing Myers v. United States (272 U.S. 52, 1962),21 Chadha’s brief argued that because
certain instances specifically discussed in the Constitution give one house of Congress authority
to act (the Senate’s advise and consent authority for treaties and appointments), all others not
mentioned should be found unconstitutional.
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Additionally, Chadha’s brief specified three other reasons the legislative veto was
unconstitutional. First, Article 1, Section 7 specifies the president must be given an opportunity
to veto any legislation that would have an impact on citizens. Second, the legislative veto is in
clear violation of the bicameral requirements found in the Constitution. Third, the legislative
veto provision in question failed to provide guidance on the delegation. Referencing Schechter
Poultry Corporation v. United States (295 U.S. 495, 1935), the brief contended that although the
delegation doctrine is not typically applied to Congress in this way because both houses of
Congress must act to pass legislation, the veto provision in this legislation failed to offer
standards and allowed for an unchecked delegation to a single branch of government.
The brief for the INS offered similar arguments related to the unconstitutionality of the
legislative veto provision. First, the INS contended that the legislative veto provision of the
legislation violated the bicameral requirements found in Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution.
As the INS brief stated:
If Section 244(c)(2) had never been enacted, it is clear that a resolution passed by one
House of Congress and not approved by the President or repassed by both Houses over
his veto would not bind the Attorney General in his administration of the Act or affect the
legal status of an individual alien. ("Brief for the Immigration and Naturalization Service"
1982, 10)
Additionally, as the INS argued, this process violated the Presentment Clause, which “clearly
shows that Congress cannot avoid submitting a legally binding resolution to the President simply
by attaching a different label to it or by re characterizing the process that led to its passage”
("Brief for the Immigration and Naturalization Service" 1982, 12)
A second reason for the unconstitutionality of legislative veto, according to the INS, was
that it violated the separation of powers doctrine because it allowed for one House of Congress to
engage in the execution of the Act in question. Referencing Buckley, the INS brief argued that if
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an officer who has been appointed by Congress cannot be given executive branch authority, it
also cannot delegate authority to one House of Congress to do the same thing. And in a third
argument the INS stated that allowing this legislation to stand, and more importantly, the
legislative veto, would allow one House of Congress the ability to invalidate the actions of any
branch of government it wished. In turn, this would completely blur the lines between what is
legislative and what is executive.
On the other side of the case, both the House and Senate submitted briefs in favor of the
Act and the legislative veto. The House brief argued that the Framers, along with the Court’s
own jurisprudence, never argued for a strict separation among the three branches of government.
To support this argument, the House brief cited the Court’s own jurisprudence in Buckley, United
States v. Nixon (1974) and Nixon v. Administrator of General Services (1977) as examples of the
Court, allowing for a weak reading of the separation of powers doctrine. Citing Buckley, the brief
stated, “the Framers ‘viewed the principle of separation as a vital check against tyranny’ but
‘likewise saw that a hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government from one another
would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively” ("Brief of
the United States House of Representatives, Appellee-Petitioner" 1982, 23). And in Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services, the Court asserted that the separation of powers was to be
flexible and change with the demands that came about over time. Further, the House brief
pointed to James Madison’s own references to Baron de Montesquieu as another guiding figure
that would not support strict adherence to separation of powers. Additionally, even the Necessary
and Proper Clause, according to the House brief, allowed for a mixing of authority rather than a
strict line among the branches.
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The Senate brief followed logic similar to that of the House. Also referencing Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services, the Senate brief argued legislative veto was constitutional
and not a violation of separation of powers because “[i]t augments, and in no way infringes upon,
executive power” ("Brief of the United States Senate, Appellee-Petitioner" 1982, 8). Further, the
Senate cited Justice White’s Buckley concurrence and dissent to argue that the actions taken by
one house of Congress are simply reviews and not actual acts of lawmaking, “The approval or
disapproval by the Congress or by one of its Houses under a statute providing for legislative
review is not an act of lawmaking. The requirements of bicameralism and presentation are fully
satisfied by the enactment of the underlying statute authorizing legislative review” ("Brief of the
United States Senate, Appellee-Petitioner" 1982, 33). Thus, just as had been argued during
congressional debates on the floor and during committee hearings, because the legislative veto
was signed into law by the president, the president was approving the action.
Oral arguments for the case were originally held on February 22, 1982, and then reargued
on December 7, 1982. During the first oral, Eugene Gressman argued on behalf of the House of
Representatives in support of the legislative veto. This was a first for the Court, having to ask
both the House and the Senate to intervene as parties before the Court.
The Supreme Court, in a seven to two decision, struck down the use of legislative veto in
a majority opinion delivered by Chief Justice Burger. Justice Burger first began by dispelling the
efficiency arguments made in favor of the veto authority:
Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of
democratic government and our inquiry is sharpened rather than blunted by the fact that
Congressional veto provisions are appearing with increasing frequency in statutes which
delegate authority to executive and independent agencies. ("Immigration and
Naturalization Services v. Chadha" 1983, 944)
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Efficiency and usefulness are not questions the Court undertakes to answer, as Justice Burger
argued, but instead it focuses on whether an act of government is constitutional or
unconstitutional.
The Court, through Justice Burger, did not take up the separation of power argument, as
both sides spent a majority of their time arguing for it – as the Circuit Court had ruled. Justice
Burger’s opinion rested on the Presentment Clause and the bicameral requirements of the
Constitution. Addressing the Presentment Clause argument first, the opinion notes that the
Framers of the Constitution took this clause so seriously they made sure it could not be bypassed.
Giving the president a role in the lawmaking process with the veto served two important
purposes. First, giving the president veto power illustrates the Framers envisioned a lawmaking
role for the executive branch, even if it was a small one. Second, the veto was important because
it placed a check on Congress from enacting oppressive legislation. Thus, legislative veto should
not be taken lightly as it alters the very important process put in place by the Framers of the
Constitution.
Citing Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 73, Justice Burger wrote, “The primary
inducement to conferring the power in question upon the executive is to enable him to defend
himself; the secondary one is to increase the chances in favor of the community against the
passing of bad laws through haste, inadvertence, or design” ("Immigration and Naturalization
Services v. Chadha" 1983, 948). Additionally, Justice Burger’s opinion argued, through Myers
v. United States (1926), that the Presentment Clause allows for a national perspective injected
into the lawmaking process. Having discussed the importance of the Presentment Clause, Justice
Burger then turned to the issue of bicameralism.
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Justice Burger argued that bicameralism was just as important and was interconnected to
the Presentment Clause. Looking to the debates during the Constitutional Convention, Justice
Burger illustrated the importance of bicameralism, quoting James Wilson, “If the Legislative
authority be not restrained, there can be neither liberty nor stability; and it can only be restrained
by dividing it within itself, into distinct and independent branches” ("Immigration and
Naturalization Services v. Chadha" 1983, 949). Alexander Hamilton followed this in Federalist
No. 22, arguing that having a single house legislature would have created one of the worst forms
of government possible. Hamilton built on this argument in Federalist No. 51 by stating, “In
republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this
inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches” (quoted in "Immigration and
Naturalization Services v. Chadha" 1983, 950).
For Justice Burger, these examples illustrate why a single house of Congress should not,
constitutionally, have the authority to overturn an action of government without the consent of
the other. Further, “the division of the Congress into two distinctive bodies assures that the
legislative power would be exercised only after opportunity for full study and debate in separate
settings” ("Immigration and Naturalization Services v. Chadha" 1983, 951).
Justice Burger admitted that there is room for the branches of government to mix their
authority and they are not completely walled off from each other, as was asserted by the Court in
Buckley. Additionally, as was argued by the Court in Hampton & Co. v. United States (1928),
“When any Branch acts, it is presumptively exercising the power the Constitution has delegated
to it” ("Immigration and Naturalization Services v. Chadha" 1983, 951). However, Article 1,
Section 7 of the Constitution details a procedural path that must be followed when legislating
and the one house veto that was utilized in this instance, against Chadha, was legislative in
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nature. Justice Burger concluded that the one house veto was legislative because both the House
and Senate agreed that absent Section 244(c)(2), Congress would have had to act under typical
legislative rules to get the same result.
The Constitution details specific instances when one house of Congress can act on its
own without the consent of the other house: 1) Art. 1, § 2, cl. 6 authorizes the House to begin
impeachments, 2) Art 1. § 3, cl. 5 authorizes the Senate to conduct impeachment trials, 3) Art. II,
§ 2, cl. 2 authorizes the Senate approve appointments by the president, and 4) Art. II, § 2, cl. 2
authorizes the Senate to ratify treaties. As Justice Burger argued in the majority opinion, the one
house veto exercised by the House in this case does not align with any of the above listed powers
one branch of Congress is authorized to use. Continuing, Justice Burger stated, “The veto
authorized by § 244(c)(2) doubtless has been in many respects a convenient shortcut,” but
“[t]here is unmistakable expression of a determination that legislation by the national Congress
be a step-by-step, deliberate and deliberative process” ("Immigration and Naturalization Services
v. Chadha" 1983, 958-959). In closing, Justice Burger asserted, “With all the obvious flaws of
delay, untidiness, and potential for abuse, we have not yet found a better way to preserve
freedom than by making the exercise of power subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled
out in the Constitution” ("Immigration and Naturalization Services v. Chadha" 1983, 959).
Thus, while the Court of Appeals found the legislative veto unconstitutional on separation of
powers grounds, the Supreme Court, under Justice Burger’s majority opinion, found the
legislative veto unconstitutional, as it violated the Presentment Clause and the bicameral nature
of the US government.
Justice Powell authored a concurring opinion in the judgment. He argued that legislative
veto in this instance was a violation of the separation of powers doctrine because “[w]hen
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Congress finds that a particular person does not satisfy the statutory criteria for permanent
residence in this country it has assumed a judicial function in violation of the principle of
separation of powers” ("Immigration and Naturalization Services v. Chadha" 1983, 960).
Further, Justice Powell argued through the words of James Madison that allowing one branch to
have legislative, executive, and judicial authority “may justly be pronounced the very definition
of tyranny” (quoted in "Immigration and Naturalization Services v. Chadha" 1983, 960). But
Justice Powell did agree the Constitution does not establish three branches that are completely
sealed off from one another, referencing Buckley, Youngstown Sheet and Tube, J.W. Hampton,
Jr. & Co. v. United States (1928). He contended there are two instances in which the doctrine
can be violated. First, as was established in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services and
United States v. Nixon, one branch cannot interfere with another branch that is exercising its
constitutionally delegated authority. The second, as was established in Youngstown Sheet and
Tube and Springer v. Philippine Islands (1928), occurs when one branch acts in a way that is the
actual authority of another branch. For Justice Powell, in this case, the legislative veto violated
the second point, with one branch acting in a capacity constitutionally left to another branch of
government. Meaning Congress was engaged in a judicial function when issuing a one house
veto to cancel Chadha’s suspended deportation notice. However, unlike Justice Burger, Justice
Powell was not comfortable with issuing a broader decision that would invalidate all legislative
vetoes. Justice Powell closed by arguing he would not reach a broader decision that rests on the
Presentment Clause argument.
Countering Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell, Justice White delivered a lengthy
dissent, as expected after his earlier discussion of the veto in Buckley. Before diving into his
legal reasoning about why the veto was constitutional, Justice White argued that the Court
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should not have invalidated Section 244(c)(2) on separation of power grounds because now over
200 pieces of legislation have been invalidated with one single Court ruling. For Justice White,
invalidating the legislative veto left Congress with a very difficult decision to make “either to
refrain from delegating the necessary authority, leaving itself with a hopeless task of writing
laws with the requisite specificity to cover endless special circumstances across the entire policy
landscape or, in the alternative, to abdicate its law-making function to the executive branch and
independent agencies” ("Immigration and Naturalization Services v. Chadha" 1983, 698).
Justice White believed that both of these options created even bigger problems.
Referencing Justice Brandeis’s concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority (1936), Justice White argued the Court should always err on the side of narrow
decisions and not engage in rulings that go further than the case before them. Additionally, as
was argued by Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet & Tube, Justice White argued “[t]he actual
governing under our Constitution does not and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the
power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from context”
(quoted in "Immigration and Naturalization Services v. Chadha" 1983, 978).
Justice White agreed with the majority opinion in that legislation must follow the defined
path stated in the Constitution, but he argued that this was not a problem with the legislation
veto. As was the claim by members of Congress, the original act and all legislative veto instances
were approved of by both houses of Congress and signed into law by the president. Justice White
went into a lengthy discussion of this fact before concluding that in all instances this may not be
the case. If a legislative veto is passed but does infringe on the authority that is specifically
granted to one branch, then that veto could be found unconstitutional. However, in most
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instances the legislative veto is used to keep the growing administrative state in check and
without it Congress loses an important oversight tool.
Justice Rehnquist also dissented with Justice White joining. For Rehnquist, the majority
erred in its application of severability clause jurisprudence, arguing, “Congress did not intend the
one-House veto provision of § 244(c)(2) to be severable” ("Immigration and Naturalization
Services v. Chadha" 1983, 1014), and yet the Court held that this was Congress’s intention. In
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion, Congress did not legislate into the Act or show any attempt that the
legislative veto provision would be severable from the Act.
Discussion
The above analysis first suggests that Chadha marks a critical juncture for the Court and
the political process. The legislative veto had been used for over fifty years with consistent
objections from the executive branch, although presidents willingly signed legislation containing
veto provisions into law. Additionally, it had been nearly fifty years since a significant separation
of power case was decided by the Court. After the 1930s, the Court established a norm to defer
questions of separation of powers to the elected branches of government, most importantly
Congress. But as time passed and Congress began placing veto provisions in any legislation that
allowed for agency rule making, the Court was put into a situation in which it had to act to
resolve the growing conflict. While the Court invalidated the legislative veto, many have argued
that Congress has not truly stopped using the authority, but simply calls it by a different name.22

22

For further discussion of this point, see Fisher (2005).
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Regardless of this point, the ruling in Chadha had a significant impact on legislation passed by
Congress and on its future behavior, which will be more fully analyzed in the following chapters.
Applying Soefer’s framework, which calls for analysis of the critical antecedent,
permissive conditions, and productive conditions, the Court’s hands-off approach to separation
of powers issues marked the critical antecedent (see Figure 9).23 With no one stepping in to stop
Congress from passing legislative veto provisions, Congress increased its inclusion of the
provisions creating conflict among the branches of government over the constitutionality of the
legislative veto. Permissive conditions then came in the form of the increased inclusion of
legislative vetoes (due to the critical antecedent), the lower federal courts ruling on legislative
veto provisions, Justice White’s opinion in Buckley, and the increased debate taking place among
multiple concerned parties.
As agencies gained more authority through congressional delegation and Congress sought
to find a way to check this authority, members of Congress looked to the legislative veto.
However, this authority came at the disapproval of the executive branch and some members of
Congress. Presidents began closely monitoring legislative veto and the impact it was having on
executive branch authority. President Carter issued numerous signing statements, arguing that
the authority was unconstitutional and advised agencies to ignore legislative vetoes unless
specifically ordered through congressional legislation.
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As previously discussed in Chapter 1, critical antecedents are defined as “factors or conditions preceding a critical
juncture that combine in a causal sequence with factors operating during that juncture to produce a divergent
outcome” (Slater and Simmons 2010, 889). Whereas, permissive conditions are defined as “those factors or
conditions that change the underlying context to increase the causal power of agency or contingency and thus the
prospects for divergence” (Soifer 2012, 1574, italics in original), and productive conditions as “the aspects of a
critical juncture that shape the initial outcome that diverge across cases” (Soifer 2012, 1575, italics in original).
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Figure 9: Chadha critical juncture.

In public President Reagan discussed his acceptance for the legislative veto as a way to
control the growing deficit, but behind closed doors, Reagan was also monitoring the situation
and searching for a way to end the use of the congressional power. And just before this increase
in use, Justice White announced his acceptance for the legislative veto, which many in Congress
spun as the Court giving the veto a stamp of approval. In connection to this increased use of
legislative vetoes, Alan Morrison (1990) argues that this issue was placed on the Court’s agenda
and invalidated because, as he states, “[I]t seems to me that the principal cause is Congress’
increasing inability or refusal to make hard choices and reach accommodations in a way that
actually resolves difficult problems” (1990, 306). It was Congress itself that brought about its
invalidation because it became too reliant on the authority.
But there was real debate taking place at multiple levels of government. Congress was
holding in-depth hearings as to the constitutionality of the veto, the Attorney General’s office
was engaged in these debates with both Congress and the executive branch, and presidents were
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issuing statements to Congress arguing that the legislative veto was unconstitutional. More
importantly, these debates did not consist of pure partisan politics, but were conducted in a way
that put the constitutional arguments first. Political elites who were against the legislative veto
argued that the Framers of the Constitution used extreme care when drafting the Presentment
Clause, and any alteration to that would have to come in the form of a constitutional amendment
and not through standard legislation. This is important because it means members of Congress
and the executive branch were speaking in legal terms, setting up and signaling to the Court
arguments the justices could take up to justify their decisions.
Additionally, the federal judiciary was hearing legislative veto cases for the first time
during this period (latter half of the 1970s). However, the lower federal courts were not willing
to make a blanket statement on the constitutionality of the legislative veto. Instead, the lower
courts issued narrow rulings that further played into the disagreement that was taking place over
the veto authority. Combined, all of these factors created increased conflict between all three
branches of government, resulting in the permissive conditions that would bring about the critical
juncture.
The production conditions came in the form of the Court’s acceptance to hear a
legislative veto case and the decision to invalidate the authority. More importantly, the Court did
not invalidate the veto on narrow grounds, but broadly, striking down nearly 200 pieces of
legislation with it. The Chadha decision marked the point that moved the institutions down a
new path, creating a jurisprudential regime that would later be reinforced in Bowsher and
Clinton. Further, Chadha illustrates how new issues are moved onto the Court’s agenda. While
there was a movement to keep structural issues off the docket by legal theorists and some of the
justices themselves, there was a growing conflict over the legislative veto. Politicians looked to
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the Court to make a determination regarding its constitutionality. Both sides were confident in
their arguments and welcomed the Court’s role. Giving the Court a voice on this issue expanded
judicial authority and allowed the Court to have the final say on this issue.
Ultimately, the Court had several options when addressing the legislative veto issue.
First, the Court could have remained silent and allowed the lower federal courts to continue to
invalidate or uphold legislative veto provision on a case by case bases. This would then leave the
overall constitutionality of the legislative veto intact. Second, the Court could have issued a
narrow decision on the veto, just as the lower federal courts had done in previous cases, thus
upholding the overall constitutionality of the legislative veto. This approach would have been a
compromise between the two side, placing a check on Congress so that they did not over use the
authority and return to only including veto provisions when it came to agency reorganization.
Third, the Court could have argued that the case was asking a political question and made a
political safeguards argument. Fourth, the Court could have heard the case and crafted a
deferential doctrine for the Court’s role in these situations. However, the Court approached the
issue head on and released a broad opinion striking down legislative vetoes in all instances. The
above analysis suggests that when it comes to clearly defined roles found in the Constitution, the
justices set aside partisan differences and upheld the will of the Framers rather than the current
functional arguments being made by a majority in Congress.
But would this decision have a lasting effect? The next chapter will discuss the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Act of 1985 and the decision to invalidate the reporting provision
of the legislation in Bowsher v. Synar. This chapter will illustrate how members of Congress and
the executive branch used the Chadha decision and constitutional debate to argue against the
constitutionality of the Act. Further, this chapter will detail how members of Congress,
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specifically Representative Mike Synar (D, OK) used constitutional deliberation in Congress and
in the press to argue against the Act and set up his suit to invalidate the legislation before the
Supreme Court.

CHAPTER 3
MR. SYNAR GOES TO COURT
One of the most pressing issues facing the United States in the 1980s was the budget
deficit. While getting the deficit under control was one area both parties could agree on (Rudder
2009, 268), substantial debate took place over the best means for accomplishing this goal. The
growing deficit led to the eventual passage of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Act
of 1985, better known as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (hereafter referred to as GRH). However,
this legislation was not without problems and strong opposition. An anonymous editorial to the
Washington Post argued that the “Gramm-Rudman plan would give Ronald Reagan (and his
1989 successor) an unexampled one-man budgetary discretion – possibly the most unbridled of
its sort in any English-speaking legislative tradition since King Charles I lost his head”
("Gramm-Rudman: Budget Bungle?" 1985). Democrat Representative Mike Synar (D, OK)
argued that GRH took power away from Congress that the Framers specifically gave to the
legislature for important reasons: “The Drafters of the Constitution . . . believed Congress should
make these hard choices because Congress is the branch of Government closest to the people”
(quoted in Roberts 1985). Speaking about earlier versions of GRH, Democratic Speaker of the
House, Thomas (Tip) O’Neil “called the measure ‘fake and a fraud,’ and said, ‘it's not going to
work.’ By next year, he said, Congress would be so upset with its own handiwork that it would
try to change the procedure and soften its impact” (quoted in Roberts 1985). Even when
President Reagan signed the bill into law, after expressing his pleasure that GRH would help
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reduce the deficit, he was quick to point out that it raised “serious constitutional questions” (Pear
1985).
In sum, GRH set maximum deficit amounts for federal spending from 1986 to 1991. The
controversial aspect of GRH came from the reporting stage of the law authorizing the
Comptroller General to issue direct reports to the president detailing the extent of the budget cuts
needed to bring the deficit under control. In turn, the president was charged with issuing a
sequestration order containing the budget reduction measures that were specified in the
Comptroller’s report. This reporting provision raised questions from members of Congress and
officials in the executive branch as to whether the Comptroller had the authority to force the
president into action and whether this was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.
Thanks, in no small part, to a provision in GRH that allowed for expedited judicial
review and granted standing to a member of Congress so that the law could be constitutionally
analyzed by the judiciary, Rep. Synar challenged the constitutionality of the law. In Bowsher v.
Synar (1986), the Supreme Court invalidated the reporting section of GRH because of the
executive role authorized to the Comptroller and the appointment clause, which makes the office
a member of Congress. The decision triggered a fallback provision that left the law mostly intact
but altered the way in which the budget cuts would be addressed.
The passage of GRH and its invalidation by the Court in Bowsher offers important and
unique opportunities to analyze how judicial precedent impacts congressional debate and how
constitutional debate in Congress influences judicial proceedings. First, through analysis of the
legislative history, discussion for and against GRH foreshadowed arguments presented to the
Court during litigation. David Mayhew (2004) and John W. Kingdon’s (1989) classic studies
argued that neither the Supreme Court or constitutional deliberation has an effect on
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congressional members decision making. However, as J. Mitchell Pickerill (2004) argued,
constitutional decisions by the Court and constitutional deliberation in Congress do have some
impact on the policy choices made by members of the legislature. In this chapter I will illustrate
how members of Congress use the legislative process in anticipation of a legal challenge, why
members of Congress follow through with threats of a suit, and to what extent congressional
debates in anticipation of legal challenges influence the Court.
Further, I will argue that in this situation the Court is acting as a quasi-independent policy
maker. Scholarship on the Supreme Court and political regimes would suggest that if Reagan
was a reconstructive president (Skowronek 2011), then it may take some time to remake the
Court in the image of the regime (see Dahl 1957). However, President Nixon had an important
role in shaping the Republican majority on the Court that was further entrenched by Reagan (see
McMahon 2011), and with five justices on the Court who were appointed by Republican
presidents and GRH being a primarily Republican endeavor, we would expect to see the Court
legitimate the policy. In turn, this decision would support the Reagan administration’s balanced
budget objectives. But this is not the result that came out of Bowsher. Additionally, the Court did
not adopt the predominant constitutional arguments against the bill in Congress or by the
executive branch, adopting a secondary justification for invalidating GRH, which further
protected the legislative process and the impact the decision would have on independent
agencies. The goal of this chapter is to use GRH and Bowsher to advance understanding of the
role of constitutional deliberation in Congress and the nature of the Court as an independent
policy maker within a political regime.
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Gramm-Rudman-Hollings and the Anticipation of Litigation
The budget deficit made GRH one of the most salient issues of the time. In November of
1985, 61 percent of respondents to a Gallup survey said that the budget deficit was a very serious
problem and 23 percent responded that it was a fairly serious problem (Federal Budget Deficit
2016). Out of domestic and economic issues, the deficit and unemployment were considered the
two most important problems facing the United States in January of 1985 (Aisch and Parlapiano
2017). Representative Pete Stark (D, CA) described it as a “cancerous deficit” (Stark 1985,
S9606). Senator Max Baucus (D, MT) called the budget deficit, “a looming presence in our
economy” (Baucus 1985, S12075). Senator Don Riegle (D, MI) argued that the deficit “is a
back-breaking load by any measure. We would be fools if we were to allow ourselves to
continue to move in this direction to amass that kind of fantastic debt burden” (Riegle 1985,
S12080). Even for those against passing GRH, all could agree that something had to be done
about the budget deficit. GRH was Congress’s attempt to place a check on budgetary spending
without tying the hands of legislators attempting to pass legislation. The ultimate goal of the Act
was to create a balanced budget by 1991 through maximum deficit amounts set in place for each
fiscal year. Exceeding the maximum deficit amounts triggered automatic cuts to bring the deficit
back under the maximum deficit amounts. In the final draft of the legislation these automatic cuts
were accomplished through a complex system where the Directors of the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) would estimate the federal
budget deficit for the coming fiscal year. If these estimates exceeded the target, then both offices
would issue reports to the Comptroller General detailing the cuts necessary to bring the deficit
under the target amount. The Comptroller would then review the suggested cuts and issue a

100
report to the President, who must then issue a sequestration order mandating the spending
reductions that were specified by the Comptroller General.
It is evident from the deliberation that took place in Congress over GRH, there were
legislators who were setting up a potential challenge before the judiciary. Although the
legislation did not go before the Committee on the Judiciary in either chamber, that is not to say
the deliberation was absent of constitutional discussion. A minority of members in both the
House and the Senate did not hesitate to object to GRH as a separation of powers violation, and
later those who testified offered the individuals who wanted to challenge the legislation strong
support and information for their arguments.
Debate and Development of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
The bill was introduced in the Senate in late September of 1985 as an amendment to a bill
to increase the debt ceiling by Senators Phil Gramm (D, TX), Warren Rudman (R, NH), and
Ernest Hollings (D, SC). Hollings argued that the amendment was to stop “the fraud that we have
all perpetrated on the American people and ourselves in the adoption of the budget” (Hollings
1985, S12569). Further, Rudman claimed that the deficit had doubled over a four-year period
because everyone in government was pointing fingers at someone else without anyone acting to
fix the problem. The amendment, for Rudman, was an opportunity to stop the finger pointing and
allow the politicians to finally take action on the growing deficit (Rudman 1985, S12574).
It was not until the second day of debate that a clear objection was raised over GRH.
Many Democrats spoke out against GRH because of what they characterized as a clear bias
toward the Republican agenda, such as cutting domestic spending while not allowing for cuts on
defense spending. As the debate continued, many who were not comfortable with GRH or were
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against it from the start began requesting more time, as they claimed the bill was changing by the
minute without any chance for members of the Senate to review those changes. Senator John
Johnston (D, LA) described the amendment as “the greatest act of self-deception and wishful
thinking that I have ever seen on the floor of the Senate in a long time” (Johnston 1985, S12629)
and later, referencing Chadha, claimed the bill was very damaging to the constitutional process:
In the recent Chadha decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, where they outlawed the
legislative veto, the Court went on at some length about the separation of powers between
the congressional and the executive branches and pointed out that it simply is not
constitutionally possible for one branch of Government to exercise the duties of the
other . . . This, Mr. President, is nothing less than a total abdication, in my judgment, of
legislative power. (Johnston 1985, S12631)
Senator Riegle reiterated these fears over concerns that the bill would continue to pile more
responsibility onto the executive branch at the expense of Congress, arguing that regardless of
which party holds the executive branch, it is a mistake (Riegle 1985, S12651). He stated:
As I reflect back over my 19 years in the Congress, when I have heard that kind of
stampede mentality and verbage used, it has been designed to try to ram something
through, poorly designed, poorly thought out, that has not been sufficiently challenged.
The hope is that somehow it will get jammed into law before people have a chance to
take a close look and perhaps change it and, if not change it, perhaps put it aside
altogether. (Riegle 1985, S12650)
Senator Rudman addressed these questions, arguing that the only constitutional question in
regard to the bill was whether these powers can be handed over to the executive. Rudman argued
that the Executive’s role in GRH was simply ministerial in function and was not delegating any
congressional authority to the president (Rudman 1985, S12670). Senator Gramm further
justified the bill as being a framework 43 states already used to ensure a balanced budget
(Gramm 1985, S12673).
But even with the assurance by multiple members of Congress toward the
constitutionality of the bill, Senator Gary Hart (D, CO) believed it was still unconstitutional:
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“Under the first option, the Gramm amendment resurrects the ability of the executive branch to
impound spending authorized and appropriated by Congress. Such authority was of dubious
constitutional validity when it was tried by President Nixon, and it suffers from the same defect
today” (Hart 1985, S12708).
The bill eventually passed through the Senate on October 10, 1985 without any
committee hearings, which became a focus of discussion when the bill was introduced in the
House where it was voted down. On November 1, the House introduced an amended version of
GRH, with many changes to ensure that the cuts would be more even across the board than those
proposed in the original amendment. But the most noteworthy change was the introduction of the
use of the CBO to calculate required spending cuts along with the OMB. Additionally, Synar
drafted and urged the adoption of a provision to be placed in GRH so that the legislation could be
fast tracked to the judiciary for constitutional review. This expedited review provision was
crucial for Rep. Synar’s future suit and according to his legislative director, Vincent LoVoi, easy
to be placed in the legislation even if there were some disagreement between those counseling
Synar through the process, specifically Alan Morrison the attorney who would eventually
represent Synar in his legal challenge and Abner Mikva, a former member of the House who
was, at the time, a judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. As
Lovoi explains:
I called Larry Gold the General Counsel of the AFL-CIO, I talked to Larry and said I
don’t really know about this area of law and he pointed me to Alan. But Larry even then
said you know, Vince, there is a model for expedited review in the Civil Rights laws
because those are cases, voting rights for example, you can’t wait three years for the
Court to decide. You have to get results quickly. And our concern was that we had budget
cuts aimed at low income people and it wouldn’t really help them much if three years
from now the Court overturned it. So, he said, just pull one of those models out. So that’s
what I began working on and Alan came in and said absolutely we will slide you right in
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there. And the fact that Mike’s pay is going to get cut harms him, gives him a “case or
controversy” and so we are fine. (LoVoi 2017)
But later, once Mikva began discussing the suit with Synar, he was not as comfortable with
members of Congress giving themselves standing. In an interview with LoVoi, he further
explained, Sen. Jim McClure (R, ID) sued to block Mikva’s appointment and placed a standing
clause for himself or other members of Congress in an appropriations bill (LoVoi 2017). Because
of this, LoVoi explains, “Mikva had very strong opinions against just writing standing into
legislation” (LoVoi 2017).
Under this original provision for expedited review, if any portion, most importantly the
role of the CBO, was found to be unconstitutional, then the entire package would be void. In the
final language of GRH, the expedited review provision remained, but it allowed for severability
of the reporting provision and an additional fallback clause. The original non-severability clause
was urged to ensure that if the CBO’s role was unconstitutional, the entire power of the budget
deficit was not handed over to the president (Synar 1985a, H9569). As Synar later discussed, this
addition was necessary in light of the many letters and testimony received from scholars
detailing the constitutional flaws in the legislation (Synar et al. 1987).
In a “Statement for Conference Report Regarding Judicial Review,” the report discussed
this expedited review provision, stating:
While the conferees believe all constitutional concerns have been successfully addressed,
it is obvious that some controversy remains. The Conferees want any constitutional issues
to be decided as promptly as possible. If any part of the Act is not constitutional, it is in
the interest of everyone in the executive and legislative branches as well as the public in
general, to know this as promptly as possible. (Synar 1985f)
The report continued, explaining:
An anticipatory review action under paragraph (a)(1) may be brought by any member of
Congress against the United States. The choices of a member of Congress as plaintiff was
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made for several reasons. First, some members, from their perspective as legislators and
without regard to the needs or interest of the executive, believe that provisions such as
section 251 of this legislation are harmful to Congress’s ability to carry out the
constitutional responsibilities that belong to the legislative branch. These members
believe that as soon as the triggering mechanism in this bill is in place, it will undermine
the give and take necessary to shape responsible appropriations legislation that takes
account of both fiscal realities and the relative priorities of the competing demands on the
government’s limited resources. (Synar 1985f)
Unlike the Senate, there was outspoken opposition from the very start of the House
debates over GRH. Rep. Jack Brooks (D, TX) argued that it was hard to find a single person who
could say with a straight face that GRH, or any version of it, is free of constitutional issues
(Brooks 1985a, H9598). Similarly, Rep. Peter Rodino (D, NJ) characterized GRH as an
“assault . . . on this fundamental constitutional principle of separation of powers” (Rodino 1985a,
H9607) and further argued that the Democrats version in the House did not completely solve the
constitutional issues. Rodino explained his reservation about GRH in a letter sent to Rep. Synar,
“The Gramm-Rudman proposal seeks to circumvent these constitutional requirements, as did the
legislative veto, except that Gramm-Rudman attempts to do so by delegating unconstitutional
powers to the President, rather than to one or both Houses of Congress” (Rodino 1985a, H9608).
He further argued that Congress can delegate the authority to implement laws, but it is unable to
constitutionally delegate authority to repeal laws, which is exactly what he believed GRH would
do. Additionally, Rodino was not relying on a single source for his argument but combining both
Court precedent in his reference to the legislative veto and legal arguments related to the Chadha
decision to argue against GRH.
A letter was also entered into the record from legal scholar Lawrence Tribe to Synar
explaining the unconstitutional nature of GRH. Tribe articulated that there were several flaws in
the legislation that garnered strong attention. First, GRH (in its original state) required the
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president to follow a predetermined deficit reduction schedule, which Tribe argued was an
infringement on the president’s constitutional power to draft and recommend legislation. Second,
it granted the president legislative power in that it allowed the executive to cut programs passed
by Congress. As the Court declared in Chadha, altering legal rights is the sole authority of the
legislature. Third, the CBO’s ability to force the president to make cuts gave the legislature
executive authority. This type of behavior and authority was previously ruled unconstitutional in
Buckley v. Valeo (1976). To this point, Tribe argued that the Court took the appointment clause
very seriously, “For the Court, the Constitution’s Appointments Clause is no mere matter of
‘etiquette or protocol’ but a vital structural check upon the power of Congress” (Tribe 1985,
H9609).
The entire floor debate in the House over GRH was contentious, and many were fearful
of the authority being handed over to the president and the unconstitutional nature found in the
formulation of the legislation. As Rep. Charles Rangel (D, NY) argued:
Keeping in mind, it is evident that the Reagan administration would like to push through
the Gramm-Rudman deficit reduction package without a thorough debate in Congress.
This is obvious when one realizes that the bill was rammed through the other body with
little or no in depth scrutiny. The President was given sweeping powers to cut funding for
social programs without the advice and consent of Congress. In effect, the executive
branch was given the power of the purse. (Rangel 1985, H9606)
Rep. Leon Panetta (D, CA), speaking in regard to Synar’s judicial fast track provision, stated,
“We also guarantee that there will be a constitutional test of this proposal which is absolutely
essential. This is not an issue on the deficit. We are all concerned about the deficit. This is an
issue of the Constitution, of justice and of the balance of powers” (Panetta 1985, H9604). Rep.
John Dingell (D, MI) channeled James Madison in arguing:
Whatever the form, Gramm-Rudman is the most extensive giveaway of congressional
authority in American history. We, as Members of Congress, should remember that if we

106
are to retain the power to legislate we cannot allow this power to be diluted. James
Madison, in Federalist 58, stated that the power of the purse represents, “the most
complete and effectual weapon with which any Constitution can arm the immediate
representatives of the people.” Make no mistake about it, Gramm-Rudman would dilute
the Congress’ power over the purse. (Dingell 1985, H9613)
In a final example, speaking in both political and constitutional terms, Rep. Theodore Weiss (D,
NY) asserted:
And so what they [Republicans] have come up with is this plan which is clearly
unconstitutional. It will not only reverse the constitutional checks and balances between
the executive and legislative branches but will also in the event of an economic recession
probably, through the fiscal straitjacket it mandates, force us into a depression. (Weiss
1985, H9617)
These sentiments were also expressed during committee hearings conducted by the House over
the early versions of the legislation that still remained free of the Comptroller General’s role that
was ultimately the most discussed aspect of GRH when challenged before the courts.
The first set of committee hearings were conducted by the House Committee on the
Budget. During these hearings, Charles L. Schultze of the Brookings Institute; Charles O. Jones,
a professor of government at the University of Virginia; and Norman J. Ornstein, resident scholar
at the American Enterprise Institute, expressed constitutional concerns regarding the Act during
questioning. Schultze expressed his concerns over the formulaic approach, which could severely
distort the separation of powers, while Jones argued that Congress should be careful when
altering the institutional framework in such a way as the Act would ultimately establish. As
Jones stated:
I implore those debating the issue to consider the institutional effects of the GrammHollings-Rudman proposal . . . [I]t is a plea to apply what we already know about
structural reform, what we already know about the constitutional separation of powers,
and the real roots of the present budget impasse. (Schultze 1985, 36)
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Just as Jones, Ornstein followed with arguments on the constitutional effects of GRH, stating that
the president would be given “enormous power . . . that is in effect legislative power as
contemplated by the authors of the Constitution” (Ornstein 1985, 38). This set the stage for the
next round of hearings conducted by the Joint Committee on the Budget, which afforded more
members of Congress and the Senate the opportunity to express their concerns over the early
version of the legislation.
Alan Blinder, a professor of economics at Princeton University, was confused by
Congress’s desire to give away so much power to the executive and urged resistance. Blinder
went further, stating, “I think we have almost a cynical game of who is more shrewd going on
here. I sense that a lot of people of my political stripe are voting for this turkey because they
think that it cuts defense far more than it cuts social programs” (Blinder 1985, 16). Rather than
making a constitutional argument, Blinder argued for a political reason as to why GRH should
not be adopted.
In a striking statement by the Chairman David R. Obey (D, WI), of the Joint Committee
on the Budget, remarked on the intentions of Congress when attempting to pass the legislation
and questioned its constitutionality:
We were also told, incidentally, by staff last week that there was no constitutional
workup done on Gramm-Rudman before it was passed. Then it was suggested to us that
since we couldn't figure out if it was constitutional before we passed it, we ought to pass
it, and we could find out afterwards in the courts whether or not it was constitutional.
When you hear comments like that, you have the right to ask whether it is true that the
Senate is the greatest deliberative body in the world. (Obey 1985, 32)
This point was echoed by many in Congress during public hearings, but none more than Rep.
Synar, who repeatedly questioned witnesses on exactly why there was no constitutional workup
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done on the legislation before being passed through the Senate (see Subcommittee of the
Committee on Government Operations).
The most extensive hearing took place in the House Subcommittee of the Committee on
Government Operations. The hearing began with testimony by Rep. Brooks who, as discussed
above, questioned why the legislation was able to pass through the Senate without any hearings
or testimony from the executive branch or other government officials voicing their opinions on
the legislation (Brooks 1985b, 1). A letter presented as testimony from Peter Rodino, the
Chairman of the Committee, repeatedly referenced Chadha, Buckley vs. Valeo (1975), and
Youngstown Sheet and Tube vs. Sawyer (1952) as evidence of the unconstitutionality of the
legislation. As he argued, “While under the Constitution Congress can delegate the authority to
implement laws, it cannot delegate the authority to repeal all laws. This is precisely what the
Gramm-Rudman proposal purports to do” (Rodino 1985b, 60 emphasis in original).
The Director of the OMB, Charles C. Miller III, was the first to be questioned during the
hearing, and began by reading a statement from President Reagan giving his full support to the
legislation:
Over the years, sincere efforts have been made by men and women of good will in both
parties to solve the chronic problem of overspending by the Federal Government, but the
problem has not been solved. We cannot escape the simple truth that the budget process
has failed . . . This legislation will impose the discipline we now lack by locking us into a
deficit spending reduction plan . . . If Congress cooperates and passes this legislation, we
can send a clear and compelling message to the world that the U.S. Government is not
only going to pay its bills, but we are also going to take away the credit cards. (Miller
1985, 67)
Miller continued by arguing that this was the first serious attempt at solving the very real
problem of the budget deficit. He further urged the committee to keep in mind that the president
is not able to act independently when making cuts and that the legislation is completely different
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from line-item veto. The president was not being authorized to pick and choose which programs
should have funding cuts because a formula was established. This argument was continued
during litigation before the courts in that the president in this instance and later the Comptroller
General are not authorized to make predictions as they wish.
Representative Synar’s questioning during this committee hearing is the most telling and
informative in regard to the changes made in the legislation and the future challenge in the
federal judicial system. Leading up to the hearing, Synar prepared a list of questions that he
circulated to other conferees who would be participating, with many of the questions referring to
the Chadha decision. First, Synar was curious about whether “Gramm-Rudman’s sequestration
trigger involves both OMB and CBO. OMB is in the executive branch and CBO is in the
legislative. Is this an unconstitutional sharing of power, in violation of INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
19, (1983)?” (Synar 1985c). Additionally, Synar asked, “Gramm-Rudman establishes that cuts
may be based on committee reports. Would this violate the explicit law-making process,
mandated by Constitution and described in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, (1983)?” (Synar
1985c). It was these questions and others that directed Synar in his questioning during the
hearing.
In an exchange between Synar and Miller, evidence shows there was little knowledge on
the part of the director of the CBO as to any legal discussions regarding the legislation:
Mr. SYNAR. Let's get specifically for the record, has the administration, or the Justice
Department, or any recognized legal group considered that GrammRudman may confer unconstitutional law-making powers upon the
President under article I, section 1, article I, section 7, clause 2, article I,
section 7, clause 3, or case law? Have you considered and analyzed that?
Mr. MILLER. Again, I am not a lawyer. I described it to you-- . . .
Mr. SYNAR. Mr. Miller, just give me an answer. Have you done that analysis or not?
Mr. MILLER. When I ask lawyers to review, I hand them a piece of legislation and say,
“Will you review this?” I would make a presumption that they would

Mr. SYNAR.
Mr. MILLER.
Mr. SYNAR.
Mr. MILLER.
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review it with respect to the entire Constitution. If you ask me have they
reviewed it with respect to this specific item or this specific article, I
would presume yes, but I do not have them at my table to say, “Did you
look at article I, section 7,” or something of that nature. I am trying to be
responsive to your question.
Do you have any written memos?
I do not.
So you have just talked about it?
Yes. (Synar 1985b, 101-102)

Just as the Senate, who took very little time to debate the legislation or engage in any type of
constitutional debate, Synar was finding the agencies charged with executing the legislation had
also done little to discuss the constitutionality of how they would carry out the bill once enacted
into law.
Louis Fisher (1985), a scholar and specialist in American national government, appeared
as the final witness in the hearing to answer questions regarding the constitutionality of the
legislation as written at that time, with the reports being sent directly to the president instead of
using the Comptroller General as a go between. Fisher’s purpose before the committee was to
analyze the bill in regarding to how it would affect the relationship between Congress and the
executive branch. Fisher’s testimony was nothing new, echoing the arguments made by many in
the House and Senate as to the unconstitutional nature of GRH. Just as Tribe had warned, Fisher
did not believe Congress could “constitutionally dictate to the President what aggregates will be
in his budget” (Fisher 1985, 198).
Second, Fisher (1985) argued that GRH would subordinate Congress to the president
because no one was sure what the bill would do, and therefore, there was going to be power
handed over to the executive branch that even those who were for the legislation were unsure of.
A more frightening aspect of this, for Fisher, was if too much power was handed over to the
president and if Congress wanted to take it back, any attempt would be subjected to a
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presidential veto. Using Chadha as precedent, Fisher explained, “Although 2 years ago in the
Chadha case it looked as though the instruction was that law would be made by a step-by-step
deliberative process, you will be making law through this bill in committee reports that would be
binding as though those reports, although the Chamber might not have acted on them, had passed
both Chambers and been enacted” (Fisher 1985, 199).
Representative Synar, who eventually spearheaded the suit against GRH, spent a great
deal of time in conversation with Fisher during his testimony. Specifically discussing
congressional authority to delegate, Fisher (1985) argued, “I think if you look at the vagueness of
what is being delegated, and second, the difficulty of recapturing control without a two-thirds
majority, and then the particular fiscal prerogatives here that have always been central to
Congress, I would say the bill would be unconstitutional” (Fisher 1985, 199). As will be
illustrated later, this was the foundation of Synar’s litigation, arguing that although Congress is
afforded the authority to delegate power in most instances, this legislation was so vague it must
be found unconstitutional. Fisher explained that before Chadha it would have been difficult to
invalidate legislation because of an undue delegation of power, but Chadha changed that “[p]rior
to Chadha, it looked as though the courts would be unlikely to strike down a delegation. Chadha
appears to call for a stricter doctrine of separation of powers” (Fisher 1985, 220). But Fisher also
expressed caution for those who claimed the Court would protect them if they made a
constitutional misstep:
I hope Members of Congress are not thinking that they may in this bill act in a certain
way, and if they gave away too much, that the courts will intervene on their behalf and
return it. It is very, very uncertain. I think if you are concerned about your power, you
have to protect them right at this point. (Fisher 1985, 220)
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Additionally, just as Tribe referenced Buckley in his letter to Rep. Synar, Fisher further argued
that a legislative actor cannot force the executive into action unless it is through an enacted law.
A final issue Fisher (1985) had with the legislation was the lack of legislative intent. The
floor debates up to this point were so contradictory and conflicting that the Court would find it
hard to rule in favor of GRH based on legislative intent, Fisher contended. To this, in a moment
of humor, Synar replied, “That is why yesterday . . . [it was] recommended that we staple Steve
Bell, the Senate staffer who wrote this, to the bill, because it is going to be necessary for us to
interpret all of this. That might be the only way to do it” (Subcommittee, 220).
The constitutional debate over GRH continued outside of floor debates and committee
hearings. In a memo from Janet Potts, the Assistant Counsel for the Subcommittee on
Administrative Law and Government Relations, to Rep. Dan Glickman (D, KS), Potts asserted:
[GRH] attempts to circumvent the Constitutional lawmaking process by delegating
unconstitutional powers to the President. Though its language merely directs the
President to issue an “order” requiring a reduction in expenditures – a mandatory duty
based on the projected economic conclusions of two bureaucrats, the effect of these socalled orders is to repel duly enacted appropriations statutes. It thus tries to authorize the
president to undo a law by something less than a law – and is thus unconstitutional. (Potts
1985)
Potts continued, stating, “The Framers of the Constitution were adamant that spending and
taxing be in the hands of the legislative body which would make the decisions and set the
priorities.” Ellen Nissenbaum, the Legislative Director of the Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, also weighed in:
As our analysis indicates, we believe that there are several serious issues regarding
Gramm-Rudman such as the way the automatic spending reductions are made, including
the fact that low income programs are not exempt; the discretionary authority accorded to
the President under this procedure; and the effect of this legislation on the economy.
(Nissenbaum 1985)
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And not everyone found constitutional fault with GRH. In a memo to the House
Committee on Government Operations, the American Law Division of the Congressional
Research Office argued that “while many ambiguities exist, the proposal does not delegate
unfettered authority to the President. . . The proposal, on its face, thus contains limits and
guidelines. Such standards and limits should blunt any delegation problems, particularly given
the acceptance by the courts of broad delegation of power to the President and executive
officials” (Ehike 1985). Additionally, in a statement about the necessity of GRH rather than from
a constitutional angle, the Secretary of the Treasury argued that “we find ourselves in a position
where continued Congressional inaction has moved the Treasury’s position from sound financial
management to unnecessary crisis management” (Baker 1985).
Concerns over GRH were not limited to the relationship between Congress and the
executive branch, as L. Ralph Mecham, the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States, explained in a memo to Rep. Dan Rostenkowski (D, IL), the Chairman of the Committee
on Ways and Means:
Because of the status of the Judiciary as a separate and coequal branch of the
Government, there are some unique implications to the method of formulating its budget.
In recognition of this constitutional reality, it has traditionally been provided by statute
that the judiciary budget may not be revised by the President or by OMB but instead shall
be included in the overall budget without change. (Rostenkowski 1985)
Thus, GRH would place the judiciaries’ budget in a delicate position, where members of
Congress feared the executive branch could use the budget process as leverage over the
judiciary.
The debate over the constitutionality of the legislation did not end in the committee
rooms or the floor of the House and Senate, overflowing into the press as well through editorials

114
drafted by members of Congress on both sides of the argument. This back and forth in the press
started with an October 4 unsigned editorial in regard to GRH:
Beware. The only way to balance the budget and control the deficit is to cut spending
equitably, which neither the President nor Congress seems able to do; or raise taxes,
which the President refuses to do; or both. No wonder everyone's rushing to embrace this
choice bit of balanced baloney. (The New York Times 1985, Oct. 4)
After this first attack on GRH, it took a little over a week for those working toward passing the
Act in the House to fire back with an editorial of their own in defense of the legislation. On the
15th of October, members of Congress – Connie Mack (R, FL), Robert Michel (R, IL), Richard
Cheney (R, WY), Trent Lott (R, MS), and Joseph Dioguardi (R, NY) – published an editorial in
favor of the Act, “The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings bill in the Senate and the Mack-Cheney
companion bill in the House are a clear signal to the American people and the world financial
markets that there is indeed a workable blueprint for achieving a balanced-budget by fiscal year
1991” (Mack et al. 1985).
On that same day a competing editorial was published in The Washington Post; the
unsigned editorial argued the Act was handing over too much power to the executive:
What is remarkable is that in its embarrassment, Congress is disposed to cancel, at one
hasty stroke, the Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974. That act aimed to retrieve
usurped spending authority from the Nixon White House, yet now the Gramm-Rudman
plan would give Ronald Reagan (and his 1989 successor) an unexampled one-man
budgetary discretion -- possibly the most unbridled of its sort in any English-speaking
legislative tradition since King Charles I lost his head. (The Washington Post, Oct. 15,
1985)
This was the original version of the Act that Synar and others were most outspoken about during
conference hearings, in which the Comptroller General was not yet included, instead allowing
the executive branch to make determinations from the reports filed by the CBO and OMB.
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Later, Senator Rudman took to the press to defend the legislation, arguing, “The bill does
one thing; it forces resolution of these policy differences. Failure of either the Congress or the
President to make these decisions will result in an obvious default of constitutional
responsibility, thus making accountability more certain” (Rudman 1985, Oct. 26). Two days
later, this was again attacked through another unsigned editorial arguing, “‘Something has to be
done about the deficit,’ say those who support the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget-balancing
bill already passed by the Senate. But some things are worse than the deficit, and GrammRudman-Hollings is one of them” (The New York Times 1985, Oct. 28). While these arguments
are not constitutional, but instead are more political, they illustrate the growing dissatisfaction
among many toward GRH.
Those in Congress and the press were quick to point out that the final version of the
legislation, with the inserted role of the Comptroller, was not subjected to any public hearings or
debate other than those that took place on the House and Senate floors (Fuerbringer 1985). This
is unsurprising given the fast paced nature of GRH in general terms and complaints about zero
constitutional markups being performed on the legislation. But that is not to say the early debates
and constitutional dialogue did not bring change. It is clear that changes occurred in light of the
arguments against the legislation, specifically those arguing that Congress does not have the
constitutional authority to delegate powers to the executive. According to Synar, there was a very
large call from the electorate to do something about the deficit, and “[t]he members were clear:
unless an acceptable alternative were offered, they would support Gramm-Rudman” (Synar, et
al. 1987, 679) that led to the final vote and passage of GRH in Congress, which will be discussed
in the following section to illustrate the point that while GRH was passed with bipartisan
support, it was not as easily passed as one might expect.
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Vote and Passage of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
At final passage, the Act received bipartisan support with the House passing the
legislation by a 273 to156 vote, and 63 to 33 in the Senate. GRH allowed members of Congress a
unique opportunity of both credit claiming and blame avoidance. As others have argued, “The
Gramm-Rudman budget-cutting mechanism is a perfect illustration” (Weaver 1986, 387) of
blame avoidance. “Congress sets in motion a process which months or years later causes cuts to
be made automatically, with no one directly to blame. Even the officials who would be
responsible for sequestering funds are simply following a mandated formula, so they cannot be
blamed” (Weaver 1986, 387). Members could continue to pass legislation without worrying
about the growing deficit and bring funding to their district or state. But if cuts were made
through the GRH mechanisms, members of Congress could then avoid blame because of the
automatic budget mechanisms put in place in the legislation. It would then be expected that
members in competitive districts would be more likely to vote in favor of GRH for this
opportunity to claim credit and avoid blame. But statistically, the voting behavior in the House
reveals some interesting results. Figure 10 displays the vote in GRH by party. More than half of
Democrats in the House voted in favor of the legislation, passing with a large bipartisan
majority. Figure 11 displays votes by competitive district and safe district.24 Figure 12 displays
the partisan breakdown of votes based on competitive and safe districts.

24

Safe seat variable was created from the partisan voting index. This is calculated by subtracting the
difference between the percentage who voted for the president nationally and the percentage who voted for the
president in a district. The smaller the difference, the more competitive the district.
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Throughout congressional debate, GRH was more heavily supported by Republicans than
Democrats, so these findings are expected. However, as illustrated in Figure 11 and Figure 12,
members in competitive districts were more likely to vote against GRH, especially for
Democrats. Considering the importance of the budget deficit to the public, it is surprising to find
Democrats in competitive districts voting against GRH. Research on voting behavior, such as
Mayhew (2004), would suggest that members of Congress would have voted in favor of the
legislation because the public was concerned about the budget deficit, and this would have been
a visible attempt to accomplish that goal. However, members of Congress could have spun GRH
as a measure that would ultimately hurt the district. As Gary Jacobson (1993) argued, “[I]nstead
of having to go on record as voting for cuts in specific programs, members of Congress could
support deficit reduction in general while taking credit for fighting to prevent cuts that would
otherwise occur automatically” (379). But members who voted against the measure could argue
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that deficit reduction is still a top priority but GRH would hurt the district more than help it. This
means money flowing into a district is more important than voting in favor of a measure the
public would widely support if it meant possible funding cuts to the district.
Specifically looking at Congressional leadership, in the House, both the Democrat
majority leadership (Jim Wright, Majority Leader; Tom Foley, Majority Whip) and Republican
minority leadership (Robert H. Michel, Minority Leader; Trent Lott, Minority Whip) voted for
GRH, with Speaker O’Neill abstaining. Although O’Neill did not vote, his vote would have been
for GRH when looking at his comments throughout the legislative process. While he raised
concerns over the legislation early in the process, he was part of a coalition arguing in favor of
the Act before the Court. In the Senate, Republican majority leadership (Strom Thurmond,
President Pro Tempore; Bob Dole, Majority Leader; Alan Simpson, Majority Whip) voted in
favor of GRH. However, Democrat minority leaders (Robert Byrd, Minority Leader; Alan
Cranston, Minority Whip) voted against GRH.
Once through Congress, on December 12, 1985, President Reagan signed GRH into law,
but not without reservations. In a signing statement, Reagan began by expressing his hope that
GRH would put the nation on the right path to deficit reduction. But his praise for the law was
short, as he was quick to point out, “I am mindful of the serious constitutional questions raised
by some of its provisions” (Reagan, 1985). As the executive branch later argued before the
Court, officers of the executive branch may only perform executive duties rather than the CBO
or the Comptroller General as was called for in GRH. Reagan also addressed the problems raised
in light of the recent Chadha decision; however, Reagan “hope[d] that the constitutional
problems [would] be promptly resolved so that the vitally important business of deficit reduction
can proceed” (Reagan, 1985).
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Just as members of Congress, specifically Synar, set up their later constitutional attack on
GRH during the legislative process, so did Reagan and the executive branch, who cited case law
and precedent to make the claim that the law had serious constitutional problems that must be
addressed. As will be discussed in the following sections, these claims are exactly the ones made
in briefs and during oral arguments. The key point is that those pushing for the passage of GRH
and arguing for it to be upheld in Court had substantial preexisting knowledge of the arguments
to come when the case was brought before the judiciary. The following section will illustrate this
point in a case study of GRH before the District Court and Supreme Court.
Mr. Synar Goes to Court: Gramm-Rudman is Struck Down
Mere hours after GRH was signed into law by President Reagan, Rep. Synar filed suit
against the legislation in the D.C. District Court. This was not surprising as Rep. Synar had been
working to build his case against GRH ever since it was submitted to Congress. As Synar stated
about the legislation:
My objection is that members of Congress acting on behalf of their constituents should
make those critical decisions and not surrender that responsibility to some computer and
some bureaucrats, in some basement, in some building here in Washington. And that’s
exactly what Gramm-Rudman wanted to do. Phil Gramm has basic distrust for
government. In fact, he hates government. I do not hate government. I see a role for
government, and that’s where the difference is. That’s the basic philosophical difference
that he and I have. (Synar 1986)
LoVoi (2017) further explained, “We felt strongly that Gramm-Rudman was a giveaway of a
core constitutional responsibility of Congress. We made two arguments. The broader argument
was that it was an undue delegation. That Congress simply can’t give that authority away. It must
do its job. The narrower argument was the separation of powers argument.” But, as LoVoi
continued, “It wasn’t a grand strategy by any means. It was a late-night conversation at a copy
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machine. But his whole purpose was that these were Congress’ responsibilities and they have to
do them.” And on top of the mixed support, a long list of interest groups reached out to members
of Congress to express their concerns about the legislation.25
These interest groups were concerned that funding they relied on to operate would be cut
if the budget deficit targets were not met. The Director of the National Legislative Commission
with the American Legion, E. Philip Riggin, urged members to vote against GRH if the
constitutional issues were not addressed, stating, “It is unwise, and probably unconstitutional, for
Congress to cede a substantial portion of its budgetary decision making to the Office of
Management and Budget and the Congressional Budget Office – two agencies which are not
accountable to the voting public” (Riggin 1985). The President of the American Public Welfare

25

Groups who wrote to Synar explaining their concerns over GRH include AFL-CIO, American Association for
Dental Research, American Association of Colleges of Nursing, American Association of Community and Junior
Colleges, American Association of Dental Schools, American Association of Retired People, American Association
of State Colleges and Universities, American Council of Education, American Council on Education, American
Federation of State and County Municipal Employees, American Federation of Teachers, American Nurses’
Association, American Public Welfare Association, Association for Retarded Citizens (National Branch),
Association for Retarded Citizens of Multnomah County, Association for Retarded Citizens/Maryland, Association
of American Universities, Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities, Association of Urban Universities,
Center for Law and Social Policy, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities,
Children’s Defense Fund, Coalition on Block Grants and Human Needs, Common Cause, Consortium for Citizens
with Developmental Disabilities, Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities, Food Research and Action Center,
Friends Committee on National Legislation, International Union, United Automobiles, Aerospace & Agricultural
Implement Workers of America, Leadership Council of Aging Organizations, Literacy Volunteers of America,
Lutheran Council of the USA, March of Dimes, National Association for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education,
National Association for the Education of Young Children, National Association of College Admissions Counselors,
National Association of Colleges and University Business Officers, National Association of Community Health
Centers, National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities, National Association of Manufacturers,
National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, National Association of Student Financial Aid
Administrators, National Coalition for Low-Income Housing, National Conference of Catholic Charities, National
Conference of State Legislatures, National Council of Churches, National Council of Higher Education Loan
Program, National Council of La Raza, National Council of Senior Citizens, National Council of the Churches of
Christ, National Organization for Women, National Political Congress of Black Women, National Urban League,
Ohio Youth Advocate Program, Save our Security Coalition, Service Employees International Union, Service
Employees International Union, The American Legion, The American Medical Student Association, The National
Caucus and Center on Black Aged, The National Council on the Aging, United Church of Christ, United Church of
Christ, United Church of Christ, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, United States Catholic
Conference, Villers Advocacy Associates, and Visiting Nurse Association. (see "Interest Group Letters" 1985)
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Association, Barbara B. Blum (1985), argued, “Our chief concern with Gramm-Rudman is that it
prejudices the federal budget process toward making substantial reductions in programs serving
low-income people—the very programs that have been disproportionately cut during the past
four years.”
Additionally, Executive Director of the American Association of Dental Schools, Richard
D. Mumma Jr. (1985), argued that the association understands the importance of fixing the
budget deficit; however, “. . . we are deeply concerned that efforts during the past several years
to control the budget and reduce deficits have been taken primarily at the expense of nondefense, discretionary programs. . . Alarmingly, the Gramm-Rudman amendment would
continue this thrust.” And the United States Catholic Conference’s Department of Social
Development and World Peace was concerned with the impact GRH would have on the poor
(Hehir 1985), while the AARP argued that “[a]s it currently stands, Gramm-Rudman will cause
extreme hardship to those who are most in need” (Brickfield 1985) because most of the cuts
targeted domestic social programs. Thus, while Synar was pushing a lawsuit to protect Congress,
special interests were backing his attempt to protect the government funding they relied on.
As LoVoi (2017) explained, the constitutional issue was left to Synar, and it was his
position to pursue because of his work with Lawrence Tribe. LoVoi recalled:
I was a night law student at the time and Mike had never practiced law in his life. We had
no authority, so that is why I reached out to Larry Tribe, because we knew he would have
a big footprint. . . What I asked for was a letter issue spotting. . . We don’t need you to
resolve anything, . . . But what we need you to do is issue spot and flag as many
constitutional issues as possible. So, he got that letter to me in about an hour, maybe a
couple hours. Conference was meeting at lunch time, early afternoon and we had that
morning to get ready. So, once I got the letter he faxed it to me and then I just made
copies for all the conferees and before the conference I just put one at each place setting
on the table. So, when the members arrived there was a letter from Larry Tribe saying
you guys are on constitutional thin ice.
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In a public statement, Rep. Synar explained, in detail, the reason and justification for his lawsuit
against the legislation: “I support a balanced budget. I believe dramatic action is needed to
achieve that goal. But I also deeply believe that there are basic principles underpinning our
system of government which cannot be violated. Further, I recognized the requirement of my
oath of office to protect and defend the Constitution” (Synar 1985e). Rep Synar concluded his
statement:
We cannot legislate leadership. Gramm-Rudman tries to insulate Congress from the hard
choices our founding fathers gave us and expected us to make. Our constituents deserve
no less. . . The drafters of our Constitution believed Congress should make these hard
choices because Congress is the branch of government closest to the people. (Synar
1985e)
Rather than explain this decision in political terms, Rep. Synar framed his lawsuit to Congress
and more importantly his constituents, in constitutional and legal terms. Whether this was a
political move or not, the use of these constitutional arguments illustrates the importance placed
on the law.
That same day, Rep. Synar released a second shorter statement, arguing, “I support a
balanced budget. I do not support this political excuse for one, however. Gramm-Rudman will
cause procedural chaos and jeopardize national security and the programs vital to Oklahoma
such as agriculture, education and transportation. We cannot legislate leadership” (Synar 1985d).
Again Rep. Synar focused on his elected role as a member of Congress, explaining how this
legislation would not only hurt his constituents but take away his elected duties as a
representative of Oklahoma.
But Rep. Synar was aware of the political consequences this suit could bring. In a memo,
LoVoi (1986) expressed concerns over the potential repercussion, “Our biggest vulnerability
after our lawsuit is a ‘September surprise’ in which members have to vote up or down, get
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pissed, and blame [Synar].” LoVoi also suggested there were those within the Democratic party
who were not one hundred percent comfortable with Synar’s suit, but they wanted to let him get
his chance. As LoVoi (2017) discussed:
Mike and I always had the impression, and I can’t point to anything specific, our sense
was there was some in the leadership who didn’t want us doing what we were doing.
They kind of saw that if we could blame Gramm and Rudman for a cut process that
actually reduces the deficit and lessens the political tension on this issue then it is winwin. Especially if Waxman and Jamie Whitten, and the others can do it in a way that
protects our core constituencies somewhat. Nobody ever said it explicitly, but there were
some. And there were others who were really believers. Then there were the ones like
Gephardt who said Synar is fricken nuts and I love the guy because of this. We want him
to do what he is doing.
Additionally, the Democratic party made it a point that this was Rep. Synar doing this and not
the official stance of the party:
[I]t was a pretty strong view that this was going to be Synar’s deal. In fact, the Democrat
leadership filed a friend of the Court opposing us. If you go through all of the amicus
briefs, you will find the Democratic leadership disagreed officially. But they did set it up
all along that it was kamikaze Synar’s deal. (LoVoi 2017)
However, Rep. Synar was not left completely alone in his pursuit to get the legislation struck
down. As will be discussed later, there were some members of his party who joined in his
lawsuit.
While Synar’s rhetoric on his lawsuit focused on the constitutional concerns, political
concerns are also important to note. First, as interest groups and members of Congress argued,
GRH would disproportionality affect social welfare spending compared to spending on defense,
which would be a clear victory for the Republican party. Second, if GRH was a success, it would
give a victory for the Republican party that could be used to campaign on in the 1986 election.
As LoVoi (2017) discussed, the Democrats wanted to use GRH as a campaign issue, but that
would be a moot point if the legislation was a success. Additionally, Synar and Gramm did not
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get along, with Synar going so far as to name his congressional softball team “The
Grammbusters” (Synar Papers). This conflict between the two members of Congress could have
led to Synar’s strong opposition to the legislation.
As for the constitutional arguments, throughout this process, Rep. Synar had help from
top legal minds beyond Lawrence Tribe. Helping Synar in his efforts were his future attorney in
the case, Alan Morrison, and former House members and at D.C. Circuit nominee Abner Mikva.
LoVoi (2017) explained, “I set it up to where Mikva would review everything so Alan on one
hand would be talking to me and I would run it all through Mikva.” LoVoi later found out the
other side also had a helping hand to guide them through constitutional issues on GRH:
[I]t was literally on Thanksgiving Day I was meeting with Republican Senate staff. We
were trying to get the final language put to bed. He turned to somebody on his staff and
said go clear this with the judge and I think it will work. I looked at him and said, you
have a judge too? And he said I do. I said, well I’ll tell you mine if you tell me yours.
And his was Scalia. So, he was consulting with Scalia. Well, months, weeks, later, when
the three-judge panel was convened, Scalia was on it. So, I went to Alan and I said we
can blow him out of the water. . . I was thinking politically. He is conservative, so he has
a red shirt on. And we are blue shirts. And Alan says, don’t mention this to anybody else.
I said, why not. He said, he will agree with us. He will be our best advocate. I said,
Scalia? And he said, yes.
Thus, both sides were not coming up with these constitutional arguments for or against GRH
completely on their own but were enlisting the advice of attorneys and judges to help them work
through the arguments.
In his suit, Synar was later joined by the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) as
a party. Leading up to the District Court decision, Alan Morrison and Katherine A. Meyer,
Synar’s attorneys, released a statement explaining their position in the case:
First, [GRH] amounts to an unconstitutional delegation of primary lawmaking powers
from the Congress to administrative officials. The brief contends the breadth of the
delegation, the fact that it relates to the sacred power of Congress to control the purse,
and the absence of any meaningful standards for determining whether the budget will
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meet the deficit target all establish that the statute unconstitutionally permits unelected
administrative officials to decide questions that the Constitution assigns to our
lawmakers. (Morrison and Meyer 1986)
The second reason was the mixing of legislative and administrative officers in making these
decisions.
In a three judge per curium decision, drafted by Judge Scalia, the District Court rejected
Synar’s argument that GRH violated the delegation doctrine, but invalidated the reporting
provision of GRH because the legislation vested executive power in the office of the Comptroller
General. Building on Chadha, Scalia argued:
[I]f the present statute had not inserted the Comptroller General between the President
and the report of the Directors of the CBO and the OMB, and if the determinations to be
made under the Act by the Comptroller General had been assigned instead to the
President himself, Congress could not constitutionally provide for legislative veto of
those determinations. ("Synar v. United States" 1986, 1402-1403)
This statement tells the most important part of the story from this decision. Scalia’s opinion
authorized a great deal of control for the executive over independent agencies, a fear both Synar
and many on the Supreme Court were not willing to accept. After the District Court decision,
pursuant to §274(b) of GRH, an appeal was brought directly to the Supreme Court.
At the Supreme Court, five distinct parties in Bowsher v. Synar appeared before the Court
with various arguments. Representative Mike Synar, the NTEU, and the United States (executive
branch) all argued against the legislation, but seeking different outcomes. For Rep. Synar, the
end goal was the invalidation of the entire Act. For the United States, the ultimate goal was to
invalidate portions of the Act that would ultimately give the executive branch increased authority
over independent agencies. On the opposite side of the argument, both the Brief of Bowsher (the
Comptroller General) and the Brief of the Speaker and Bipartisan Leadership Group were
attempting to persuade the Court to uphold the Act in its entirety. The following subsections will
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discuss the various parties’ arguments before the Court and finish with a discussion of the
Court’s decision in relation to the arguments presented by the different parties.
Argument by Congressman Synar and the National Treasury Employees Union
Both the brief for Synar and the NTEU mirrored one another in the arguments presented
and the order in which they were discussed. With Synar, House members Gary Ackerman (D,
NY), Albert Bustamante (D, TX), Silvio Conte (R, MA), Don Edwards (D, Cal.), Vic Fazio (D,
CA), Robert Garcia (D, NY), John LaFalce (D, NY), Jim Moody (D, WI), Claude Pepper (D,
FL), Robert Torricelli (D, NJ), and James Traficant, Jr. (D, OH) joined in arguing to strike down
GRH. For both parties, GRH represented an unconstitutional delegation of power, but the sole
difference in their arguments came from where they claimed they gained standing. For Synar
standing was awarded thanks to the provision of GRH that specifically gave standing to members
of Congress so the Court could analyze the constitutionality of the Act. The NTEU claimed and
was awarded standing because its members had their cost of living adjustments for 1986 frozen
thanks to GRH.
Because these two briefs followed the same arguments, attention will be focused on
Synar’s. Up front his brief conceded there is a long history of the Court upholding acts
delegating powers because of a pragmatic approach by Congress.26 As the Synar Brief argued,
“One reason that no decision of this Court since A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935), has overturned a delegation is that in no case since then can it fairly be said
that the purpose of the delegation was to enable Congress to evade its lawmaking
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see Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (1935), Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator (1941), Bowles v. Willingham
(1944), Yakus v. United States (1944), American Power & Light Co. v. Securities & Exchange Comm’n (1946),
Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute (1980).
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responsibilities” ("Brief of Appellees Mike Synar, Member of Congress, et al." 1985, 25).
Further, the argument largely rested on Justice Cardozo’s concurring opinion, which stated “that
a proper delegation ‘is born of the necessities of the occasion’” ("Brief of Appellees Mike Synar,
Member of Congress, et al." 1985, 26). For Synar and the appellees, GRH was nothing more
than blame avoidance so Congress could continue to pass legislation and government programs
as they wished and did not have to make the hard decision on what should or should not be
funded. More clearly, they were asking the Court to establish a set of rules to follow when
delegating authority and not allow delegations the sole purpose to “abdicate their function”
("Brief of Appellees Mike Synar, Member of Congress, et al." 1985, 26).
Further, quoting a special concurrence by Justice Rehnquist in Industrial Union Dep’t,
AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute (1980):
It is the hard choices and not the filling in of the blanks . . . which must be made by the
elected representatives of the people. When fundamental policy decisions underlying
important legislation about to be enacted are to be made, the buck stops with Congress
and the President insofar as he exercises his constitutional role in the legislative process.
("Brief of Appellees Mike Synar, Member of Congress, et al." 1985, 29)
Thus, the main argument presented by Synar and the other appellees was that Congress was
delegating simply to avoid blame on the tough decisions it is constitutionally obligated to make
in the budget process. They further reinforced this argument by connecting it to the recent
Chadha decision in which the Court had asserted, “The fact that a given law or procedure is
efficient, convenient and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not
save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the primary
objectives—or the hallmarks—of democratic government.... “ ("Brief of Appellees Mike Synar,
Member of Congress, et al." 1985, 30).
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In a secondary argument, relying on Buckley v. Valeo (1976), the Synar brief argued that
the roles delegated in the Act could not fall on an official who was controlled by the legislature.
As previously discussed, this is precisely the point the District Court made when invalidating the
role of the Comptroller General. As for Chadha, Synar argued that the sharing of administrative
duties authorized to the CBO under GRH constituted a violation of the legislative process as
decided in Chadha.
Argument by the United States (Executive Branch)
The executive branch did not directly come out and express its wish for the Court to rule
in its favor so the president could have increased control over independent agencies, and during
oral argument, they were clear to point out they were also not calling into question the
constitutionality of other independent agencies. But the ultimate goal was to gain increased
power over these agencies for the executive branch and the Court was aware of this. The brief’s
main focus was centered on the appointment clause and rested on decisions in Meyers v. United
States (1926), and Humphrey’s Executor v. United States (1935). In Meyers, as the U.S. argued,
the Court determined that the appointment and removal of officers charged with the
administration of laws falls on the executive branch. Similarly, in Humphrey’s, the Court ruled
the president could only remove officers for cause when they performed quasi-legislative or
quasi-judicial functions. These cases uphold the argument that if an officer of the U.S.
government is given administrative and/or executive duties, the officer is then under the
authority of and removable by the president. In the case of GRH, the Comptroller was an officer
of Congress and thus could not be given authority that is granted to the executive branch.
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Similarly, like Synar, the brief for the U.S. relied heavily on the recent decision in Chadha to
further support their argument.
While the brief acknowledged that the fallback provision in GRH was constitutional, the
U.S. government argued that if Congress wanted to leave the calculations in the hands of the
administration, then the power should have been given to the executive branch:
But if Congress chooses instead to enact a law that provides for administrative
calculation of the precise spending cuts required throughout the Executive Branch, the
execution of that law is the responsibility of the President, who is the people's elected
representative in the Executive Branch. ("Brief for the United States" 1986, 11)
But just because the executive branch was hoping for a ruling that empowered the fallback
provision, the result of the argument was in hopes of gaining more control over all independent
agencies. As the brief stated, “The result of implying any Senate role in removals would be
seriously to undermine the unity and sense of responsibility that were deemed essential to the
Office of the President as established by the Constitution” ("Brief for the United States" 1986,
21).
The executive branch’s argument followed the logic addressed by Richard Neustadt
(1991), who asserted that Reagan did little by way of stopping the budget deficit from increasing.
But what he did do was attempt to use the deficit to his advantage to change the political climate
of the time. Reagan never once stopped advocating for a balanced budget; even though many of
his own policies were increasing the budget every day, Reagan “denied responsibility and
blamed Congress for not cutting social programs more than a bipartisan majority was willing to
do” (Neustadt 1991, 278). Thus, just as Synar was arguing that through GRH Congress was
attempting to push the blame and responsibility on to the President, Reagan was placing blame
on Congress.

131
Argument by the Comptroller General
The office of the Comptroller General, Charles Bowsher, took a different approach in the
argument before the Court. First, in support of GRH, the Comptroller argued that the Court
should first look to the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, which created the Office of the
Comptroller General. Under the terms of this Act, the Comptroller is removable only by a joint
resolution that then must be signed or vetoed by the president. Because of this, the Comptroller
argued this did not make his office subservient to any single branch of government.
Citing Glidden Co. v. Zdanok (1962) as precedent, Bowsher argued that if the removal
provision of the 1921 Act is incompatible with GRH, then the removal provision in the 1921 Act
should be severed and invalidated instead of invalidating the 1985 provisions in GRH. In
drafting the 1921 Act, Congress authorized the Comptroller to perform administrative duties.
Furthermore, the removal provision, if the Court considered the legislative history, was in no
way intended to make the Comptroller subservient to Congress ("Brief for Appellant
Comptroller General of the United States" 1986).
Argument by the Speaker and Bipartisan Leadership Group, and the Senate
The final parties presenting arguments before the Court in Bowsher came from the
Speaker of the House, Tip O’Neil, and a bipartisan leadership group, along with the Senate as a
separate party. Both groups issued similar arguments before the Court. The bipartisan leadership
group consisted of House Majority leader Jim Wright, Republican Leader Robert Michel,
Majority Whip Thomas Foley, and Republican Whip Trent Lott. In their argument before the
Court, the Speaker’s brief argued that GRH did not violate any specific provision of the
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Constitution. Relying on case law similar to Synar’s, the Speaker agreed with Humphrey’s and
Buckley that Congress and the president may delegate powers to independent offices.
First, the Speaker argued that the functions assigned to the Comptroller under GRH were
a suitable nature to an independent officer. Those challenging the Act, according to the Speaker,
through Humphrey’s and Buckley did not allow for independent agencies to perform functions
that include interpretation or application of laws. But as the Speaker argued, interpreting and
applying law for the Government Accountability Office (GOA) and other independent agencies
is “the heart of the functions performed every day for the past century and longer by independent
regulatory commissions and their precursors” ("Brief of the Speaker and Bipartisan Leadership
Group" 1986, 12). Further, this type of action is exactly what the Federal Trade Commission
was doing in Humphrey’s and the War Claims Commission was doing in Wiener v. United States
(1958), which the Court upheld. Before moving on to the next point, the Speaker concluded that
if the delegation is constitutional, then the role of the Comptroller falls in line with actions
upheld by the current Court in previous cases.
Second, the Speaker claimed that the Court allowed for a more flexible view of
separation of powers and has repeatedly rejected claims for an “archaic” view. Quoting Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services (1977), the Court “rejected the ‘archaic view of the separation
of powers as requiring three airtight departments of government’” ("Brief of the Speaker and
Bipartisan Leadership Group" 1986, 15). Additionally, when the Court has invalidated
legislation on the grounds it violated separation of powers, the Court has had clear textual
support for the violation. This was true, according to the Speaker’s brief, in Chadha, Buckley,
and Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline (1982), but when analyzing GRH,
there is no single provision found in the Constitution that restricts the Act.
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The third and final argument presented by the Speaker and the Bipartisan Leadership
Group further addressed the role of the Comptroller as an independent officer. The Speaker’s
brief did however caution the Court against finding support for the Comptroller’s argument in
relation to the 1921 Act, arguing that it hurts the stance that the Comptroller is an independent
officer. The reason the 1921 Act was signed into law was because of the removal provision of
the Comptroller, which ensured that neither branch could encroach on his authority. Thus,
invalidating the removal provision from the 1921 Act could place the Comptroller in a difficult
situation.
Separately, the Senate made a four-point argument before the Court. First, as an
appointee of the president, the Comptroller General is an officer of the United States and citing
Buckley, “may exercise ‘significant governmental duty . . . pursuant to a public law’” ("Brief of
Appellant United States Senate" 1986, 9). The office was created as an independent office in the
1921 Act. Second, the removal power over the Comptroller was created to ensure the office
would be independent to perform the duties authorized to the office. Third, the Court has never
decided a case regarding the separation between the legislative and executive branches before
any action had been taken. All cases cited to invalidate the legislation (Buckley, Meyers,
Chadha) came after action was taken. Fourth, Congress conferred the budget authority to the
Comptroller in GRH because of the long-standing history of the Comptroller being an
independent office.
Supreme Court Decision
In a seven to two decision, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the District Court ruling,
invalidating the role of the Comptroller General in the budget process and thus triggering the
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fallback provision. In a mixed ideological coalition with Chief Justice Burger, writing for the
majority, and Brennan, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor joining, Burger argued that the
removal powers were the “critical factor” in the decision ("Bowsher v. Synar" 1986, 727-728).27
Referencing Chadha, which struck down the legislative veto, as well as older case law such as
Myers vs. U.S. (1925), Humphrey’s Executioner vs. U.S. (1935), Weiner vs. U.S. (1958), and
Buckley vs. Valeo (1976) to make arguments regarding both the removal powers of the branches
and the legislative process, the Court argued that it has always been clear that the Comptroller
General is an officer of the legislative branch and to have the office engaged in executive duties
while being removable through impeachment or by joint resolution violates the removal powers
of an executive officer.
The Court did not directly address the main argument by Rep. Synar in the majority
opinion, instead leaving any discussion about improper delegation of legislative power to a lone
footnote:
Because we conclude that the comptroller General, as an officer removable by Congress,
may not exercise the powers conferred upon him by the Act, we have no occasion for
considering appellees’ other challenges to the Act, including their argument that the
assignment of powers to the Comptroller General in §251 violates the delegation
doctrine. ("Bowsher v. Synar" 1986, 736)
Instead of addressing the main argument, the Court followed the District Court’s lead, relying on
the removal power provisions to invalidate §251 of the Act. This is the secondary argument
made in Synar’s brief.
Synar’s delegation argument was not ignored by all of the justices. In a concurring
opinion drafted by Justice Stevens, joined by Marshall, Stevens believed the delegation argument
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The coalition consisted of a wide ideological spectrum with two conservatives, two moderates, and one liberal.
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was precisely the path the Court should have taken when adjudicating the case. For Stevens, if
the Court concluded that the Comptroller is clearly a member of and acting under the authority of
the legislative branch – but under this act is engaged in executive action – then §251 should be
invalidated because of an improper delegation. Again referencing Chadha, Stevens writes:
[E]ven though it is well settled that Congress may delegate legislative power to
independent agencies or to the Executive, and thereby divest itself of a portion of its
lawmaking power, when it elects to exercise such powers itself, it may not authorize a
lesser representative of the Legislative Branch to act on its behalf. ("Bowsher v. Synar"
1986, 757-758)
Stevens acknowledged that Congress can delegate its powers if it so chooses but not its own
powers to a smaller body within itself, as discussed in Chadha.
The majority’s argument was even more problematic, for Stevens, when looking at the
fallback provision that was triggered by the majority’s opinion. If the Supreme Court and District
Court opinions are correct that the Comptroller’s authority under the Act was executive in
nature, then analysis of the fallback provision should also be conducted. The fallback provision
would then give the same powers originally handed to the Comptroller to Congress. Those
powers were decided to be executive in nature, which leads again to the question of whether this
Act is an undue delegation of power ("Bowsher v. Synar" 1986, 751-752). Put in simpler terms,
the majority opinion argued that when these functions are performed by the Comptroller, they
are executive, but when performed by Congress, they are legislative. Stevens did not believe that
this would be considered an undue delegation because the function could be labeled legislative in
nature no matter if the Comptroller and/or executive agency was acting.
When addressing the arguments put forward by the United States, the justices on the
Court were aware of the executive’s goal to obtain enhanced authority over independent agencies
and they took steps to inform Justice Burger over their fears that the Court opinion may give the
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executive branch what they wanted. Justice Stevens urged Burger to narrow the language in the
original drafts to apply only to the case before the Court to not give the impression that the
executive branch had increased control over independent agencies (Harriger 1998, 514). Justice
Marshall’s clerk also feared this result in a memo addressed to Marshall:
The most important thing to keep in mind during this case is the hidden agenda of the
Reagan Administration and Judge Scalia . . . If they can get this Court to strike down sec.
251 on the ground that it allows executive power to someone not under the President’s
control, they will set the stage for an attack on the independence of a host of agencies like
the NLRB, the FTC, etc. The SG doesn’t flat out attack Humphrey’s Executor (1935) . . .
he merely says that when Congress can actually remove an officer who exercises
executive powers, as here, the situation is clearly unacceptable. There is no reason we
should buy this argument . . . Moreover, any decision in this direction will give the SG
more ammunition when he does attack the independent agencies. (quoted in Harriger
1998, 515)
The Solicitor General refuted this during oral arguments, but the point is clear. A decision that
follows this line of logic would leave the door open for the executive branch to have greater
control over independent agencies or for further litigation to take place to accomplish this end.
This point is addressed in a lengthy footnote in Burger’s majority opinion:
Appellants therefore are wide of the mark in arguing that an affirmance in this case
requires casting doubt on the status of “independent” agencies because no issues
involving such agencies are presented here. The statutes establishing independent
agencies typically specify either that the agency members are removable by the President
for specified causes . . ., or else do not specify a removal procedure . . . this case involves
nothing like these statutes, but rather a statute that provides for direct congressional
involvement over the decision to remove the Comptroller General. Appellants have
referred us to no independent agency whose members are removable by the Congress for
certain causes short of impeachable offenses, as is the Comptroller General. ("Bowsher v.
Synar" 1986, 725)
As many of the Justices on the Court stressed, Burger, through a footnote, made the point clear
that this case only relates to the actors before the Court and has no further application to other
independent agencies. Further, the evidence presented to come to this result was found to be
insufficient to do so.
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Just as the District Court, the Supreme Court did not follow the arguments by the
Comptroller General. As the majority opinion pointed out, the inclusion of the removal power in
the 1921 Act was intended to bring the Comptroller under the sole authority of Congress, “so
Congress at any moment when it found he was inefficient and was not carrying on the duties of
his office as he should and as the Congress expected, could remove him without the long, tedious
process of a trial by impeachment” (quoted in "Bowsher v. Synar" 1986, 728). While Justice
White, in dissent, contended that the removal of the Comptroller could not be done at will but
only for specific reasons, Justice Burger found that removal due to inefficiency, neglect of duty,
or malfeasance was broad and could allow Congress to remove the Comptroller for any number
of reasons.
More importantly to the majority, the Comptroller was tasked with heading up the GAO.
This office was created by Congress to be an office independent from the executive and as part
of the same 1921 Act in question. In addition to the legislative history of the 1921 Act that
Bowsher used to argue that his office was independent and not a part of the legislature, previous
Comptrollers made clear claims their office was part of the legislative branch. Numerous quotes
between 1924 to the present illustrated that Comptrollers believed they were officers of Congress
(see "Bowsher v. Synar" 1986, 730-732). Overall, the Comptroller General’s argument before
the Court gained very little ground.
Finally, the Speaker and Bipartisan Leadership Group, along with the Senate, used case
law similar to the abovementioned parties, but it ultimately worked against their argument in
light of Justice Burger’s appointment clause justification. As Burger argued in relation to
Humphrey’s, Wiener, and Buckley, “Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of
an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment” ("Bowsher v. Synar"
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1986, 726). The Court did uphold the duties and responsibilities of independent agencies, but
when an officer of those agencies is charged with executive duties and removable by Congress
other than impeachment, then the act becomes unconstitutional.
In the end the fallback provision triggered by the Court’s ruling in GRH was found to
have little effect on government spending. Both branches found ways to get around provisions of
GRH that aimed to stop the increased budget deficit (see Schick 1980; Russo 1990; Fisher 2012).
When all was said and done, by the end of GRH’s run, it never once met any of its deficit
reduction targets.
Discussion
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings and the decision in Bowsher illustrate important points about
constitutional debate in Congress, Court decision making, regime politics and the path dependent
dynamics of judicial decisions. Focusing first on Congress, the debate and passage of GRH helps
illustrate how legislators engage in blame avoidance and utilize legislative deferrals. Synar and
others repeatedly claimed throughout the legislative process, GRH was nothing more than blame
avoidance so members could continue to promise their districts whatever they wanted. Even
when responding to negative constituent letters, Synar made sure to explain how this automatic
process of debt reduction was not the intended process the Framers envisioned for Congress in
the budget process (Synar 1985d). As for congressional voting behavior, similar behavior was
illustrated in 1990 when Congress passed President Bush’s deficit reduction package. Members
who faced considerable opposition during reelection voted against the package, allowing them to
avoid blame when budget cuts went into effect. A large enough bipartisan majority was safe to
vote for the package without risking their seat (Jacobson 1993). But with GRH, members were
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afforded an additional out, the loud claims that it was unconstitutional and the provision for
expedited judicial review.
Congressional leadership also defied what would be expected in that when leadership
does not consider the authority of the institution and places a greater concern on partisan politics,
the authority of the institution is diminished (see Mann and Ornstein 2009). In the House, both
the Democrat majority leadership (Jim Wright, Majority Leader; Tom Foley, Majority Whip) and
the Republican minority leadership (Robert H. Michel, Minority Leader; Trent Lott, Minority
Whip) voted for GRH, with Speaker O’Neill abstaining. Although O’Neill did not vote, his vote
would have been in favor of GRH. While he raised concerns over the legislation early in the
process, he was part of a coalition arguing in favor of the Act before the Court. In the Senate,
Republican majority leadership (Strom Thurmond, President Pro Tempore; Bob Dole, Majority
Leader; Alan Simpson, Majority Whip) voted in favor of GRH. However, Democrat minority
leadership (Robert Byrd, Minority Leader; Alan Cranston, Minority Whip) voted against GRH.
This could suggest that even if the institution is losing authority over a key power granted to
Congress, delegating authority over budget cuts to an agency or the executive aids the institution
in blame avoidance. Meaning institutional maintenance is not always about keeping power and
authority, but about doing what is best for all members when it comes to public opinion and
reelection.
The legislative history also illustrates Lovell’s (2003) three criteria for a true legislative
deferral. First, members of Congress, both for and against the legislation, did draw attention to
the “ambiguities and interpretive questions that judges would later decide” (41). Questions were
raised in connection to its constitutionality throughout the floor and committee debates. The
second and third criteria were met with the provision allowing for expedited review by the Court.
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The expedited review provision gave both a future role for the Court and rejected provision that
could “limit the discretion of the courts” (Lovell 2003, 41). Further, deferrals to the Court
through expedited review provisions may enable the justices an avenue for independent policy
making because it did not simply invite judicial review, it caused judicial review.
As for the Court, the decision in Bowsher illustrates important information about decision
making and regime politics. Most importantly, the Court took careful steps to ensure that the
Reagan administration was not getting exactly what it wanted with enhanced or complete control
over independent agencies. However, it is argued that Clinton, as in Chahda, was a move by
Justice Burger to once again protect presidential authority by striking down legislation that
would give a congressional agent executive authority (see Chemerinsky 1987). This is supported
by early versions of Burger’s opinion that would have gone even further and ruled that
independent agencies were unconstitutional, which would have been strongly supported by the
Reagan Administration (see Schwartz 1990). But unlike areas such as federalism in which the
Court later helped to further the policy interests of the Reagan administration, the Court took
steps to ensure that no single branch was afforded greater authority than the other, upholding a
clear separation between Congress and the executive branch. Moreover, it built on Chadha,
which clearly stated the legislative process cannot be altered.
Just as Keck (2007b) illustrated, Bowsher does not fit into theories based on ideology or
regime. A large mixed judicial coalition invalidated the reporting function of GRH, a policy that
garnered bipartisan support, was a key policy for the President and was wanted by the public.
The justices feared the opinion might authorize excessive authority to the executive branch,
suggesting the Court was concerned with its constitutional duty to protect the legislative process.
As for the salience of the case, Bowsher did appear on the cover of the New York Times the day
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after the decision was announced, and the article stated, “It was one of the Chief Justice's most
important rulings since he took office in June 1969” (Taylor 1986, 1a). It was Chief Justice
Burger’s opinions in separation of powers cases that were the most important in his career, with
the Bowsher opinion marking the last opinion he drafted before retiring from the bench later that
year.28
But that is not to say this type of ruling had an impact on U.S. citizens to any great degree
to make it an issue that would impact both the public and their representatives in Congress come
election time. The Court was not issuing a ruling on the budget deficit itself or arguing that
Congress could not take action to fix the deficit. Early in President Reagan’s first term there was
debate as to whether a budget deficit mattered much in relation to the success of the United
States economy (Atkinson 1981). But by the mid-1980s, it was a universal belief that something
had to be done, and a key policy of the Reagan administration. Speaker of the House, O’Neill
argued in 1985 that “[t]he main issue in America today is not trade, is not taxes, is not foreign
affairs. The main issue is the deficit” (Dewar 1985).
The troubling nature of the deficit was not lost on the citizens of the United States.
Gallop Poll surveys illustrate that from December of 1984 to January of 1989 between 54 to 63
percent of those surveyed characterized the federal budget deficit as a very serious problem for
the country, which is contrasted with a drop to 40 percent in 1998 of those who characterizing
the deficit as a very serious problem (Gallup 2015). Further, in 1980, the list of the most
important problems facing the nation, the budget deficit did not appear as a response to this
open-ended survey question. But the economic situation was listed as the most important (Gallup
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majority opinion in Chadha.
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June 1980). In 1985, the budget deficit was seen as the third most important problem facing the
country, behind fear of war and unemployment (Gallup Jan, 1985). The trend continued into
1986, with the top three responses remaining unchanged (Gallup Jan, 1986a). However, in a
contrast to these polling numbers, as Rep. Synar explained in an interview a few months after the
Bowsher decision, the budget deficit was not as salient as the polling numbers suggest:
I thought there would be an outrage by this time by the American public concerning these
deficits. There hasn’t been that outrage; hence, the American public hasn’t focused in on
members of Congress and scrutinized how they have dealt with the deficit problem.
Again, . . . if you don’t get the America public focused in on the process, political
pressures will not develop. (Synar 1986)
But there was clearly a majority within Congress who thought otherwise.
While opinion polling suggests the deficit was a salient issue to the general public, GRH
and Bowsher did not reach a point of being salient. As displayed in Figure 13, A Gallup Poll
from January of 1986 asked respondents, “Have you heard or read about the Gramm-RudmanHollings act, which sets mandatory targets for spending reductions that would cut the federal
deficit from about $200 billion at present to zero by 1991? (If ‘yes,’ ask) Do you approve or
disapprove of this act?” (Gallup Jan, 1986b). Fifty-five percent responded, “Haven’t heard/read
of act.” Of those who had heard of GRH, 26 percent approved of the Act, 9 percent disapproved,
with 12 percent holding no opinion (Gallup Jan, 1986b). A similar poll, as displayed in Figure
14, conducted by Money Magazine, found that 80 percent of respondents did not know enough
about GRH to explain it to someone else (Magazine May, 1986). With more than half of
respondents claiming they had not heard of or read about GRH in one poll and another poll
reporting that 80 percent of respondents did not know enough about GRH to explain the Act,
there is little evidence to support the idea that the legislation itself was salient enough to garner a
response from the public when the Court invalidated a key provision. This helps illustrate the
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point that while an issue may be salient, the actions of Congress and the Court may fall outside
the scope of public interest.
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Figure 13: Have you heard or read about the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, which sets
mandatory targets for spending reductions that would cut the federal deficit from about $200
billion at present to zero by 1991? (If 'yes,' ask) Do you approve or disapprove of this act?
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Figure 14: Do you understand the term “Gramm-Rudman” well enough to explain to someone?
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In the immediate aftermath of Bowsher, it received substantial attention regarding the
impact it would have on independent agencies, while other sources focused on the formalistic
approach the Court used in dealing with separation of powers just as it had done earlier in
Chadha (see Fisher 1987; Harriger 1998). What has been missing from the discussion is the
independence of the Bowsher decision and how it built on Chadha to set a limit as to how far
Congress could delegate and diverge from the legislative process.
In addition to the lack of salience and possibility of the justices feeling a sense of
institutional duty suggested from this study, there was a lack of direction from Congress and past
case law for the Court to follow, which further added to the Court’s ability to act independently.
As Gillman (2008) argued, there may be times of divided government or the absence of a concise
voice to guide the Court when searching for an agenda to follow. During the legislative
deliberation there was a clear lack of a single voice, with members complaining that the language
of GRH was changing by the minute. Even Fisher expressed this point during testimony, arguing
that everyone appeared to be confused over what GRH does which will result in the Court
finding it difficult to establish the exact legislative intent of the Act.
Most importantly, GRH and the Bowsher decision illustrate the role of path dependency
on political actors and the judiciary. Members of Congress, both those who were for and against
the legislation, cautioned passage of the legislation in light of the Chadha decision. While typical
path dependent cycles are perpetuated by political majorities who attempt to further solidify their
policy preferences, in this instance it comes from the political minority that was attempting to
protect its institution. For the judiciary, the justices on the Supreme Court had two very viable
options. First, the Court could have upheld GRH and marked a return to the previous standard in
which the judiciary abstained from getting involved in separation of power disputes to allow
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them to be decided through electoral politics. But the Court had enough support in Congress and
the legal community to do so and the Court continued down the path it had set in Chadha,
holding political actors to the very preciously set legislative process integral to the founding of
the system of government. Additionally, the expedited judicial review provision appears to have
enabled independent policy making by the Court, and arguably judicial supremacy with
Congress not just simply inviting judicial review but causing it. This is further evidence of
political actors supporting the judicialization of politics and policy, creating a path that leads us
to what we are seeing today with lawsuits against the Obama administration.
Conclusion
The above research suggests two important findings. First, constitutional deliberation has
an influence on the legislative process and the resulting litigation in Court. Members of Congress
were vocal in their worries over the constitutionality of GRH, and with the addition of an
expedited judicial review provision, the arguments made during deliberation were discussed
before the Court. These concerns, while not exactly what the Court decided, still shaped the
legislation and had an influence on the final judicial outcome. Second, the Court was able to act
independently in a case, Bowsher, deciding a separation of power issue. Because this issue is less
salient and was decided by a large mixed judicial coalition, it illustrates that the justices put aside
their partisan differences (for the most part) and issued decisions based on institutional duty
rather than ideology or strategy.
In the next chapter, I turn to the constitutional debate, passage, and judicial challenges to
the Line-Item Veto Act. My analysis further illustrates how members of the minority were able
to use Chadha, and now Bowsher, to argue against the constitutionality of a presidential line-
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item veto and the Court, even though a large majority was in favor of the legislation and
remained committed to the precedent they had set. Additionally, analysis of the Line-Item Veto
Act illustrates how even members of the majority believed they had dealt with all constitutional
issues in light of the previously set precedents, but to no avail.

CHAPTER 4
A CONTINUED PATH: CLINTON V. NEW YORK
As part of a promise made in the Republicans’ Contract with America, in 1996 Congress
attempted to bring the budget and deficit under control through the passage of the Line-item
Veto Act. The conference report filed in the House on March 21, 1996, defined the Act as an
amendment to the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 to authorize the President
to cancel in whole any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority, any item of new
direct spending, or any limited tax benefit signed into law, if the President: (1) determines
that such cancellation will reduce the Federal budget deficit and will not impair essential
Government functions or harm the national interest; and (2) notifies the Congress of any
such cancellation within five calendar days after enactment of the law providing such
amount, item, or benefit. Requires the President, in identifying cancellations, to consider
legislative histories and information referenced in law. (Summary: S.4 — 104th Congress
(1995-1996))
In short, the Act authorized the president to cancel spending from bills after enacting them into
law in certain situations, but only in three specific situations: “1) any dollar amount of
discretionary budget authority; 2) any item of new direct spending; or 3) any limited tax benefit”
(quoted in "Clinton v. New York" 1998, 436). The Act raised serious constitutional concerns as
a violation to the separation of powers and the Presentment Clause of the Constitution, allowing
the president to veto portions of a bill after it had passed through the House and Senate. But there
was also a real belief that the Act was constitutional by those who supported it, even when
considering the recent decisions in INS v. Chadha (1983) and Bowsher v. Synar (1986).
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Attempts to pass line-item veto legislation were nothing new, as many presidents and past
legislators had called for the authority. As President Clinton stated, “Starting with Ulysses S.
Grant, Presidents of both parties have sought the line item veto so they could eliminate waste in
the Federal Budget. Most recently, Presidents Reagan and Bush called for its passage, as did
many Members of Congress” (Clinton 1995c, 637). In 1985, President Ronald Reagan, in a letter
to Robert H. Dole (R, KS), expressed his support for efforts being made in Congress to pass lineitem veto legislation: “As the Senate considers S. 43, I wanted you to know and convey to your
colleagues my strong support for this initiative. As you know, I asked the Congress to pass this
legislation in my State of the Union Address on February 6th. I am pleased that under you
leadership the Senate is acting judiciously on this important matter” (Reagan 1985, 912). But not
everyone was optimistic about line-item veto legislation. During that same year, the Acting
Assistant Attorney General, Ralph Tarr expressed caution regarding the line-item veto:
It is not a satisfactory answer to this constitutional argument to respond that Congress
would have voluntarily imposed this limitation on itself and that Congress would be
aware when it adopted an appropriations bill that the President would be able to veto
individual parts of it. Congress made the same argument in the Chadha case with respect
to the President’s approval of legislative veto statutes, but the Supreme Court expressly
stated that it was not permissible to later by legislation the veto provisions of the
Constitution. (Tarr 1993, 30)
But that did not stop politicians from promoting the presidential tool. President Reagan’s
attorney general, Edwin Meese (1989), expressed his support for the authority in 1989, “As part
of the effort to restore a truly independent and energetic executive would come from giving the
President . . . the line item veto. This device would help restore the balance between the
appropriating functions of Congress and the budget proposing responsibility of the president”
(Meese 1989, 189).
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George H. W. Bush was also vocal in his calls for line-item veto authority, but from a
constitutional amendment rather than a piece of legislation. In 1990, Bush stated, “As President,
I repeat the call of many of my predecessors for the line-item veto, and today I am proposing an
amendment to the Constitution to accomplish this” (Bush 1990b, 912). Further, Bush believed
this was something that would benefit the nation as it was a power most States already afforded
their governors:
Amending our national charter is profoundly serious step, and I am fully aware of the
great responsibility involved in proposing such an action. My proposal, however, is
supported by ample precedent. Today, the Governors of 43 of the 50 States have lineitem veto authority, and for more than a century American Presidents have urged the
Congress to adopt this reform at the Federal Level. (Bush 1990a)
He also continued these remarks on the campaign trail in 1992, “I am for reforming Government.
I am with Newt Gingrich and Strom Thurmond because I want a balanced budget amendment to
the Constitution. I want a line-item veto. I want to give you, the people, a taxpayer check-off. So
we must compel the Congress to get this Federal deficit down” (Bush 1992, 2013).
In this chapter I illustrate how the precedent set in Chadha and furthered in Bowsher
continued into the late 1990s. In this instance, the Court once again upheld the precedent set and
further solidified the decision in Chadha. Second, I illustrate the strong role members of the
political minority in Congress played in using previous precedent to protect its institution. While
members of Congress may have been engaging in partisan politics with their opposition to the
legislation, they were still shaping their arguments in constitutional terms. Additionally, in the
fight against the line-item veto, it was Democratic members of Congress who were most
outspoken against handing over this authority to a president of the same party. I further explain
the strength of their constitutional deliberation and how while members of the majority believed
they had dealt with all of the constitutional issues in the legislation, those in the minority were
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still correct when it came to the Court’s interpretation of the law. Last, I discuss the judicial
proceedings and the role the Chadha decision played in the Court’s legal reasoning to strike
down the Line-Item Veto Act.
Congressional Debate over Line-Item Veto

Committee hearings and floor debates for the Line-Item Veto Act illustrate the struggle
that took place in Congress as to whether the legislation should not only should be passed but
whether it was constitutional as well. While attempts to pass line-item veto legislation date back
to the late 1800s, this chapter only focuses on the buildup to the passage of the Line-Item Veto
Act of 1996.29 Just as I illustrated in analysis of debates over legislative veto and GrammRudman in the 1980s, members of Congress who were in favor of the legislation, in many
instances, urged their fellow members to not become sidetracked with the constitutionality
because it was ultimately the Court’s role or it was not important enough to become tangled up
with. As Sen. Ernest Hollings argued during hearing before the Committee on the Budget:
Let me make it very clear what this bill is about and what it is not about. The line-item
veto is about eliminating wasteful spending. We are not talking here about some
highfalutin principle of Constitutional powers. I just don’t go along with the idea of
making a fetish out of legislative prerogatives. The issue here is not the separation of
powers; the issue is the sharing of responsibility and accountability. Right now, the
responsibility for budget cutting rests almost exclusively on Congress; I want to shift an
equal share of that responsibility to the executive branch. (Hollings 1994, 2)
However, in this situation there was also a real belief the Act would pass a constitutional test or
even there was no need to pass the legislation because the president already had line-item veto
authority. Members who were against the legislation did not shape their arguments in political
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For further discussion about the line-item veto and attempts to pass line-item veto legislation prior to 1996 see:
Carter and Schap (1990); Crovitz (1990); Dixon (1985); Edwards (1985); Fisher and Devins (1986).
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terms, but they used constitutional debate to signal their intentions to vote against the legislation
and bring about litigation if passed. Additionally, members against the Act consistently
referenced the Chadha (and Bowsher to a lesser degree) decisions as evidence of the
unconstitutionality of the legislation.
During a committee hearing before the Senate Committee on the Budget on October 5,
1994, members were presenting their line-item veto proposals. Senator William Bradley (D, NJ)
announced his reasons for supporting a line-item veto proposal:
I have not always supported the line-item veto, but to change our Nation, I have changed
my mind. Many times since I first ran for the Senate, I have thought through the
arguments and each time I came to the conclusion that the line-item veto would tilt the
balance of power farther toward the President than the delicate balance embodied in our
Constitution. But I also watched for 12 years as the deficit quintupled, shameless porkbarrel projects persisted in appropriations and tax bills, and our Presidents again and
again denied responsibility for the decisions that led to these devastating trends. In 1992,
I decided that it was time to change the rules. (Bradley 1994, 15)
Senator John McCain (R, AZ; 1994) also argued for the line-item veto because of problems
created by Congress, “given Congress’s predilection for pork barrel spending, omnibus spending
bills and continuing resolutions, it would seem only prudent and constitutional to provide the
President with functional veto power” (McCain 1994, 147). These statements point to the policy
side of the argument, which was the largest focus of the debate with many members ignoring the
constitutional problems and placing a focus on the policy side of things.
But this was not an uncommon sentiment throughout this period, as previously discussed
and explored in greater detail by Jasmine Farrier (2004, 2010). During the 1980s and 1990s,
members of Congress were increasingly willing to save themselves from making the difficult
decisions through attacking their own branch “as the symbol of an irresponsible federal
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government” (Farrier 2004, 215) when it came to the budget. Thus, those in favor of line item
veto legislation focused on policy goals rather than constitutional concerns.
Senator Arlen Specter (R, PA) took a different approach than most in the Senate, arguing
that the president already had the authority to issue line-item vetoes. As Sen. Specter argued
during the hearing, the president had this authority from “the key clause in the U.S. Constitution,
Article I, Section 7, Clause 3, which was copied from the Massachusetts Constitution and
duplicated in other State constitutions, under which the chief executive officers of those States
exercise the line-item veto” (Specter 1994, 25).30 This reading of the clause was in response to
the fact that Congress was now engaged in omnibus spending bills, while in the past, spending
bills were presented to the president as individual pieces of legislation. For example, spending
bills that granted money to different state projects would not have passed as a single piece of
legislation but as individual bills. Sen. Specter (1994) continued, arguing that the AntiFederalists also opposed this clause “precisely because it ‘made too strong a line-item veto in the
hands of the President’” (Specter 1994, 27). Senator Robert Kasten (R, WI; 1994) later agreed
with this line of thought.
But this argument was supported by others in and out of Congress. During questioning of
Louis Fisher (1994) of the Congressional Research Services, he argued there was no merit in
those who claimed the president had line-item veto authority already found in the Constitution
because many of these early suggestions from the Framers mirror something more like judicial
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Article 1, Section 7, Clause 3 of the Constitution states “Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the
Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment)
shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by
him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives,
according to the Rules and Limitation prescribed in the Case of a Bill.”
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review. Additionally, “In 1988, the Office of Legal Counsel of the Justice Department released a
54-page analysis that found no merit to the concept of an inherent item veto” (Fisher 1994, 66).
Further, President Bush also addressed this issue, stating that “Attorney General Barr, . . . ‘and
my trusted White House Counsel [C. Boyden Gray], backed up by legal opinions from most of
the legal scholars, feel that I do not have that line-item veto authority. And this opinion was
shared by the Attorney General in the previous administration’” (Fisher 1994, 66).
While the main purpose of the hearing was for line-item veto proposals, there were others
who expressed their concerns and objections to any type of legislation. Senator William Cohen
(D, MA) was troubled by the constitutional questions the line-item veto posed, and while he and
other members were committed to fixing the deficit, there were still “concerns about whether or
not the transfer of power associated with the line-item veto is something that we should really
encourage and support” (Cohen 1994, 42). Rep. David Skaggs (D, CO) also expressed his
concerns, especially in light of the Court’s decision in Chadha:
As the Supreme Court noted in its decision in I.N.S. versus Chadha, “explicit and
unambiguous provisions of the Constitution prescribe and define the respective functions
of the Congress and of the Executive in the legislative process.” The Court continues,
“These provisions of Article I are integral parts of the constitutional design for the
separation of powers.” (Skaggs 1994, 603-604)
But out of all who opposed the legislation, Sen. Byrd was the most vocal in his objections to any
type of line-item veto legislation.
Byrd (1994), quoting Madison, discussed the importance the framers placed on the power
of the purse and placed it with the people’s branch, “As Madison so eloquently explained, ‘This
power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with
which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people for obtaining a
redress of every grievance and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure’” (Byrd
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1994, 47). Just as Rep. Synar was concerned with the power shift in Gramm-Rudman-Hollings,
Sen. Byrd expressed the same concerns during committee hearings:
What it will do, however, and what it is meant to do, is that it will shift the power over
the purse from the legislative branch to the executive and thus destroy the delicate
balance crafted by the framers of our constitutional system over 200 years ago. I am
opposed to the item veto in all of its forms, and I shall at some length, explain why. (Byrd
1994, 163-164)
Additionally, Sen. Byrd was concerned with how Congress would take line item veto power
away from the president once given up because the president would have veto power over any
legislative attempts to end the authority. The only way he saw this happening was through a legal
challenge in the courts because a president would never sign legislation to give it back (Byrd
1994, 56).
The discussion over the constitutional flaws of the line-item veto continued during floor
debates. After a discussion of the Chadha ruling and the intention of the Framers, Rep. Skaggs
argued:
The line-item veto proposed in H.R. 2, by providing the President with the authority to
veto subsidiary parts of legislation, turns the framework defined in article I, section 7 on
its head. What the president might decide to eliminate is simply eliminated, unless the
Congress goes through an entire repetition of article I legislative process, including a two
thirds vote of both Houses. This would allow the President and a majority in only one
House of Congress to frustrate the will of the majority – an outcome that flies in the face
of the constitutional principle of majority rule. (Skaggs 1995a, 3794)
But as detailed earlier, not all members believed that Chadha was a controlling precedent when it
came to line-item veto legislation – with the small number of members believing the president
already had the authority without legislation and those who believed the limitations were enough
to pass the constitutional questions.
Sen. Byrd (1995a), referencing Chadha, explained that “in no way would” a line-item
veto “coincide with the ‘single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure,’
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contained in Article I” (Byrd 1995a, 8406). Senator Carl Levin (D, MI) argued that the Chadha
decision made it clear that Congress could not alter the steps set for in Article I, and Congress
could in no way change that through legislation, stating, “We did not have it before Chadha,
when the Supreme Court wrote that we cannot amend the Constitution by legislation. And we do
not have it after Chadha.” (Levin 1995a, 8421)
On January 24, 1995, the Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution, Federalism, and
Property Rights met in a hearing titled “The Line-Item Veto: A Constitutional Approach.” In
discussing how the rescission of funds would operate, Timothy E. Flanigan, a former employee
of the Office of Legal Counsel, noted:
S. 4, however, would go further by making the proposed rescission effective unless
Congress acts within a specified time. It should be noted that under the Supreme Court’s
decision in INS v. Chadha, Congress’ disapproval of a rescission must be accomplished
through legislation. In other words, Congress must create the bill rescinding that act
which is then to be presented to the President, and that, of course, can be vetoed by the
President and then overridden. (Flanigan 1995, 72)
Later, when asked directly if the legislation would comply with the bicameral requirements
under the Constitution and as set forth in the Chadha decision, Flanigan (1995) stated, “I think it
clearly does. As I mentioned in my testimony, as I read S. 4, it does nothing to alter either the
presentiment or bicameral requirements under the Constitution for the enactment of legislation”
(Flanigan 1995, 85)
Fisher (1995) concurred with Flanigan (1995) but argued there may still be some
problems with the legislation. Specifically, when it came to delegation of powers, Fisher stated:
Again, it is a balance of power. The existing rescission system puts on the President the
burden of getting approval of both Houses. The enhanced rescission would reverse that.
A President’s proposal to rescind money would automatically take effect within ‘x’
number of days unless Congress stops him, and they would have to stop him with a joint
resolution of disapproval. Of course, that would go to the President and he could veto
that, and now you are in a situation of a two-thirds. Or, putting it differently, on a balance
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of power the President’s decision would be final so long as he could have one-third plus 1
in one House to stop the override vote. So the proposal for enhanced rescission is a big
shift of power to the President to determine budget priorities, something that people
normally associate with Congress. So I don’t think it is a Chadha problem. I think it is a
delegation issue and one about the balance between the two branches, especially in the
spending power. (Fisher 1995, 85)
When pressed further, Fisher explained that under his assessment of the legislation, the line item
veto would be found to be constitutional under the Court’s reading of Chadha and the Court’s
interpretation of delegation of powers. However, he argued that Congress should be cautious
about whether they want to give up such powers to the president at the expense of their own
(Fisher 1995, 85-86).
A report from the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight released on January
29, 1995, argued that over time presidential authority to combat wasteful spending has been
limited and the Chadha decision helped restore some of the authority the president should be
authorized to carry out. In essence, the report argued that enhanced presidential authority was a
good thing, placing a check on Congress who could not be trusted to stop wasteful spending
itself, and “As Chief Executive, the President should have a great sense of accountability in
spending federal funds and resisting special tax benefits” (CRPT-104, Jan 29, 11).
Later, during floor debates in the House, Rep. John Spratt (D, SC), who ultimately voted
in favor of the Line-Item Veto Act, was concerned about the breadth of the legislation in light of
the decision in Bowsher, which he argued was a warning about being too broad in legislation
(Spratt 1995, 3462). Four days later, Rep. David Skaggs (D, CO) expressed different concerns
related to Chadha:
As the Supreme Court noted in its decision in I.N.S. versus Chadha, ‘Explicit and
unambiguous provisions of the Constitution prescribed and define the respective
functions of the Congress and the Executive in the legislative process.’ The Court
continues, ‘These provisions of Article 1 are integral parts of the constitutional design for
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the separation of powers.’ The line-item veto proposal in H.R. 2 would impermissibly
alter that ‘constitutional design for the separation of powers’ between the executive and
legislative branches by allowing the president singlehandedly to amend legislation which
Congress has already approved. (Skaggs 1995b, 3794)
Both of these statements clearly show the divide that was taking place, even among individuals
of the same party, with some using case law to improve the language and odds of the legislation
passing a constitutional test and others using the case law to argue against the legislation.
In a later hearing before the Senate Committee on Government Affairs, Sen. John Glenn
(D, OH) stated, “I believe we can craft a proposal that protects the balance of powers laid out in
the Constitution while still allowing the President greater latitude in eliminating unnecessary
spending” (Glenn 1995, 4). Sen. Peter Blute (R, MA) in reference to those raising concerns over
the constitutionality of the line-item veto argued:
I urge you not to get sidetracked with arguments about tilting the balance between
Congress and the President. Two hundred years ago, our Founders set up a system in
which the Congress would send to the President narrow bills on specific issues, and they
gave him a veto power so that he could insert himself into the debate. (Blute 1995, 10)
Sen. Blute added, many scholars and the American Law Foundation also believed the Act was
constitutional (Blute 1995, 26). Sen. Joe Lieberman (D, CT; 1995) offered some optimism in the
fact that this will be done through legislation and not a constitutional amendment, “So if there is
a problem as we go along, we can address it by statute” (Lieberman 1995, 23).
Still there were others who were less than comfortable with the constitutional challenges
the legislation would create. Sen. David Prior (D, AR) asserted:
The Constitution specifically gives the power of the purse to Congress. By allowing the
President to open up appropriations bills or possibly entitlement programs and use the
line item veto would certainly change the entire appropriations process and cause partisan
bickering that makes the last 2 months look calm. (Prior 1995, 6)
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In reference to the Chadha decisions, Sen. Carl Levin (D, MI) expressed his concerns about
passing line-item veto legislation:
The Supreme Court said that the presentment clause, as well as bicameral requirement,
President’s veto, and the Congress’ power to override a veto, were intended to erect
enduring checks on each branch and to protect the people from the improvident exercise
of power by mandating certain prescribed steps. To preserve those checks and maintain
the separation of powers, the carefully defined limits on the power of each branch must
not be eroded. Bottom line, we can’t give it away. We can’t give away our power by
statute if we wanted to. (Levin 1995b, 25-26)
These concerns were addressed in analysis of the Act completed by the American Law Division
of the Congressional Research Service that was also entered into the record. This report detailed
how the Court, over the course of the previous twenty years, had applied two different tests in
separation of powers cases: formalist and functional. As the report stated, “The formalist
approach emphasized the necessity to maintain three distinct branches of government through the
drawing of bright lines demarcating the three branches from each other determined by the
differences among legislating, executing, and adjudicating” (Killian 1994, 16-17). Whereas the
functional test allowed for left “a good deal of leeway” (Killian 1994, 17).
The problem that came from these two very different tests was that the Court did not
explain when they would apply which test. Specifically, on the same day as the Bowsher
decision, in which the Court applied the formalist test, the Court applied the functional test in a
separate separation of power case. In light of these concerns, the research concluded:
It seems, therefore, on the basis of textual analysis and precedent that it would be
constitutionally permissible for Congress to delegate to the President the power to reduce
or omit various items from appropriations acts under the terms set out in the draft bill.
The power to delegate encompasses the inclusion within delegations of presidential
power over appropriations and tax provisions. The standards contained in the draft appear
to fall within the unconfining scope of judicial precedents. And the delegation doctrine
permits the overturning of statutes by the recipients of the delegation. Only the issue of
the five-day period within which the President’s veto must be overridden presents an
unsettled question, but this matter seems amendable to a solution supportive of the bill.
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(Killian 1994, 41)
However, very little analysis was put into the Presentment Clause question, with the CRS
analysis arguing that the only troublesome issue regarding the Presentment Clause came from the
five-day period given to Congress to override a veto.
Publicly, President Clinton was also supportive of the line-item veto throughout this
entire period. Clinton was not focused on the constitutional questions the authority would raise,
but on the benefit it would bring in keeping the budget deficit under control. In March of 1995,
Clinton released a statement in support of the line-item veto, stating, “If the Members of
Congress from both parties are serious about cutting the deficit, give me this line-item veto, and I
will get started right away. This is one area where both parties can and should come together”
(Clinton 1995b, 446).
Despite the opposition’s best efforts, the Line-Item Veto Act passed the House with a
294-134 vote and in the Senate 69-29. In a signing statement, President Clinton explained:
This carefully defined authority is also a practical and principled means of serving the
constitutional balance of powers. The modern congressional practice of presenting the
President with omnibus legislation reduces the President's ability to play the role in
enacting laws that the Constitution intended. This new authority brings us closer to the
Founders' view of an effective executive role in the legislative process. The President will
be able to prevent the Congress from enacting special interest provisions under the cloak
of a 500- or 1,000-page bill. Special interest provisions that do not serve the national
interest will no longer escape proper scrutiny. (Clinton 1996)
Thus, President Clinton, as others before him (and as those who argued in favor of GRH
discussed in the previous chapter), believed, the functional purpose of the Act would outweigh
the constitutional issues that the legislation brought about.
After signing the Line-Item Veto Act into law, Clinton gave a lengthy public statement
expressing his pleasure to finally have the authority:
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We all know that this is needed because too often, as vital bills move through Congress,
they can become clogged with items that would never pass on their own. Presidents often
have not choice but to sign these bills because of their main purpose. This new law will
give the President the power to cancel specific spending items and specific tax loopholes
that benefit special interests.” (Clinton 1995a, 635)
But while taking questions, reporters raised concerns over the constitutionality of the legislation.
When asked if the Act “transcend[s] the Founding Fathers’ separation of powers and give[s] the
President too much power?” Clinton answered:
I don’t think so. We’ve worked hard to—we anticipate that it will be challenged. We’ve
worked hard to provide for a means for it to be resolved quickly. But this leaves ultimate
hands in the authority of the Congress. They can take all these separate issues back and
vote on them separately. And I think all of us believe that as long as that is done, that we
don’t violate the constitutional separation of powers doctrine. (Clinton 1995a, 636)
Clinton was further questioned about whether the power could or would be used to cut special
deals with members of Congress, meaning the president could bargain with select members of
Congress for the inclusion of particular items in a bill, and in response, the president would not
veto parts of a spending bill that would impact those particular members of Congress.
Essentially, this could allow for the president to hold members of Congress hostage. Clinton
responded that every power has the ability of being abused, but that is why the system has checks
and balances (Clinton 1995a, 636).
This section has highlighted the debates that took place in Congress and the White House
over the legislation, illustrating the important role constitutional deliberation played and, as will
be illustrated in the next section, the role it played in shaping the litigation. Further, it helps
demonstrate how members of Congress used past precedent to make their arguments against the
legislation and how it impacted those in favor of the Act. While the concerns were real, members
in favor of the Act believed they had carefully considered the judicial rulings and worked out
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legislation that would pass the test. The next section turns to litigation over the line-item veto
and its ultimate invalidation.
Line-Item Veto Act at the Judiciary
In the first judicial action brought against the Line-Item Veto Act, Senator Robert C.
Byrd and five31 other members of Congress filed suit in the D.C. Circuit Court thanks to Section
3 of the Act allowing for expedited judicial review by members of Congress or individuals that
were harmed by the enactment.32 This action was not surprising as Sen. Byrd had been
attempting to defeat line item veto legislation for over ten years.
As early as 1982 Sen. Byrd was vocal regarding the constitutional challenges line item
veto would create for both separation of powers and checks and balances, and his statements
mirror those made by Rep. Mike Synar (D, OK) in his attempt to invalidate GRH in Bowsher,
while also basing them on constitutional grounds rather than political ones. In a draft memo from
1985, Sen. Byrd argued:
The line item veto proposed by this bill would fundamentally alter the very checks and
balances which have preserved our liberties and protected our people from arbitrary
government for nearly two centuries. It is no coincidence that our government – the
oldest representative democracy in the world – is also the only one in which the
legislative branch is co-equal with the executive branch. (Byrd 1985a)
In a separate memo, Byrd went further, stating, “The history of our republic is one of constant
vigilance against the accumulation of power by the executive. To surrender that struggle now
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Sen. Byrd was joined in his suit by Sen. Mark O. Hatfield (R, OR), Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D, NY), Sen.
Carl Levin (D, MI), Cong. Henry A. Waxman (D, CA), Cong. David Skaggs (D, CO).
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Section 3(A) states, “Any Member of Congress or any individual adversely affected by part C of title X of the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 may bring an action, in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, for declaratory judgment and injunction relief on the ground that any provision
of this part violates the Constitution.” (Line Item Veto Act 1996)
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would be to forfeit the trust the citizens of our states placed in us when we were elected” (Byrd
1985b, 1).
At this early stage, Sen. Byrd was also making arguments against line-item veto in
connection to recent the decision in Chadha, stating:
I say to my friends who support the line item veto approach, that even if they agree with
the goal which this legislation attempts to accomplish, it should be achieved through
amending the Constitution, and not by way of legislation cast in the guise of simple rulemaking. That is what the Congress attempted to do in creating the legislative veto system,
and the Supreme Court told us in 1983, in the Chadha case, that we may not create a
legislative process which contravenes the Constitution of the United States. (Byrd 1985b,
15)
Later in a series of editorials published in local papers in 1989, Byrd argued:
In fact, the line-item veto would give a President powers never intended by the
Constitution or the Founding Fathers, making him the ‘Chief Legislator,’ as well as the
Chief Executive, thus crippling the checks-and-balances system that has proved itself
over the past two centuries. (Byrd 1989a)
And the constitutional arguments were not his only problem with the line-item veto, he was also
concerned about the ability of members to use it as a tool for blame avoidance, “The line item
veto would also lessen the responsibility of Congress. Congressmen could include all of their pet
local projects on appropriations bills and let the President take the blame for cutting them” (Byrd
1989b, 6). Sen. Byrd was consistent in his efforts against any line item veto, repeatedly arguing
this authority would upend the power of the purse so vital to the Framers of the Constitution.
In a draft version of a statement, Sen. Byrd discussed the constitutional importance of
protecting the power of the purse; “The control of the purse is the foundation of our
constitutional system of checks and balances of powers among the three departments of
government. The Framers were very careful to place that control over the purse in the hands of
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the legislative branch” (Byrd 1995b). Sen. Byrd continued by discussing the important nature of
these constitutional mechanisms:
[T]he survival of the American constitutional system, the foundation upon which the
superstructure of the republic rests, finds its firmest support in the continued preservation
of the delicate mechanism of checks and balances, separation of powers, and control of
the purse, solemnly instituted by the Founding Fathers. For over two hundred years, from
the beginning of the republic to this very hour, it has survived in unbroken continuity. We
received it from our fathers. Let us as surely hand it on to our sons and daughters. (Byrd
1995b)
These concerns about the imbalance the Act would place on the constitutional order would later
become the basis for his challenge in the courts.
Later, Sen. Byrd continued his attack on line-item veto. Again just as Rep. Synar had
previously done, Sen. Byrd made strong constitutional arguments against the legislation and the
effect it would have on the balance of power between the branches:
The senate is on the verge of making a colossal mistake, a mistake which we will come to
regret but with which we will have to live until January 1 of the year 2005, at the very
least. We are about to adopt a conference report which will upset the constitutional
system of checks and balances, a system which was handed down to us by the
Constitutional Framers 208 years ago, a system which has served the country well during
these two centuries, a system which our children and grandchildren are entitled to have
passed on to them as it was handed down to us. (Byrd 1996c, 1)
Just after the Act was passed, Sen. Byrd wrote, “In instituting such an enormous change in our
constitutional system, the members of the current Congress have demonstrated a reckless lack of
regard for both the intent of the Framers of the Constitution and for future generations” (Byrd
1996d). Later, after Sen. Byrd filed his suit, he wrote, “This lawsuit, which was filed in the U.S.
District Court, District of Columbia, is based on the simple principle that the plain words of the
Constitution mean what they say” (Byrd 1997a).
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In response to constituents who supported the Line-Item Veto Act, Sen. Byrd explained
his opposition, just as Rep. Synar had done in his letters to constituents in relation to his
challenge on Gramm-Rudman in Bowsher:
I am opposed to the line-item veto because I believe it would endanger our Constitutional
system of government, and because I think it could prove harmful to a state like West
Virginia. The line-item veto would vest in a single individual – the President – the power
to make or break virtually any federally funded project in any state, county, or
municipality in the nation. Roads, bridges, schools, post offices, flood control measures
in West Virginia – all could be subject to a line-item veto. (Byrd 1996a)
Additionally, to those who supported Byrd in his opposition to the Act, he argued, “Even a
cursory review of history should convince anyone that the shift of power necessarily extending
from a line-item veto would inevitably produce the kind of results our constitutional Framers
sought to overcome” (Byrd 1996b).
While attempting to get line-item veto ruled unconstitutional in the courts, Sen. Byrd also
introduced legislation aimed at repealing the Line-Item Veto Act. In a October 24, 1997, press
release, Byrd argued in support of his repeal legislation, stating, “In offering this legislation I am
attempting to restore the kind of government, with its separation of powers and checks and
balances, that the American people have enjoyed for over 200 years” (Byrd 1997b). He
continued, stating, “I am chagrined. I am puzzled. I am disappointed that members of Congress
would willingly give to any President this power. But that is what Congress did” (Byrd 1997b).
Whether Sen. Byrd was sincere in his approach to challenge the legislation or was simply
applying a technique he had learned from earlier examples, such as Bowsher, these arguments
translated to what was presented in his court documents. Additionally, only if a political ploy to
invoke the constitutional argument, law was shaping his arguments.
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Raines v. Byrd
In Sen. Byrd’s challenge, the District Court for the District of Columbia heard Byrd v.
Raines (956 F.Supp. 25, 1997), where Sen. Byrd along with three other senators and two
members of the House filed suit against the Act.33 The District Court first addressed the
Presentment Clause issue. Citing Bowsher, Judge Jackson argued that the Court does not
automatically look to invalidate legislation; however, the judiciary must take the Constitution
and the structure established by the Framers seriously. Judge Jackson asserted, again referencing
Bowsher, “‘The Framers recognized that, in the long term, structural protections against abuse of
power were critical to preserving liberty.’ . . . Accordingly, the Supreme Court has ‘not hesitated
to invalidate provisions of law which violate the separation of powers’” ("Byrd v. Raines" 1997,
33).
Judge Jackson continued, asserting that the Court must view the legislation in light of the
Chadha decision, stating:
“[T]he legislative steps outlined in Art. I are not empty formalities; they were designed to
assure that both Houses of Congress and the President participate in the exercise of
lawmaking authority.” . . . It is insufficient, therefore, for defendants to argue that,
notwithstanding the resemblance between a cancellation and a statutory repeal, the Act
should stand because the same result could be accomplished through clearly
constitutional means. Rather, “the purpose underlying the Presentment Clauses … must
guide resolution of the question whether a given procedure is constitutional.” ("Byrd v.
Raines" 1997, 34-35)
Further, as Judge Jackson argued, affording a president the authority to cancel provisions from a
bill that has been signed into law will inhibit both the House and the Senate from performing
their constitutional authority prescribed in Art. 1, § 7 of the Constitution.
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Joining Sen. Byrd in the suit, Senators Daniel Moynihan, Carl Levin, and Mark O. Hattfield, along with
Representatives David E. Skaggs and Henry A. Waxman.
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Judge Jackson also addressed separation of powers issues raised by the Act. Again
referencing Chadha, he stated:
The Constitution vests “all legislative powers” of the United States in Congress, U.S.
Const. art I, § 1, including the power to repeal. . . As Chadha made clear, there are formal
aspects of the legislative process that Congress may not alter. Just as Congress could not
delegate to one of its chambers the power to veto select provisions of law, it may not
assign that authority to the President. Before the question of a delegation’s excessiveness
ever arises, then, a court must be convinced that Congress did not attempt to alienate one
of its basic functions. ("Byrd v. Raines" 1997, 36)
And in conclusion, Judge Jackson again returned to Chadha for guidance, stating, “Cancellation
under the Act is simply not the same thing as impoundment, or any other suspension of a
statutory provision. Instead, cancellation is equivalent to repeal – and ‘repeal of statutes, no less
than enactment, must conform with Art. I.’” ("Byrd v. Raines" 1997, 36).
The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court in Raines v. Byrd (521 U.S. 811,
1997), with Appellees Robert C. Byrd arguing to uphold the District Court ruling and Appellants
Franklin D. Raines, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, arguing for the
Supreme Court to overturn the lower Court decision. The Appellants argued in their brief that
[T]he Act does not authorize the President to sign into law some provisions of an
appropriations bill while ‘returning’ other provisions to Congress. The President remains
subject to the constitutional obligation to approve or disapprove, in its entirety, an
appropriations bill presented to him by Congress. His cancellation authority under the
Act comes into existence only after an appropriations bill has been passed by both
Houses of Congress and approved, in toto, by the President. ("Brief for Franklin D.
Raines" 1997, 16)
The Appellants also brought in historical examples to support the constitutionality of the Act,
arguing, “The First Congress, for example, chose to fund the general operations of the federal
government through lump-sum appropriations acts that did not require that the full amount of the
appropriation be spent” ("Brief for Franklin D. Raines" 1997, 16-17).
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To get around the problems posed by the Chadha ruling, the Appellants argued the lineitem veto would not conflict with this ruling as it deals with the procedural practice of passing
legislation. Under the Act, legislation would still be passed through the constitutionally
prescribed process. This Act gets at the implementation of legislation that has already passed
through the legislative process, thus “the Act must be scrutinized under the standards governing
statutory grants of discretion to the Executive Branch in its administration of duly enacted laws”
("Brief for Franklin D. Raines" 1997, 37). Further, the legislation made a clarification between
different types of spending, with appropriations being labeled “discretionary” and “mandatory.”
With this, Congress and the president, when enacting legislation, are agreeing to which portions
can be cut after the fact by a line-item veto ("Brief for Franklin D. Raines" 1997, 37).
In contrast, Sen. Byrd and the Appellees continued the arguments they made during
congressional debates, committee hearings, and in the District Court proceedings. As the
Appellees’ brief stated:
The Act is an unconstitutional attempt to do indirectly what the text of Article I forbids.
The Act’s purpose, indicated by its title and repeatedly stated throughout its legislative
history, is to give the President the line item veto power that the Constitution denies him,
and that is exactly its effect. It authorizes the President to cancel items the instant after
signing a bill, conceivably in the same breath (and in no event more than five days later).
There is no practical difference between giving the President power to strike items at the
same time he signs a bill and giving him power to strike them immediately afterwards.
("Brief for Robert C. Byrd" 1997, 19)
Despite this strong argument, the Court ruled in favor of the Appellants, finding that Byrd and
his fellow members ultimately lacked standing to bring the case.
The majority opinion, drafted by Justice Rehnquist for the seven to two Court, steered
clear of referencing Bowsher on the standing issue, claiming that the members in this current
instance lacked a sufficient “personal stake” ("Raines v. Byrd" 1997, 830). While this was the
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end of Byrd’s attempt at striking down the Act, the City of New York and Snake River Potato
Growers, Inc. each filed a legal challenge against President Clinton’s use of line item veto.
A month after the Court rejected Byrd’s challenge, President Clinton, during a press
conference, discussed the issue and announced he would be using the authority for the first time,
“Last month the United States Supreme Court, on procedural grounds, rejected challenges to this
authority. Today, for the first time in the history of our country, the President will use the line
item veto to protect taxpayers and to ensure that national interests prevail over narrow interest”
(Clinton 1997, 1225). During this same press conference, Clinton was asked where line-item
veto authority is located in the Constitution, to which he responded:
Well, the power is given by legislation. The real question is, does the Constitution permit
or forbid the Congress to give the President this kind of power. I believe that since—if
you look at the fact that 43 States have this power for the Governor, and it has been
upheld in State after State after State, the provisions of most State constitutions are
similar to the provisions of the Federal Constitution in the general allocation of executive
authority and legislative authority. (Clinton 1997, 1227)
Despite confidence in its constitutionality, the Act was soon challenged again.
Clinton v. New York
While Byrd’s challenge failed, President “Clinton, to the surprise of some, did not
hesitate to exercise his cancellation power” (quoted in Craig 2004, 350). In Clinton v. New York
(1998), both the city of New York and the Snake River Potato Growers challenged President
Clinton’s use of the line-item veto less than two months after the Court rejected Byrd’s attempt
to have the Court invalidate the Act. The Appellants’ Brief (Clinton) argued:
The Line Item Veto Act is constitutional. Its title notwithstanding, the Act does not
authorize the President to sign into law some provisions of a tax or spending bill while
“returning” other provisions to Congress. The President remains subject to the
constitutional obligation to sign or return, in its entirety, a bill presented to him by
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Congress. His cancellation authority under the Act comes into existence only after a tax
or spending bill has been passed by both Houses of Congress and approved, in toto, by
the President. ("Brief for William J. Clinton" 1998, 15-16)
Additionally, the Appellants addressed the Chadha decision in a footnote, stating:
The district court’s reliance . . . on INS v. Chadha . . . , is misplaced. The petitioner for
review (plaintiff) in Chadha was himself the direct object of the contested government
action (a deportation order); he had already exhausted available administrative
procedures to prevent entry of that order; and the order was therefore final and subjected
him to immediate injury through removal from the country. Here, by contrast, the
appellees are not the object of the cancelled spending provision, and the entity that is –
the State of New York – is actively pursuing an administrative process that may afford it
(and appellees) complete relief, and that thus far has insulated it (and the appellees) from
any financial injury.” ("Brief for William J. Clinton" 1998, 22)
Thus, the Appellants continued the same line of reasoning as the majority in Congress, arguing
this legislation was different from legislative veto, and the groups bringing suit did not have the
same personal stake found in Chadha.
However, the Appellees did not see it this way. In the Brief for the City of New York, the
Appellees asserted:
The Act thus confers upon the President a discretionary power to repeal federal law. It is
therefore unconstitutional, for the repeal of a federal law, no less than its enactment, must
comply with Article I’s “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered procedure,”
specifically, bicameral passage and presentment to the President. INS v. Chadha. . . The
President’s cancellation of section 4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act is accordingly
void. ("Brief for Appellees City of New York, et al." 1998, 8-9)
Further, citing Bowsher, the brief argued, “‘[W]hen Congress legislates, when it makes binding
policy, it must follow the procedures prescribed in Article I’” (quoted in "Brief for Appellees
City of New York, et al." 1998, 33). This same sentiment was continued throughout the brief,
consistently pointing out how the decision in Chadha was clear, the passage and repeal of a law
must follow Article I, and there is no way to legislation around this short of passing a
constitutional amendment. The Snake River brief consisted of the same arguments, arguing that
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line-item veto “treats the steps prescribed by Article I as ‘empty formalities,’ contrary to
Chadha” ("Brief for Appellees Snake River Potato Growers, Inc. and Mike Cranney" 1998, 35).
Continuing with connections to Chadha, the Appellees argued that if the Act was treated
as a delegation of power to the executive branch, it would still fail under the previous precedent,
specifically that of intelligible principles. As the Court detailed in Chadha, when Congress
delegates authority, it must set out specific guidelines, which this Act still fails to accomplish. As
the brief states, “By contrast, the Members of Congress (and the President himself when he is
acting in his limited Article I role) are not subject to any constraint other than the Constitution
and their own best judgments of the nation's interests” ("Brief for Appellees Snake River Potato
Growers, Inc. and Mike Cranney" 1998, 45).
Additionally, there were a number of important amicus curiae briefs filed in the case. In
support of President Clinton, briefs were filed by: Rep. Dan Burton (R, IN), Gerald Solomon (R,
NY), and Rep. Porter Goss (R, FL); the U.S. Senate. In support of the Appellees, amicus briefs
were filed by the Bar of the City of New York; Marci Hamilton and David Schoenbrod (law
professors); Sen. Byrd, Sen. Moynihan, and Sen. Levin; Rep. Waxman, Rep. Skaggs, and Rep.
Louise M. Slaughter (D, NY).
All of the briefs filed in support of the Line-Item Veto Act follow similar logic, arguing
that the Line-Item Veto Act was different than anything Congress had attempted in the past and
should be upheld under a constitutional challenge. Representatives Burton, Solomon and Goss
did not make any reference to the Chadha decision or how this legislation is different from what
the Court asserted in that case, but they argued that upholding the lower court decision “freezes
into the constitutional firmament the allocation of these concurrent powers found in the
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, which was enacted at a time when the relations between the
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executive and legislative branches were particularly strained” ("Brief for Congressmen Dan
Burton, Gerald Solomon, and Porter Goss as Amicus Curiae" 1998, 7).
Likewise, the Senate Amicus brief argued that appropriations are never a mandate to the
president that he must spend all of the funds. Thus, this legislation allows the president to notify
when those funds will not be spent ("Brief of the United States Senate as Amicus Curiae" 1998,
1-2). Further, the Senate brief explained how the Chadha decision was now bearing on line-item
veto, arguing that “[t]he cancellation authority exercised in these cases does not give the
President lawmaking power contrary to Article I, for his sole authority under the Line Item Veto
Act remains to execute the laws in fulfillment of Congress’s deficit-reduction policy” ("Brief of
the United States Senate as Amicus Curiae" 1998, 2). In direct reference to Chadha, the Senate
argued that the cancelation is not a repeal of an act as detailed in Article I but is part of the
implementation authority afforded to the president.
However, those amicus briefs against the Line-Item Veto Act viewed things differently,
especially regarding the Chadha decision. The Bar Association of New York City argued that the
legislation was not only unconstitutional in itself, but also an attempt to reach an unconstitutional
end ("Brief for the Association of the Bar of New York as Amici Curiae" 1998, 1). In reference
to Chadha, the Brief argued, “The legislative steps outlined in Article I are not empty
formalities: they are commands which simultaneously require and limit the participation of both
houses of Congress and the President in lawmaking. As such, they may be altered only by the
constitutional amendment” ("Brief for the Association of the Bar of New York as Amici Curiae"
1998, 4). And in a final attempt to connect line-item veto to the unconstitutional legislative veto,
the brief asserted, “The power to repeal or amend existing law is indisputably a legislative
power, which the Constitution vests solely in the Congress. . . The Line Item Veto Act is an
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unprecedented attempt by Congress to alienate that basic legislative function” ("Brief for the
Association of the Bar of New York as Amici Curiae" 1998, 10).
In a second amicus brief in support of the Court invalidating the Act, Marci Hamilton and
David Schoenbrod, law professors who specialized in constitutional and policy prepositives on
legislative delegations, argued in reference to Chadha that “there is no question that the
Constitution assigns Congress, not the President, the power to enact, and therefore, repeal tax
and spending laws. . . Thus, the Act necessarily implicates the nondelegation doctrine” ("Brief
Amicus Curiae of Marci Hamilton and David Schoenbrod" 1998, 4). Additionally, in an
argument that was reminiscent of Rep. Synar in Bowsher, the brief argued against Congress
handing over one of its most important duties – that of making difficult policy choices, “If the
Court fails to invalidate those laws in which Congress abdicates its central constitutional role,
this Court will have deprived the people, the State, and the Congress of the guidance necessary to
bring legislative process within the constitutional fold” ("Brief Amicus Curiae of Marci
Hamilton and David Schoenbrod" 1998, 24).
The amicus from Representatives Waxman, Skaggs, and Slaughter discussed the
legislative nature of the line-item veto in some detail:
As this Court observed in Chadha, a governmental action is assessed for separation of
powers purposes ‘by the character of the … action it supplants.’ . . . Thus, because a
cancellation supplants a part of a law, and in turn can only be supplanted by a new
legislative act of Congress, passed under Article I, the cancellation power is legislative, in
contrast to the vast array of administrative decisions that can be replaced by other
administrative decisions made by officials of the executive branch under Article II.
("Brief for Representatives Henry A. Waxman, David E. Skaggs, and Louise M.
Slaughter as Amici Curiae" 1998, 26)
The brief filed by Senators Byrd, Poynihan and Levin routinely referenced from Chadha the
assertion that the Framers of the Constitution were clear about “a single, finely wrought and
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exhaustively considered, procedure” for the passage of legislation (see "Brief of Senators Robert
C. Byrd, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and Carl Levin as Amici Curiae" 1998). Additionally, in
citing Chadha, the brief argued, “[A]s this Court has made plain, ‘Amendment and repeal of
statutes, no less than enactment, must conform with Art. I’” ("Brief of Senators Robert C. Byrd,
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and Carl Levin as Amici Curiae" 1998, 28).
In the Supreme Court’s decision, Justice Stevens, writing for the six to three Court,
agreed with the arguments made by the Appellees. In the majority opinion, Justice Stevens
argued there were important differences between vetoing legislation before it is signed into law
and cancelling portions of a bill after it has been signed into law by the President. Thus, since the
Act allowed the executive to cancel portions of a bill after signed into law, it ran counter to
Article I, Sect. 7 of the Constitution. Referencing Chadha, Justice Stevens stated, “Familiar
historical materials provide abundant support for the conclusion that the power to enact statues
may only ‘be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedure’” ("Clinton v. New York" 1998, 439-440).
As the Court explained, the Act was limited in power by only allowing the “President the
power to ‘cancel in whole’ three types of provisions that have been signed into law: ‘(1) any
dollar amount of discretionary budget authority; (2) any item of new direct spending; or (3) any
limited tax benefit’” ("Clinton v. New York" 1998, 436). Additionally, there were precise
directions about how the veto would be used, while the cuts had to reduce the federal deficit and
not impact the function of government (see "Clinton v. New York" 1998, 436). However, in
reference to Chadha, “There is no provision in the Constitution that authorizes the President to
enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes. Both Article I and Article II assign responsibilities to the
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President that directly relate to the lawmaking process, but neither addresses the issue presented
by these cases” ("Clinton v. New York" 1998, 438).
In conclusion, Justice Stevens asserted, “If there is to be a new procedure in which the
President will play a different role in determining the final text of what may ‘become a law,’
such a change must come not by legislation but through the amendment procedures set forth in
Article V of the Constitution” ("Clinton v. New York" 1998, 449). This case clearly continued
the argument the Court had previously detailed to a great degree in Chadha and Bowsher: the
legislative can only be altered through the amendment process, not through legislation.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy reinforced Justice Stevens and echoed the
arguments made by the Chadha Court, stating:
A Nation cannot plunder its own treasury without putting its Constitution and its survival
in peril. The statue before us, then, is of first importance, for it seems undeniable the Act
will tend to restrain persistent excessive spending. Nevertheless, for the reasons given by
Justice Stevens in the opinion for the Court, the statute must be found invalid. Failure of
political will does not justify unconstitutional remedies. ("Clinton v. New York" 1998,
449)
Not only do these arguments mirror and rely heavily on the Chadha decision, they are also
similar to the claims made by members of Congress who were vocal against the passage of the
Act.
In dissent, Justice Breyer, with O’Connor and Scalia joining, argued that the Act was not
in violation of any specific clause of the Constitution or separation of powers. As Breyer
asserted, the authority of the line-item veto could have been afforded to the president as each
appropriation could have been given to the president in a separate bill. However, as the country
has grown and appropriations have increased, it is impossible for each appropriation to be
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separate. Second, this case rests on the definition of legislation, which is not clearly defined in
the constitution when it defines legislative authority. As Breyer concludes:
In sum, I recognize that the Act before us is novel. In a sense, it skirts a constitutional
edge. But that edge has to be do with means, not ends. The means chosen do not amount
literally to the enactment, repeal, or amendment of a law. Nor, for that matter, do they
amount literally to the “line item veto” that the Act’s title announces. . . The Constitution,
in my view, authorizes Congress and the President to try novel methods in this way.
("Clinton v. New York" 1998, 496-497)
Thus, Breyer took a similar stance to Justice White in Buckley and the dissenting justices in
Chadha and Bowsher. The Constitution should be viewed in current terms and in light of the
problems facing the nation; these attempts to fix the deficit should be allowed to move forward.
After the decision was announced and the Line-Item Veto Act was invalidated, Sen. Byrd
released a statement expressing his pleasure with the Court’s action. In his statement, Byrd
asserted, “Now that the Supreme Court has found the Line Item Veto Act to be unconstitutional,
it is my fervent hope that the Senate will come to a new understanding and appreciation of our
Constitution and the power of the purse as envisioned by the Framers” (Byrd 1998).
Discussion
The Line-Item Veto Act and Clinton v. New York again illustrate the role the Chadha
decision played in the legislative debate and the Court proceedings. Members of Congress,
primarily lead by Sen. Byrd, fought against the legislation in constitutional terms and pushed the
debate to the courts. Members of Congress who were against the Line-Item Veto Act continually
referenced previous Court cases and threatened suits to gain concessions on the legislation in the
hopes that the bill would be abandoned. Literature on judicialization details how political elites
work to place issues on the Court’s agenda to further or reinforce their policy making goals. But
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in this instance, there were political elites who were in the minority who sought to place issues
on the Court’s agenda to protect their institution, urging the Court to uphold the status quo.
I also illustrate the role constitutional deliberation plays in Congress and how political
elites use case law to impact policy making and work to place issues on the Court’s agenda.
From the constitutional deliberation in this instance, the decisions in Chadha and Bowsher
played a vital role in framing the discussion in Congress, before the Court, and in the opinion of
the Court. In Congress, Senator Byrd led the charge against the legislation, consistently
referencing Chadha. Others like Senators Cohen, Sen. Levin, and Rep. Skaggs also weighed in,
arguing that the Act was unconstitutional in light of the recent Court decision.
Additionally, Clinton ended a twenty-year judicial battle over congressional attempts to
delegate budgetary authority away from Congress. In Chadha, the Court invalidated the ability
of a minority of Congress from doing what constitutionally prescribed to the entire body. In
Bowsher, the Court invalidated the role of a government agency from having authority over
Congress and the executive branch in the budget process. Last, in Clinton, the Court invalidated
the ability of the executive branch from cancelling out budgetary provisions without the say of
Congress.
However, attempts to stop improper delegations were not as productive as the salience
and importance of the Court decisions would have you think. As I have discussed in previous
chapters, since Chadha Congress has continued to engage in legislative veto style authority and
since Bowsher Congress found ways to continue to delegate the deficit cutting mechanisms. But
when it comes to Clinton, the line-item veto remains unused after the decision, despite recent
claims by the Trump administration that it would like to revive it.
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The most important aspect of the analysis of the Line-Item Veto Act and its invalidation
in Clinton v. New York is continued adherence to the precedent set in Chadha and the
continuation of the path that was reinforced in Bowsher. However, this decision is potentially a
break from the path that the original drafter of the Chadha decision had in mind. As I have
previously argued, there is evidence that some on the Court were attempting to expand executive
authority in Chadha and Bowsher; however, the opposite happened in Clinton with the Court
invalidating an act of Congress that would have greatly expanded the authority of the President.
The issue with the existing scholarship is the focus on the political majority working to
enact the legislation in both steps of the process: getting new issues onto the Court’s agenda and
the decision making of the Court. Just as a minority in Congress and the executive branch
worked to have the Court invalidate legislation to protect the executive branch and members of
Congress have worked to get GRH invalidated to protect congressional authority, with line-item
veto a minority within Congress were vocal in its opposition to protect the important budgetary
authority of Congress. Thus, political elites do not always work to place issues on the Court’s
agenda to further or reinforce policy goals, but do so to protect their institutional authority.

CHAPTER 5
CRITICAL JUNCTURES, PATH DEPENDENCE AND THE CHADHA REGIME
Independently each of the three previous chapters has illustrated how political elites
move issues to the judiciary because of constitutional conflict and how political elites engage in
constitutional deliberation to effect policy outcomes and the behavior of the Court in structuralseparation of powers cases. In this concluding chapter I tie all of the previous case studies
together to discuss how Chadha (1) was a critical juncture that established a jurisprudential
regime and (2) created path dependent dynamics that were perpetuated by members of Congress
engaging in judicialization. Additionally, I discuss what the analysis illustrates: how new issues
are moved onto the Court’s agenda and the effects these decisions have on the Court and the
elected branches of government. To conclude, I discuss the shortcomings found in current
decision-making theories as they relate to separation of powers cases and the need to adopt a
theory that relates specifically to separation of powers issues.
Critical Juncture, Path Dependence and Judicialization
This study illustrates how Chadha was a critical juncture that created path dependent
dynamics in the Bowsher and Clinton decisions, which were perpetuated through political elites’
use of judicialization. More specifically, the path dependent dynamics came in the form of
members of Congress from the political minority (opponents of the legislation) using the Chadha
decision to argue against the passage of legislation. The conditions that led to the Chadha
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decision are important for understanding how the issue was accepted onto the Court’s agenda,
specifically the critical antecedent, permissive conditions, and productive conditions. This is
important to understand for a number of reasons. First, structural issues, like separation of
powers, were absent from the Court’s agenda between the 1940s and 1980s. During this absence,
separation of powers issues were resolved by the elected branches of government. It was this
lack of true conflict among the branches of government over separation of powers issues that
marks the critical antecedent. The permissive conditions that led to the Court placing the issue
back onto its agenda after a long absence were the increased use of the legislative veto coupled
with Justice White’s concurrence and dissent in Buckley and the debate that was taking place
over the constitutionality of legislative veto in the elected branches of government. Congress
was, to put it simply, its own worst enemy when considering this issue from a policy standpoint.
As the 1970s progressed, members of Congress increasingly inserted legislative veto provisions
into legislation. It was not just the number of provisions, but it was also the types of legislation
with which the veto was now associated.
As first introduced in Congress in the 1930s as a compromise between the legislative and
executive branches, legislative vetoes were to give Congress a check over the executive branch’s
authority to reorganize agencies. As the 1970s progressed, legislative veto language was making
its way into any type of legislation that allowed for agency rulemaking. Toward the late 1970s,
legislation was introduced on multiple occasions to give members of Congress legislative veto
authority over all agency rulemaking without having to place it into each piece of legislation.
This behavior increased after Justice White declared his acceptance for the authority as a check
on the growing bureaucracy. Coupled with the increased use of legislative veto and Justice
White’s opinion, the judiciary, in the late 1970s, was addressing the legislative veto for the first
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time. Figure 15 displays the Chadha critical juncture and the subsequent cases that furthered the
path dependent dynamics established in the Chadha ruling.

Figure 15: Chadha critical juncture and path dependence.

The decision in Chadha did little to alter congressional behavior as the decision was
aimed to do, but it did create a judicial precedent and threat that the Court might strike legislation
down which in turn gave opponents ammunition to argue against the legislation. The threat from
the Court also gave the constitutional issue more traction in congressional debate. There were
numerous cases in which the lower federal courts confronted issues related to the legislative
veto. In all instances, the courts took a narrow path in their decision making, issuing rulings that
only applied to the law and situation before them, noting the decision would not impact the
overall constitutionality of the legislative veto. Although at this early stage, the Supreme Court
was still refusing to take up the issue and in cases in which they had the opportunity were
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ignoring the issue, there was still that willingness by judges at the lower level to decide on the
veto, even if it was on narrow grounds.
Permissive conditions also came from the fact there was debate taking place over the
constitutionality of legislative veto in all three branches of government. The stance coming out
of the executive branch had been, for decades, that the legislative veto was unconstitutional, but
presidents (e.g., Carter and Reagan) leading up to its invalidation were taking a stronger stance
than they had during previous administrations. Additionally, as was illustrated through
congressional record and committee hearing transcripts, there were members who expressed their
concern over the constitutionality of legislative veto. However, as Alan Morrisson argues, no one
in Congress cared about the constitutionality of the legislative veto, they continued to use it
because they liked it (Morrisson Interview). But for the first time, there was debate among all
three branches of government as to the constitutionality of the congressional authority.
These events set the stage for the legislative veto being moved onto the Court’s agenda
and its invalidation, which marks the productive condition. The entire critical juncture process
and the subsequent path dependency are displayed in Figure 15. While the Court ruling did little
to stop Congress from acting, the decision had a long-standing impact on congressional behavior
through the empowerment of political minorities who were attempting to protect their institution
from further delegation of key constitutional powers. In Bowsher, a small number of political
elites used the Chadha decision to engage in judicialization and argue that Congress was
violating the legislative process in passing GRH. Although when challenged before the Court,
the justices invalidated GRH because it violated the Appointment Clause, the Court still relied
heavily on the Chadha decision in its legal reasoning. Later this behavior was reinforced in the
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Clinton decision, where once again, a political minority invoked the Chadha ruling to argue
against the passage of the line item veto.
As Morrison asserted, Bowsher and Clinton would not have happened without the
Chadha ruling, although he admits “it would be impossible to say for sure” (Morrison 2018).
And although the ruling in Chadha had very little impact on Congress’ ability to use legislative
veto style provisions, it had a significant impact on Congress, specifically for the political
minority. The analysis illustrates that in Bowsher (Chapter 3) and Clinton (Chapter 4) minority
members of Congress relied heavily on the Chadha precedent to make their arguments against
GRH and the Line-Item Veto Act.
This is important because judicialization research and, to some extent, path dependency
literature focus on the majority party’s attempts to place issues onto the judiciary’s agenda to
further validate their policy goals. In Bowsher and Clinton, although the minority coalition was
actively attempting to get the Court to accept the issue onto their agenda, the majority coalition
was willing to allow the minority to take these steps as they believed the policies would stand up
to the Court’s scrutiny. As Silverstein (2009) illustrates, this was an instance of the Court saying
no. This is important, but there is more to it that must be considered. It was also the Court saying
yes to a minority who was attempting to protect the institution from further delegation. While
this may have been for political and/or partisan goals, those who were working to invalidate the
legislation framed their reasoning in constitutional terms and judicial precedent.
Figure 16 and Figure 17 display the percentage of words spent debating Chadha and the
larger constitutional issue for GRH and the Line Item Veto.34 These data were collected through

34

Data for Figure 16 and Figure 17 were collected through committee hearing transcripts (found on Hein Online)
that were conducted in relation to GRH and the Line Item Veto Act. The conversations were coded if members
directly discussed the Chadha ruling or discussed broader constitutional issues related to the legislation in questions.
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analysis of the committee hearings conducted over GRH and the Line Item Veto Act. As
displayed in Figure 16, there was very little discussion that was directly related to the Chadha
ruling and more with GRH even though the Court did not fully follow the Chadha ruling in its
judicial reasoning.
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Figure 17: Percentage (of total words) of constitutional deliberation.
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However, as displayed in Figure 17, there was a larger percentage of time spent debating
the overall constitutionality of the legislation in both instances. While it looks as if Chadha was
not specifically being discussed, the constitutional debate was framed by the Chadha ruling. The
constitutional debate, while not directly citing Chadha, was based on the idea that the legislation
in question was, or was not, a direct violation of the legislation process found in the Constitution.
Thus, the debate was framed in legal terms as is expected from instances of juridification.
Further, the figures and analysis largely support Pickerill’s (2004) argument that
precedent that creates a threat to the constitutionality of legislation makes it more likely that
serious constitutional deliberation will occur in Congress and that precedent is likely to shape the
content of debate. Similar behavior was found in relation to separation of powers issues,
specifically the legislative veto. There are further connections to Pickerill’s findings in relation to
federalism. When it came to federalism issues the Court showed deference to Congress and
posed little threat to members ability to legislation. This led Congress to assume it had power
and legislate with little debate. The increase in the passage of legislative vetoes illustrates the
same point. As the Court continued to defer to Congress on the issue, members of Congress
increased the passage of veto provisions with little debate on the issue.
The case studies of Chadha, Bowsher, and Clinton also further illustrate occurrences of
judicial supremacy on particular issue areas. As Whittington asserts, “the American judiciary has
been able to win the authority to independently interpret the Constitution because recognizing
such an authority has been beneficial to others” (Whittington 2007, 27). Presidents have two
goals: “to advance [their] agenda and to maintain [their] political coalition” (Whittington 2007,
18). But the conflict created by separation of powers when it comes to the legislative veto, GRH,
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and the Line Item Veto Act put the president into a particularly difficult situation regarding
maintaining their coalition, as all three achieved bipartisan support in Congress.
When political actors are attempting to bring an issue under their control rather than have
the Courts settle the issue, framing is important. As seen with abortion, Reagan and conservative
politicians framed the issue as a political one rather than a legal one for the Courts to decide (see
Whittington 2007, 67). But when it comes to the separation of powers issues discussed in the
previous chapters, the issues were not framed politically. All parties involved – including
members of Congress, the president, and members of the executive branch – framed the issues as
legal ones that should be decided by the judiciary.
Thus, the type of conflict and the framing of the issue directly relate to why the Court
achieved supremacy over separation of powers issues. First, the conflict was not over the policy
goals, but the constitutionality of the legislation and was framed as a legal problem rather than a
political one. Second, because of the nature of the conflict and the policy goals of the legislation
in question, there was broad bipartisan support for the legislation and in public discourse even
the president spoke out in favor the legislation. However, there were political elites who pushed
the constitutional issue and asked for a judicial ruling to settle the matter once and for all. Those
who were in favor welcomed the judiciaries’ role in the determining the outcome as they
believed the judicial ruling would come out on their side.
Chadha Jurisprudential Regimes
Although the decisions in the three cases cannot be explained through the attitudinal
model, there are factors that relate to and point to political regimes, jurisprudential regimes, and
independent policy making. However, in the end, these theories fail to adequately explain
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judicial decision making in these separation of powers cases. And while these decision-making
theories fail to explain the Chadha ruling, the decision in Bowsher and Clinton can be explained
through jurisprudential regime theory. For political regimes, if we consider President Reagan a
reconstructive president, as discussed by Skowronek (2011), it takes time for regime forces to
take hold because of the appointment process to the judiciary (see Dahl 1957). However, when
considering President Nixon as a preemptive president and given the fact that he was able to
appoint four justices during his tenure in office, Nixon aided in establishing the Republican
regime set up by Reagan. During his presidency, Nixon appointed Warren Burger (1969), Harry
Blackmun (1970), Lewis Powell (1972), and William Rehnquist (1972). Thus, if these cases
were about executive authority, we would then expect these Republican appointed justices to
strike down these creative policy attempts by Congress in Chadha and Bowsher and then uphold
the line-item veto in Clinton. However, if the conservative justices in Clinton voted to strike
down the Line-Item Veto Act because the authority was given to President Clinton, this behavior
would support the attitudinal or partisan models of judicial decision making.
Additionally, in Chadha, Rehnquist ruled against the majority and voted to uphold the
legislative veto, a decision that goes against the expansion and protection of executive authority.
Then in Bowsher, Justice Blackmun ruled against striking down GRH. Many years later, in
Clinton, Rehnquist then ruled to strike down line-item veto, once again voting against the
expansion of executive power. Thus, there are inconsistencies in the behavior of the conservative
justices on the Court that run counter to what would be expected from regime politics.
As for independent policy making, while there are strong arguments these cases are
instances of independent policy making and they do fit into many of the theories that suggest
when independent policy making by the Court will take place, there is still one large problem –
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can a judicial decision be an act of independent policy making by the judiciary when political
elites were actively working to place the issue onto the Court’s agenda? As previously discussed,
Gillman (2008) suggests there are four situations in which the Court may be able to engage in
greater independent policy making from the dominate political regime: 1) less salient issues, 2)
lack of a concise voice to push the agenda, 3) functions of American political development that
allow for the judiciary to engage in greater independence, and 4) a sense of institutional duty that
is different from other political actors. These cases have aspects of all four of these conditions,
especially the first two, with the separation of powers issue being less salient to the general
public because it does not impact citizens’ daily lives. Additionally, it is evident there was a lack
of a concise voice as was illustrated with many different proposals being discussed up until the
final votes for GRH and the line item veto.
Furthermore, analysis suggests there was a sense of duty among the justices on the Court
when deciding these cases that is different from other political actors. While it is admittedly
difficult to truly understand if this is happening (because it is difficult to measure someone’s
sense of duty from Court memos and judicial opinions), the justices appear to have been very
concerned about the balance of power between the two branches of government and took great
care to not upset the delicate balance crafted by the Framers in the Constitution.
While there is strong evidence that illustrates how these three cases were instances of
independent policy making by the Court, political elites were actively attempting to place the
issue on the Court’s agenda and were willing to give the judiciary the final say. Despite
conditions that point to the Court acting in an independent way, it cannot be true independence if
this was the desired outcome for a small group of political elites. Additionally, even those in
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favor of the legislation were willing to let the Court decide the issue as they believed the
constitutional arguments were on their side.
Last is jurisprudential regimes, and while it fails to explain the outcome in Chadha, the
subsequent decisions in Bowsher and Clinton can be explained through this theory. Tables 3, 4
and 5 display the justices’ votes in the Chadha, Bowsher, and Clinton decisions, respectively,
along with their appointing president (party affiliation), and the justices’ individual MartinQuinn ideological scores.35 With the establishment of the Chadha regime, all but one justice in
the majority was appointed by a Republican president, but as the Martin-Quinn scores indicate,
this was an ideologically mixed coalition with four justices leaning liberal. The dissenting
coalition is mixed by partisanship, with Justice White being appointed by President Kennedy and
Rehnquist being appointed by Nixon. However, Justice White leaned conservative at this point in
his tenure on the Court.
What is of note are the changes in the behavior of justices. First, Justice Blackmun
moved from the majority in Chadha to the minority in Bowsher. In his dissenting opinion,
Blackmun argued that the parties lacked standing to bring their suit and that such an important
piece of legislation should not be invalidated because of the appointment process of one
individual (the Comptroller General). While he argued that the Chadha holding was still the
correct decision in that instance, the problems being addressed in Bowsher were not connected
and, thus, Chadha should not be a controlling principal in this instance. Blackmun’s position was
close to that of Justice White in his Chadha and Bowsher dissents.

35

Martin-Quinn Scores are ideological measurements that allow for ideological change in the justices’ positions
over time. The scale runs from 6 to -6, with 6 representing the most conservative a justice can be and -6 representing
the most liberal a justice can be. Thus, positive represents conservative and negative represents liberal. The closer a
justice is to the zero represents the closer that justice is to a moderate position (for further information see: Martin et
al. 2005a, 2005b; Martin and Quinn 2002).
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Table 2
Justices Votes in INS v Chadha (1983)

Justice

Majority
Appointing
President (Party)

Martin-Quinn
Score

Justice

Minority
Appointing
President (Party)

Martin-Quinn
Score

Marshall

Johnson (D)

-3.824

White

Kennedy (D)

0.815

Brennan

Eisenhower (R)

-2.821

Rehnquist

Nixon (R)

3.977

Stevens

Ford (R)

-0.571

Blackmun

Nixon (R)

-0.014

Powell

Nixon (R)

1.049

O'Connor

Reagan (R)

1.687

Burger

Nixon (R)

1.697

Table 3
Justices Votes in Bowsher v. Synar (1986)
Majority
Justice

Appointing
President (Party)

Marshall

Johnson (D)

Brennan
Stevens

Minority
Martin-Quinn
Score

Justice

Appointing
President (Party)

-4.192

Blackmun

Nixon (R)

Eisenhower (R)

-3.413

White

Kennedy (D)

Ford (R)

-0.614

Powell

Nixon (R)

0.803

O'Connor

Reagan (R)

1.38

Burger

Nixon (R)

2.114

Rehnquist

Nixon (R)

3.265

Martin-Quinn
Score
-0.907
1.204
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Table 4
Justices Votes in Clinton v. New York (1998)
Majority
Justice

Appointing
President (Party)

Stevens

Minority
Appointing
President
(Party)

Martin-Quinn
Score

Justice

Martin-Quinn
Score

Ford (R)

-3.329

Breyer

Clinton (D)

-0.745

Ginsburg

Clinton (D)

-0.927

O'Connor

Reagan (R)

0.964

Souter

H.W. Bush (R)

-0.586

Scalia

Reagan (R)

3.405

Kennedy

Reagan (R)

0.919

Rehnquist

Nixon (R)

1.855

Thomas

H.W. Bush (R)

3.779

Of these three cases, only three justices remained on the Court for all three decisions:
O’Connor, Rehnquist, and Stevens. Justice Stevens is the only one who remained consistent
throughout all three cases. Additionally, in Bowsher, Stevens drafted a concurrence, arguing that
the Court should rest its decision on the principles established in Chadha rather than the
Appointment Clause. Justice Rehnquist, dissented in Chadha, not because he did not agree that
the legislative veto was unconstitutional but because he did not believe the legislative veto clause
was severable from the rest of the legislation. In his dissent, Rehnquist argued that the decision
by the Court to sever the provision was essentially the Court passing legislation without the
approval of Congress or the president.
But in Bowsher, Rehnquist joined the majority opinion that, while it issued the ruling on
Appointment Clause grounds, still heavily relied on the judicial reasoning established in Chadha.
And in Clinton, Rehnquist once again joined the majority opinion that furthered the ruling in
Chadha. Justice O’Connor also moved, but in the opposite direction. O’Connor joined the
majority opinion in Chadha and Bowsher, but she joined Justice Breyer and Scalia in dissent in
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Clinton. Breyer and Scalia both dissented because under their understanding of the Line-Item
Veto Act, the president was not actually vetoing legislation as the name implied; it was
essentially an enhanced rescission. Because the president was simply acting on authority
Congress had already legally afforded to the office, the dissenting justices did not believe the
Chadha decision was binding precedent in Clinton.
Jurisprudential regimes are not strict guidelines that must be followed at all costs for the
regime to remain, and that is illustrated in the Chadha, Bowsher, and Clinton case studies.
Although the Court failed to rule in line with the Chadha decision in Bowsher, the justices in the
majority heavily relied on Justice Burger’s majority opinion from the Chadha decision in the
legal reasoning in Bowsher. Additionally, the one concurring opinion in Bowsher would have
decided the case in line with the Chadha ruling. Thus, the legal reasoning of the judges and
political elites outside of the Court based their arguments and legal reasoning on the ruling the
Court issued in the Chadha decision.
Implications
The central questions at the start of this research was how new issues are moved onto the
Court’s agenda after prolonged absence and what effects those decisions have had on the Court
and other political actors. I have illustrated new issues are moved onto the Court’s agenda
because of several factors working in unison to make the issue more salient for the Court. The
most important factor for the legislative veto was conflict and growing salience within the
government and the legal community. First, there was conflict between Congress and the
executive branch over the constitutionality of legislative veto. As members of Congress
increasingly attached legislative veto language to legislation, the executive branch became more
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forceful in its opposition to the congressional authority. There was also increased conflict on the
judiciary as lower federal courts were issuing narrow decisions in relation to the legislative veto
that if taken in the broad sense would have conflicted. Additionally, as conflict increased, so did
salience within the legal community, as more legal scholars were addressing and discussing the
issue in law review articles.
As for the effects, as have been previously discussed, the decision in Chadha established
a jurisprudential regime and gave members of Congress a judicial precedent they could use to
argue against further delegations of power. This perpetuated both path dependency and
judicialization to protect Congress. Members of Congress were attempting to engage in real
constitutional debate in light of the Chadha ruling, and while it was not taken as seriously when
it came to GRH, Republicans were very careful when drafting the Line-Item Veto Act to ensure
it did not violate the Court’s past precedent. But even then, the political majority got it wrong.
The Court was not willing to allow even the slightest deviation from the legislative process for a
number of reasons.
With the importance that comes from the Chadha decision and the impact it had on all
the branches of government and subsequent Supreme Court decisions, there is a greater need to
include more accurate coding for structural issues, specifically separation of powers in the
Supreme Court Database. To demote an issue area to the miscellaneous category or to have it
spread out across multiple categories is a disservice to judicial behavior when the issue area has a
profound impact on how the American political system operates.
The analysis also points to the unintended consequences of judicial review. Building on
the idea that the early Court rulings in Chadha and Bowsher were attempts to expand and protect
executive authority, the justices could not have expected that one day the precedent they had set
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would prevent expansion of executive authority by striking down the line-item veto.
Additionally, members in the political majority consistently believed that what they were doing
was constitutional, or at the very least did not care, and welcomed the Court’s role in deciding
the constitutionality of the legislation, directly giving the Court strong authority over important
policy areas.
For decision making, I have illustrated and argued that the dominant models fail to
explain the behavior and outcome in the Chadha decision. Building on Keck’s work that argued
the attitudinal and partisan models failed to explain the judicial behavior, so do political regimes
theory and independent policy making. That being said, there are still aspects of these theories
that are present, although muted compared to other issue areas. Because issues related to
separation of powers bring about questions free of partisan and ideological factors, a decisionmaking theory is needed that strictly focuses on separation of powers issues.
There are also limitations in the current study that should be addressed in future research.
First, legislative process and appointment clause structural issues are but two areas of separation
of powers cases during this period that shaped the political system throughout the 1990s and into
the 2000s. In future research I will extend this study to all separation of powers cases during this
period to analyze the impact of Chadha and the legislative debates. Additionally, in all three
instances the Court invalidated the congressional act, so it will be important to extend this study
to instances in which the Court upheld the congressional action to determine under what
conditions separation of powers was permissible.
Further, I will expand this research to analyze how this issue area impacted the federalist
revolution that began in the 1990s. As I have discussed, there was a belief by members of the
Court that structural issues and, more specifically, federalism questions were best resolved

194
through the political process. But the Court in the 1990s, through its decisions, began striking
down federal legislation to hand power back to the states. In future research I will analyze how
and to what extent the Chadha decision led to a return to structural questions that opened a
pathway for federalism cases to make their way onto the Court’s agenda.
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